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In the Lisbon Strategy, the Member States and the European Commission recognised that 
increasing innovation is a key to respond to the challenge offered by globalisation. When 
studying this innovation process, part of the literature understands the technological change 
process into three distinct phases: the invention process (whereby new ideas are conceived), 
the innovation process (whereby those new ideas are developed into marketable products or 
processes), and the diffusion process (whereby the new products spread across the potential 
market). The diffusion stage is where the impact of the technological change on the economy 
takes place and where it has to be evaluated.  
 
In such a context, public policies play an important role. Among such policies, the full 
implementation and enforcement of internal market rules, the Single Market Programme, is 
essential to reap the benefits and the innovation potential of the large European domestic 
market. The impact that IM regulations may have on the adoption of innovation is likely to be 
channelled through the role that the Internal Market (IM) regulations have on some 
macroeconomic dimensions. For example, the IM EU regulations are aimed at fostering the 
free movement of goods and people and at increasing competition and cooperation across 
member states. These dimensions, which we will call “transmission channels”, are those 
directly affected by the IM regulations which will have an impact on the diffusion and 
adoption of innovation.  
 
In particular, reinforcing cooperation or trade is expected to positively impact the possibility 
that blueprints or innovation spill over from firm to firm as well as from country to country. 
At the same time, recent empirical and theoretical literature argues how more competition 
and neck-to-neck market structure may incentivize innovation and therefore also affect 
positively the possibility of diffusion of new innovations and technology across countries.  
 
In this context, the main aim of the present study is to analyse the drivers of innovation 
adoption by developing proper measures able to proxy for innovation adoption and IM 
regulations, the identification of the channels through which innovation adoption takes place 
and the estimation of the main determinants of this adoption process in the IM. 
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More specifically, the aim of the study is fourfold: 
1)  Providing insights on the magnitude and nature of innovation diffusion at the EU level 
2)  Assessing the impact of IM on diffusion 
3)  Giving preliminary analysis of the impact of diffusion on productivity 
4)  Providing the reader with policy recommendations to foster innovation adoption. 
 
Using innovation survey to account for innovation diffusion 
 
The innovation surveys of the EU (Community Innovation Survey) provide us with three broad 
groups of measures: 
- Innovation inputs: R&D, other expenditures related to innovation such as acquisitions of patents and 
licenses, product design, training of personnel, trial production, and market analysis 
- Innovation outputs: introduction of new products or processes, organizational changes and market 
innovations  
- Modalities of innovation: sources of information, perceived strength of various appropriability 
mechanisms, and the cooperation in research and innovation. 
 
Main limitations are due to some statistical problems raised by the data: (i) answers concerning 
qualitative items can be subjective; (ii) quantitative items are not perfect (approximated); (iii) 
statistical secrecy limits sometimes the information precision. 
 
Definition of innovation diffusion/adoption. In the CIS survey, the definition of innovation covers 
both the creation and the adoption of innovation. We consider that innovation adoption occurs as soon 
as the interviewed firm declares that its process or product innovations have been developed “Mainly 
together with other enterprises or institutions” or “Mainly by other enterprises or institutions”. 
Therefore, our definition refers to innovation adoption and does not allow to address all the 
issues associated to the process of innovation diffusion. The magnitude of adoption is measured as 
the share of adopting firms among innovative firms. Innovative firms are those who innovate on 
product or process or both and who have ongoing or abandoned innovation activities. 
 
 
Data base building 
 
This research study is based mainly on two samples extracted from the CIS3 survey which concerns 
innovative activities carried out between 1998 and 2000. The micro dataset has been provided by 
EUROSTAT while the macro dataset have been downloaded from the EUROSTAT website. 
 
There are significant differences between these two databases in terms of the number of countries 
represented and the sectoral disaggregation level. In order to have the best country coverage, the final 
database was built from micro and macro data following the availability of information according to 
countries. The use of micro data has been preferred for the countries for which data were available in 
the two datasets. This choice is due to the fact that, using the macro dataset, we face a double counting 
problem in the construction of the indicators of innovation diffusion/adoption.   
Finally, the database contains 22 countries. The source is micro dataset for 15 of them. For the other 7 
countries, the risk of double counting is present because of the use of macro dataset. For this reason, 
macro data have been rescaled. Comparisons of the rates before and after the rescaling procedure 
allows us to check the robustness of the method and to see that a substantial part of the gap between 
after and before rates comes from the figures of financial sector. We decided thus to drop it from the 
calculation of the indicators. In conclusion, the database covers 22 countries and 6 sectors. 
 
Main statistics of innovation diffusion within the EU 
 
1.  39% of EU innovative firms relies on innovation adoption, whereas the remainder 
“generates″ internal innovation. However, this rate greatly varies according to countries 
and sectors [Figures 1 and 2]. 
 
At the country level, the maximum value of adoption is observed for the Netherlands with a 
rate of 61%, followed by Belgium with 51%. On the opposite, the minimum value is observed 
for Luxembourg with 18% which is particularly low if compared to other countries since all 
other values are between 27% and 44%.  
 
Generally speaking, countries with the highest level of innovative activities are also those 
exhibiting the highest rate of adoption. It seems that fostering innovation activities may also 
be associated with spillover effects leading to higher levels of diffusion and adoption of 
innovation. 
 
Innovation adoption is also far from being homogeneous across sectors ranging from 32% in 
Mining and quarrying and 62% in Electricity, gas and water supply. 
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Figure 1. Innovation and adoption rates by countries 
 
Note: The average adoption rate given on the graph (and on all the following 
graphs) is computed as an average of the country rates and not as a global rate 
computed from the country and industry database.  
 
Figure 2. Innovation and adoption rates by sectors 
 
 
2.  For all the countries, the adoption rate is higher for process innovation (41% on 
average) than for product innovation (28% on average). This contrasts with innovation rate 
which is more product oriented: 24 % of  EU firms make process innovations whereas 28% 
perform product innovations [Figures 3 and 4].  
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Such a result suggests that process innovations need interactions between the firm and its 
suppliers and/or clients to be successful. Moreover, process innovations are often the results 
of supplier or client needs. This would encourage cooperation or outsourcing strategies to 
develop this type of innovation. 
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3.  Cooperation activities are driving innovation adoption at the EU level while the 
acquisition of innovations from external innovators is a less important source of adoption 
of innovation (both process and product) [Figure 5]. 
 
The nature of innovation adoption can differ according to the way adoption occurs. In 
particular, adoption may result from adoption of external technologies but it also relies often 
on the joint production of innovation. This last pattern is more frequent than the first one. 
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4. The comparison between two waves of the CIS (1998-2000 and 2000-2004) shows that 
the average adoption rate increases between the two periods. 
 
This is mainly due to process adoption that increases by 4.2 points of %. On the opposite, 
the product adoption remains stable (slight decrease of 0.1 point of %). 
  
Moreover, it appears that the increase in adoption is not necessarily associated with a 
global increase in innovation. Process adoption growth does go together with an increase in 
process innovation (+6.3 points of %) whereas stability in product adoption is associated with 
a decrease in product innovation (-2.3 points of %).  
 
This increase in the adoption rate can be observed in most countries and for several sectors. 
Among other factors, the development of the Internal Market may at least partly explain 
this evolution. The econometric investigations made in Part III of this report assess the role 
played by the different determinants, and the specific role of IM. 
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Assessing the role of Internal Market on Innovation Diffusion: 
Econometric study 
From our literature review on innovation diffusion/adoption and based on a theoretical model 
of productivity, the causality among the variables we used for our empirical research on 
innovation diffusion goes as follows: 
        Internal Market reforms⇒Channels (Cooperation, Competition, Trade) ⇒Innovation diffusion 
In order to correctly disentangle the direct effect of the IM on the transmission channels 
(Cooperation, Competition and Trade) and the indirect one on the degree of innovation 
adoption we implemented a two-stage estimation procedure by using Instrumental Variables 
estimators. In a first stage we define the impact of some major IM regulations on cooperation 
and competition and trade across EU countries. The results of this first stage show how 
different IM regulations are important determinants of these three transmission channels. We 
observe that cooperation is, for instance, positively influenced by the IM proxies such as 
“regulatory and administrative opacity” which in turns are composed by sub-indicators 
referring to the degree of “communication and simplification procedures” and of the “licence 
and permit system” in each EU country examined. Also, human capital and trust are found to 
be drivers of cooperation across EU firms (both across countries and within the same country) 
pointing that regulations leading to easier communication are going to boost cooperative 
innovation.  
 
Competition is driven by several IM regulations. We show how those members that 
implement more EU directives in the specific areas of competition are also experiencing 
lower markup levels and therefore stronger competition. Similarly, the reduction of public 
aids and subsidies as well as the improvement of the administrative procedures (in order to 
open a business in particular) foster competition.  
 
Finally, trade flows are notably impacted by the regulations which improve its easiness of 
trade as well as by a reduction of the intrusiveness of national governments in policy 
areas such as price controls.   
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In a second stage, we address whether innovation adoption rates significantly depend on the 
degree of cooperation, trade and competition; the “transmission channels”. Some control 
variables have also been included in the econometric analysis: legal structure and IPR as well 
as sectoral and country dummies. Estimations have been computed using an econometric 
model whose dependent variable is total innovation adoption as well as its possible 
disaggregation into sub-categories (product/process innovation adoption, made in cooperation 
or in isolation i.e. by direct acquisition of external innovations). 
  
Results show that the impact of the transmission channels on innovation adoption is 
especially important for Cooperation, leaving Trade and Competition as apparently minor 
channels of innovation diffusion (and especially depending on the type of innovation adoption 
under examination). The overall result argues that more cooperation across firms and 
countries is going to be beneficial to the process of innovation adoption. Behind this 
result, however, lies a more interesting consideration to be done on the impact of IM 
regulations on the total innovation adoption share. In fact, for example, what we are 
measuring here is the indirect impact that IM regulations (those which foster and boost 
cooperation) are exerting on the level of total innovation adoption through the cooperation 
channel. 
 
Hence, some caveats should be stressed. Whereas Cooperation, and all the IM regulations 
which boost it
1, seems to be the main determinant of innovation adoption whatever the type 
of innovation diffusion, the effect of the other two channels (Trade and Competition) varies 
according to the type of innovation adoption (made in cooperation vs in isolation or 
concerning product vs process). 
 
In fact, the second channel which shows up to be statistically significant is that of 
competition
2. This is only significant when we specifically look at the product innovation 
adoption made in isolation (directly acquired by the an external firm). The coefficient is 
negative implying that more competition (lower markup) is going to foster more product 
                                                 
1 The IM regulations and other important factors affecting the Cooperation level across firms and countries are 
Trust, Communication and Simplification Procedures and Human capital. 
2 The IM regulation governing the first stage for competition are found to be: State control, Public Ownership, 
Sectoral and ad Hoc State Aid and other measures of Subsidies of the Govt. as well as the bureacratic quality of 
each member state. 
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innovation adoption on average. This result is consistent with empirical and theoretical 
models where neck-and-neck competition fosters innovation.  
 
Trade seems to be of minor importance in igniting innovation adoption. In fact it shows to 
be statistically significant only for product innovation adoption made in isolation but with a 
negative coefficient. This may be due to the specific way we built the innovation adoption 
indicators as a ratio of adoptive firms over the total innovative firms. Hence, trade may be 
working both on creation and adoption of innovation making difficult to disentangle its partial 
effect. 
 
Apart from these three macro-economic channels, micro-economic analyses have pointed out 
other determinants of innovation adoption: the innovative strategy of firms and especially, 
when they innovate, their choice to innovate on their own or to acquire external innovation. 
 
Different specifications have also been tried where we inserted a considerable number of 
control variables. In particular, we find that legal structure and protection of property 
rights, once we account for the transmission channels, reduces the speed by which 
innovation spills over across firms and countries. However, this result should be 
considered within a broader context where the legal structure and the protection of property 
rights (especially of IPRs) may lead to an increase in the innovative activity and so, to a 
potential increase in adoption, which is not captured directly by the regression analysis. 
 
The econometric results proposed in the report for a variety of variables are sometimes not 
statistically significant at conventional significance levels but still marginally significant. 
Hence, extra care should be used in the interpretation of these results even if, in many cases 
the coefficients seems to show the correct sign. Further analysis is indeed needed in order to 
get more robust estimates. This issue could be tackled by using more recent and complete 
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Empirical verification of the relationship between innovation 
adoption and productivity 
 
The study aims also at providing an empirical verification of the relationship between 
innovation adoption and productivity, by means of descriptive statistics. The productivity 
indicator we use is labour productivity from Eurostat, that is, gross value added per person 
employed. 
 
1.  The average productivity level is positively and significantly correlated with the 
innovation adoption rate, although showing a moderate correlation coefficient of 27.1%. 
This confirms from an empirical point of view the theoretical link between innovation 
adoption and productivity.  
 
However, we do not observe such a clear relationship for the countries with low levels of 
productivity. It seems therefore, that the adoption of innovation affects productivity in 
those countries that already experience high levels of productivity, probably due to the 




2. When considering separately product and process innovations we observe a statistically 
significant positive relationship (correlation coefficient of 31.3%) for product innovation 
adoption vs productivity, whereas the relationship between productivity and adoption of 
process innovations is not significant (correlation coefficient of 12.1%). 
 
3. The analysis at the sectoral level highlights that the only case where we observe a 
significant positive correlation between productivity and adoption rate is in the 
Manufacturing sector.  
 
                                                 
3 The standard technology catching up framework would suggest that countries far away from the technology 
frontier should be those more relying on innovation adoption. However, recent empirical literature (e.g. 
Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994 , 2005) shows that the catch-up of follower economies is not immediate but it only 
works when also these economies are endowed with specific (and minimum) absorptive capacities. When, 
instead, they lack these caractheristics, follower countries are shown to diverge. This rationale may explain our 
result in the correlation analysis between productivity and innovation diffusion. 
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In the other sectors, the correlation between productivity and innovation adoption is not 
significant. Therefore, we could think that an important part of the overall correlation 
obtained before may be due to the existence of national correlations between 
productivity and innovation adoption, which vanishes once we take into account different 
countries with different productivity levels and behaviours.  
 
With the information for all countries and sectors we also investigated the relationship 
between innovation adoption and productivity growth (for the years 2001-1004). Our results 
show a non-significant coefficient of correlation with a negative value of -2.5%, in contrast 
with the theoretical assumptions (which would instead point to a positive correlation between 
the growth in productivity and adoption rates). 
 
If we carefully review this result, two differentiated patterns seem to be observed according to 
the productivity growth rates of two different groups of countries. Those with growth rates 
above the average (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania and Hungary) present a low 
adoption of innovation (the exemption is Bulgaria, with a high rate of productivity growth and 
high innovation adoption levels). On the other hand, the rest of countries display productivity 
growth rates below the average but without a clear correlation with the level of innovation 
adoption, since some of those countries present innovation adoptions above the average 
(Spain, Italy, Austria, Finland, Norway and Belgium) whereas others are below the average 
(Sweden, France, Portugal, Romania, Germany and Luxembourg). Therefore, the global 
negative relationship is due to the existence of these two different patterns of productivity 
growth rates, whereas within each group such a negative relationship is not observed.  
 
Main conclusions and related policy recommendations 
 
Before summarizing the main conclusions and considering their implications for policy 
makers, it is important to recall that the results have been obtained through a statistical 
analysis which may suffer some limitations.  
1)  Our measure of diffusion focuses on adoption, and therefore does not allow us to 
cover the whole diffusion process.  
2)  The database used is of weak quality (due to double counting problems and missing 
observations). 
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 Therefore the policy recommendations should be considered with the due caution.  
 
1. The study stresses that the main determinant of innovation adoption is cooperation. The 
econometric study allowed us analysing what the drivers of cooperation are from an Internal 
Market point of view. In particular, a key role seems to be played by the level of trust among 
people within each country, by the improvement of communications and simplification 
procedures, as well as by high educational levels. Therefore, policies contributing to 
reinforce social trust within/across countries especially through “communication and 
simplification procedures” (within the broadest proxy for “regulatory and administrative 
opacity”) are likely to develop cooperation among firms and consequently to achieve higher 
levels of diffusion/adoption and increase in the efficiency of process innovation adoption. 
Strengthening Human Capital also appears as an efficient way to enhance cooperation 
and consequently innovation adoption. 
 
2. Along with cooperation, but to a much lesser extent, competition has been identified as 
another factor likely to affect product innovation adoption directly acquired by external 
firms (in isolation). As a result of the impact of competition on product innovation adoption, 
also productivity levels seem to be affected by differences in the competition level (product, 
rather than process innovation adoption is shown to impact productivity levels). Econometric 
estimates of the main drivers of competition show that competition is negatively affected by 
the level of public ownership within each country, by the level of transfer and subsidies, as 
well as by the administrative burdens. As a consequence, policies reducing unnecessary 
rents, administrative burdens and national government controls should be implemented 
at the EU level in order to achieve higher levels of competition and eventually higher 
shares of innovation adoption of and eventually productivity. 
 
3. The third determinant of innovation adoption which emerges as statistically significant in 
this study is the level of trade. Its negative impact on adoption seems rather small and limited 
to product innovation made in isolation. The result is however of difficult interpretation since 
this channel is probably affecting both innovation creation and adoption at the same time. 
Concerning the determinants of trade, we have shown that the higher the “price controls” and 
regulations within each country, the lower the level of trade. The composite index “Freedom 
to trade” (OECD) exerts on the contrary a positive impact on trade. Therefore, policies 
reducing price controls or the national government controls on the transport sector are 
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likely to foster international trade. This would however favor the “generation of 
innovation” more than the “adoption of innovation”  
 
   
4. As a result of the experience working with the CIS dataset in order to study the innovation 
diffusion process in the EU countries, we can offer some suggestions for future 
implementation of CIS data and questionnaires:  
 
•  It is important for policy makers to dispose of precise information about the 
diffusion/adoption of innovation. In spite of the important limitations of the CIS data 
in measuring diffusion and adoption, these data are still probably the most relevant 
tool that is available at the moment, and the only one likely to provide a general 
overview of these processes at the EU level. Some improvements in the survey may 
allow coping with the main limitations highlighted in this study. In particular, 
collecting more quantitative information about the way innovation is produced 
would be of great help in econometric and economic analysis. For instance, the shares 
(or the intensity) of innovation made in isolation, in cooperation or developed by 
others should be registered directly for each case. Moreover, the usefulness of the CIS 
data comes from the possible crossing of several items. Most of these crossing cannot 
be implemented using aggregated data available on Eurostat website while micro data 
are needed. Increasing the availability of data at the micro level (which for now is 
restricted to only few EU member states) would thus provide more tractable 
information and richer analysis of the adoption process and its determinants. 
 
•  A second suggestion would be that of trying to eliminate the subjectivity in some of 
the questions of the CIS questionnaire in order to be able to better define categories 
and quantify the answers. Some of the present questions, for instance, ask to define 
whether an innovation has been developed “mainly” by other firms of in collaboration. 
This subjectivity impedes to measure or consistently define the same processes across 
countries due to the possible biases related to the subjectivity of the answer. As 
suggested above, this subjectivity may be partly solved by asking the share of 
innovation that relies on each type of innovation and not as a result of the 
interpretation of the word “mainly”. 
 
  xiii 
•  In the present CIS questionnaire, the items allowing to deal with innovation 
adoption question, do not provide separated information about diffusion 
occuring within the country and across countries. A revision of this question may 
solve directly this problem. 
 
•  EUROSTAT should provide a technical annex on how the macro data provided in 
their web-site have been treated starting from the micro data. Aggregation issues 
and different methodologies may be in fact a problem for researchers which have to 
know, first, how the statistical office treated micro data in order to obtain macro ones.  
 
•  So far in CIS we know if a firm has made innovation or adoption but not the intensity 
of such processes. Therefore, a firm making some innovation but at a very small scale 
and a big firm making a lot of innovation are, at the moment, considered equally. Both 
of them would answer yes, and this is all the information given in CIS. We have 
information about the share of turnover due to innovation. But this is only available 
for product innovations. This can hardly be asked for process innovations or other 
types of innovation (organizational, marketing, etc). However a question (even 
qualitative) about the importance of innovation in the firm activity could be 
added. This question should be asked for each type of innovation (innovation made in 
isolation/ innovation made in collaboration / innovation made by others). 
 
•  Finally, in addition to these marginal changes, it may be useful to constitute a working 
group to suggest improvements of the CIS in order to better account for innovation 
diffusion. This working group might suggest for instance a set of items, in order to 


















The implementation and enforcement of internal market rules, the Single Market Programme, 
is likely to foster innovation adoption, and to reap the benefits and the innovation potential of 
the large European domestic market. In this context, the main aim of the present study is to 
analyze the drivers of innovation adoption by (i) developing proper measures able to proxy 
for innovation adoption and internal market regulations, (ii) identifying the channels through 
which innovation adoption takes place and (iii) assessing the main determinants of this 
adoption process within the internal market (IM). An original model is derived from the 
theoretical literature on innovation diffusion. This two stages framework relies on the 
following assumption: the impact that IM regulations may have on the adoption of innovation 
is likely to be channeled through the role that the Internal Market (IM) regulations have on 
some macroeconomic dimensions. Special attention is put on three specific channels: 
cooperation, competition and trade. Results show that the impact of the transmission channels 
on innovation adoption is especially important for Cooperation, leaving Trade and 
Competition as apparently minor channels of innovation diffusion (and especially depending 
on the type of innovation adoption under examination). The overall result argues that more 
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Introduction, objectives and outline of the report 
 
The “First Action Plan for Innovation in Europe”, launched by the European Commission in 
1996, clearly states that, in spite of its excellent scientific capabilities, Europe's level of 
innovation is lower than that of its main competitors. At a time when innovation is the main 
driving force in economic competitiveness (as asserted also by the tradition of economic 
growth models starting from Romer, 1986), this has serious implications for employment and 
economic prosperity in Europe. Innovation has therefore become a priority of European 
countries in order to start and sustain the engine of economic growth. 
 
In the Lisbon Strategy, the Member States and the European Commission recognised that 
increased innovation is a key to respond to the challenge offered by globalisation. Success in 
the global economy is determined by firms’ ability to give answer to changing views, needs 
and structures. Innovation is an opportunity that will enable Europe to create new markets and 
reinvent new ones. In such a context, public policies play an important role. Among such 
policies, the full implementation and enforcement of internal market rules, the Single Market 
Programme, is essential to reap the benefits and the innovation potential of the large 
European domestic market.  
 
The Single Market Programme, as set out in the Commission White Paper of 1985, 
constituted a very ambitious supply-side programme with the aim of removing physical, 
technical and fiscal non-tariff barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital and persons 
inside the Community. The elimination of these barriers by 1
st January 1993 aimed at creating 
a large integrated market for goods and services, allowing the realisation of economies of 
scale, and resulting in an increased competition in this internal market which would end up in 
efficiency gains. It was also aimed at providing increased incentives for European producers 
to invest in product and process innovations.  
 
Indeed, as a result of the progress made from 1992 to 2006 in achieving an enlarged Internal 
Market (IM) of 25 Member States, the GDP increased 2.2% and the gain in total employment 
was estimated of around a 1.4%, which amounts to 2.75 million jobs (Ilzkovitz et al, 2007). 
However, implementation of Single Market liberalisation measures are proceeding still 
nowadays, and in fact, these gains could have been substantially larger if services market had 
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been fully opened up to cross-border competition. In fact, certain measures have encountered 
problems such as technical barriers and public procurement. Policy instruments are not fully 
operational, barriers persist in certain sectors, and an internal market for knowledge is still 
missing.  
 
It seems therefore that the efforts made to increase innovation have not been enough, but at 
the same time economic literature identify innovation processes as one of the driving forces in 
economic competitiveness. When studying this innovation process, part of the literature has 
understand the technological change process into three distinct phases, that is to say, the 
invention process (whereby new ideas are conceived), the innovation process (whereby those 
new ideas are developed into marketable products or processes), and the diffusion process 
(whereby the new products spread across the potential market). The diffusion stage, although 
apparently the less important phase of the process of technological change (at least, it has 
received less attention within research agenda and policy-makers), is where the impact of this 
technological change on the economy takes place and where it has to be evaluated. Indeed, the 
contributions made by technology to economic growth and development are determined by 
the rate and manner by which innovations spread through relevant population. Without 
diffusion, innovation would have little social or economic impact, albeit diffusion is also an 
intrinsic part of the innovation process.  
 
In fact, for a long time in economic literature the major focus was on the process prior to the 
first attempt to commercialisation of a new idea (Fagerberg, 2006). It continues being an 
important issue but the importance given to access to external (to the firm, to the country) 
sources of knowledge and the view of knowledge as the outcome of learning processes 
implies the existence of knowledge flows. Knowledge flows include technology transfer and 
the flow of know-how, knowledge, and information, including both accidental spillovers and 
intentional transfers. There are many alternative routes for knowledge flows to materialize. 
They require a channel, such as for example an established collaborative link between two 
scientists from different firms, and a mechanism, that is a way in which communication can 
be achieved through the specific channel, such as co-operative research efforts, informal 
discussions, or the expressed ideas of a scientist. Such flows are not limited to the exchange 
of information between firms or institutions. As stated in David and Foray (1995) what 
characterizes and determines the performance of ‘different systems of learning in science and 
technology’ is not so much their ability to produce new knowledge as their ability to 
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disseminate it effectively and allow it to become economically valuable to third parties. This 
is why in the last years there has been a transfer of interest from steady structures and 
absolute measures of innovative activities (such as R&D expenditure and patents) to the 
different types of interactions among actors within and beyond the boundaries of a national 
system. 
 
Given the importance of innovation diffusion, it is of utmost importance to get to know its 
main determinants. According to previous literature (e.g. Hall and Khan, 2003), innovation 
diffusion results from a series of individual decisions to begin using the new technology, 
decisions which are the result of a comparison of benefits and costs of adopting the new 
invention (demand and supply-side perspectives).  
 
•  From the demand-side there are three main conditions for innovation diffusion: being 
aware of the new technology and being able to use and adapt the new technology 
(what is referred to in the literature as the absorptive capacity), and the profitability of 
adopting the new technology (depending on the price, on the expected returns, and on 
the level of risk). Therefore, from the demand side perspective, several factors are 
likely to affect these three conditions: user’s investments in human capital and R&D, 
user’s organizational innovation and size and market features, among the main ones. 
 
•  Based on the literature focusing on the supply-side factors we can identify two main 
drivers of innovation diffusion: Supplier’s R&D and innovation (the capability of 
firms to improve their technology, provide users with complementary products as well 
as to reduce the technology costs) and  supplier’s financial means (to be able to adapt 
the new technology and to inform potential users).  
 
Additionally, the institutional dimension is considered to be a highly important determinant of 
the adoption of innovation. Traditional economic and other regulations, such as competition 
and intellectual property rights protection, taxation, financing, education, national policies, 
EU-level policies and so forth can ease or block agents’ interaction. This is particularly 
important when exploring the question of the emergence of the European Research Area and a 
European system of innovation since there are important differences in the ways public sector 
institutions and research facilities supporting industrial innovation have been set up and 
operate in each country.  
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In the present project we will focus on the impact of some institutional factors on innovation 
diffusion. Mainly, we will analyse the role that the Internal Market (IM) may have on the 
diffusion of innovation, while controlling for some other determinants. 
 
With respect to the IM, product market integration would theoretically stimulate 
innovation and its diffusion. On the one hand, because the pressures of competition would 
stimulate innovation in firms in order not to be eliminated from a bigger market, retain their 
market positions and stay ahead of the competitors (Griffith et al, 2006). Also, because the 
creation of the IM would allow gaining scale economies, with fixed R&D costs distributed 
over a larger volume of production (Schmookler, 1966). And finally, because technology 
diffusion can be stimulated thanks to the increased FDI flows as a consequence of the 
functioning of the IM and because of a more intensified trade, among other reasons. However, 
despite these theoretical assumptions, there is practically no evidence on the effect of the 
IM on innovation diffusion.  
 
Therefore,  the main aim of the study is to analyse the drivers of innovation diffusion 
through the development of proper measures, the identification of channels through which 
innovation diffusion takes place and analysing the main determinants of this diffusion process 
in the European IM. In particular, we are interested in understanding the link between the 
strengthening of the IM and an improved innovative performance of the overall EU economy, 
with special emphasis on the role that the IM may have on the diffusion/adoption of 
innovation. Finally, we will analyse the effects of the innovation diffusion on growth. 
 
To accomplish its tasks, the study is divided into five parts, as follows: 
 
•  Part I: Literature review and analytical framework to study innovation adoption and 
diffusion 
•  Part II: Descriptive statistical analysis of the innovation diffusion/adoption process in 
the EU 
•  Part III: Regression analysis in the study of the innovation diffusion/adoption process 
•  Part IV: Analysis of the effects of the innovation diffusion/adoption on productivity 
growth 
•  Part V: Policy recommendations 
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These five parts are complemented by a series of appendices that give some extensions to the 
content included in each of them. 
 
Among the main novelties of this study we can stress the followings: 
 
•  In contrast to most empirical studies on innovation diffusion in which the determinants 
of the adoption of a specific technology is analysed, in this study we analyse the 
determinants of general innovation adoption process across countries and sectors 
in the European Union. Therefore, an initial important issue will be the definition 
and design of the variable(s) proxying such innovation diffusion/adoption 
process.   
•  A comprehensive descriptive analysis of innovation adoption exploiting the 
Commnunity Innovation Survey (CIS) data at the EU level (and not only a country 
case analysis) is done. This way we will be able to cover most EU countries with a 
sectoral disaggregation and a temporal comparison CIS3-CIS4. 
•  Although the main theoretical determinants of innovation adoption at the EU level are 
considered as explanatory variables in our analysis, our study focuses on the impact of 
some regulatory environment, specifically the impact of the Internal Market on the 
adoption of innovation. Our study considers therefore a wide spectrum of measures 
such as the ones covered by the functioning of the Internal Market and their impact on 
the rate of adoption of innovation.  
•  As a result of the project, we have used a comprehensive database for most EU 
countries in relation with the topic of innovation adoption as well as its main 
channels of impact (trade, cooperation and competition). In some cases, it has been 
necessary to homogeneize the information available from both micro and macro 
databases provided by the CIS.  
 







Literature review and analytical framework  
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I.1.  Review of theoretical and empirical studies 
 
Although it is widely usual in academic research to relate technological change with R&D 
investments or the generation of new technologies, needless to say that it is only when these 
new technologies are broadly introduced into the economy that their benefits will be realized. 
Thus, the diffusion stage of the technological change process becomes almost the foremost 
phase.  
 
According to Stoneman (1986) technological diffusion is the process by which innovations, 
be they new products, new processes or new management methods, spread within and across 
economies. Diffusion involves the initial adoption of a new technology by a firm (inter-firm 
diffusion) and the subsequent diffusion of the innovation within the firm (intra-firm 
diffusion), being the later the process by which the firm’s old technologies and facilities are 
replaced by new ones.
5 
 
Although these ideas are widely accepted, different theoretical approaches have been pursued 
to describe and give the rational behind the main characteristics of the diffusion process. This 
section will therefore review the main theoretical and empirical approaches to the diffusion 
phenomenon. Firstly, we will present some stylised facts in the process of diffusion of 
innovation, to focus later in the demand and the supply models and determinants.   
 
I.1.1. Stylised facts in the process of diffusion of innovation 
 
Technological change is often considered as the driven engine of the economy, which is 
divided into three differentiated stages, the well-known Schumpeterian trilogy (Schumpeter, 
1939):  
  the invention process (whereby new ideas are conceived);  
  the innovation process (whereby those new ideas are developed into marketable 
products or processes);  
                                                 
5 As it can be seen in the definition by Stoneman, diffusion and adoption of innovation are not exactly the same 
process, although both terms have sometimes been used in the literature interchangeably. However, strictly 
speaking adoption would refer to the initial adoption of a new technology from another firm. Therefore, in the 
review of the literature made in this Part I we will refer to the process of innovation diffusion, the widest term, 
which besides is the one more commonly used in the literature.  
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  and the diffusion process (whereby the new products spread across the potential 
market). 
 
This distinction is very important since, as it has been noted, every stage does not have the 
same impact on the economy. Thus, the diffusion stage, although apparently the less 
important phase of the process of technological change (at least, it has received less attention 
within research agenda and policy-makers), is where the impact of this technological change 
on the economy takes place and where it has to be evaluated, specifically where it has to be 
measured according to the change that exerts on the economy when a new technology has 
been introduced. Although many scholars have criticized the linear model that lies behind the 
division of innovative activity into three parts as oversimplified, it remains true that without 
invention, it would be difficult to have anything to diffuse, so the model serves us as an 
organizing principle, even if we need to be aware of its limitations (Hall, 2004). 
 
New technologies tend to take time for being adopted by those who seem most likely to 
benefit from their use. This slowness has been considered in the literature as a stylized fact 
about innovation diffusion: diffusion rates first rise and then fall over time, leading to a period 
of relatively rapid adoption sandwiched between an early period of slow take up and a late 
period of slow approach to satiation. This fact is known as the S-shaped curve of the rate on 
diffusion when it is plotted over time. 
 





















Apart from the widely spread notion of the S-curve, another commonality highlighted within 
academic research on innovation diffusion is the importance of both economic and social 
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factors. According to Hall and Khan (2003), diffusion results from a series of individual 
decisions to begin using the new technology, decisions which are the result of a comparison 
of benefits and costs of adopting the new invention. In their own words, “Diffusion can be 
seen as the cumulative or aggregate result of a series of individual calculations that weigh the 
incremental benefits of adopting a new technology against the costs of change, often in an 
environment characterized by uncertainty (as to the future evolution of the technology and its 
benefits) and by limited information (about both the benefits and costs and even about the 
very existence of the technology). Although the ultimate decision is made on the demand side, 
the benefits and costs can be influenced by decisions made by suppliers of the new 
technology. The resulting diffusion rate is then determined by summing over these individual 
decisions.” 
 
Taking into account these two stylized facts and regularities in technological diffusion, 
literature has been divided into demand- and supply-based studies. We will next review these 
theories. 
 
I.1.2.  Demand models: Demand-side determinants of the diffusion of 
innovation 
 
I.1.2.1. Theoretical and empirical evidence based on the demand models 
The so-called epidemic model states that what limits the diffusion is the lack of information 
available about the new technology, how to use it and what it does. Thus, this kind of model 
tries to answer why, if a new technology is a real improvement, some firms shift over to it 
more slowly than others. According to these models, consumers (or adopters) have equal 
tastes and the costs of acquiring new technology can be constant over time. But not all 
consumers are informed about the new technology at the same time. As time passes, more and 
more people adopt the technology, leading to an increasing rate of adoption. Eventually, the 
market becomes saturated and the rate decreases again, performing the S-shaped curve.  
 
In this point, the distinction made by Rogers (1995) could be useful. According to the author, 
two features characterize every new technology: software and hardware. The later is explicitly 
the new tool or machine that will be used in the production process or sold in the market, 
which embodies the technology as a material or physical object. In turn, the former is the 
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information to use it effectively, the knowledge base for the tool. Within this non-physical 
information, some could be transmitted through users’ manual, but some becomes tacit and 
transmitted only person to person. Without good software knowledge, many potential users 
will not adopt the new technology, even aware of its existence. To pass on software 
knowledge, potential users need to be able to communicate directly with current users who 
have accumulated experience, following a “worth-of-mouth” information diffusion process. 
This is the reason why new technologies are not transmitted instantaneously, including when 
their existence is known by potential users. Moreover, within this kind of diffusion model 
process, people who know the software grow gradually, until a maximum where it is difficult 
to find someone without this software knowledge. To sum up, what arises of this kind of 
model is that it assumes that the use of new technology is constrained by the number of 
people knowing the existence of the new technology. However, as time proceeds, the 
experience of users leads to the spreading of knowledge on the existence of the technology to 
non-users who, in turn, become users.  
 
Nevertheless, an important weakness arises from this kind of explanation of the diffusion 
process: it cannot explain the diffusion of an innovation from the date it is invented, but only 
from the date when some number of users used it. Thus, the epidemic diffusion can only 
begin when there exists a critical mass of users (Karshenas and Stoneman, 1995). 
 
Among the main works on innovation diffusion within the epidemic area, a starting point was 
the pioneer one by Griliches (1957), followed by those of Mansfield (1961), Bain (1962) and 
Bass (1969). All these papers performed empirical studies of the diffusion of specific 
technologies such as the diffusion of the hybrid corn seed in the Midwestern US (in the case 
of Griliches), 12 major innovations in the coal, iron and steel sectors (Mansfield), or the effect 
of the program independent television on the saturation level in each area (Bain). See 
Appendix I.1 for a review of their main contributions to the diffusion of innovation literature. 
 
According to the probit (or rank) and stock effects models it is necessary to consider 
differences in the goals, capabilities or actions of individual members of the population as 
being determinants of the diffusion of information. In this framework, the decision to adopt is 
a choice made by a particular individual (or firm), so differences between individuals (or 
firms) may play an important role in explaining patterns of diffusion. In these models, 
individuals differ in some characteristics, namely zi, which affect directly the profitability of 
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adopting the new technology, and the model generates, again, and S-shaped curve. Its precise 
shape (that is, the time of the diffusion process that will be generated by this model) will 
depend upon on how zi is distributed across the population, and on how zi changes over time. 
Hence, information in the economy is perfect and knowledge about the characteristics and 
profitability of the new technology is widespread. The differences in adoption timing happen 
because potential adopters differ from each other. The heterogeneity is therefore represented 
by the key characteristics that are assumed to be important in determining responsiveness to 
the technology. This approach is known as probit or rank because its empirical application 
makes use of probit models, and it ranks firms by their significant characteristics.  
 
As given in David (1969), suppose that the potential adopters of a technology differ according 
to some unspecified characteristic z that is distributed with a density function f(z) and a 
distribution function F(z) as in Figure I.2. At time t, a potential adopter i of a technology will 
be a user if his characteristic level zi is higher than z
*, where z
* is a critical level of the 
characteristic. The proportion of the population who have adopted by time t will then be the 
shaded area in Figure I.2.  
 
Thus, the key is to identify the relevant characteristics of the population. Among them, for 
instance, several scholars have suggested the firm size, the growth rate of industry demand, 
the age of existing capital equipment, the state of monopoly power in final product markets, 
the suppliers behaviour (since they are responsible for facilitating the flow of information 
about the new technology and for marketing it) and learning and search costs.  
 
Figure I.2. Probit models of diffusion 
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Among this type of models, the Bonus (1973) work on consumers durable is the best known, 
although important contributions were made by David (1969, 1991) and Davies (1979). One 
clear gain of these models is that they enable one to generate a long and fairly impressive list 
of firm’s specific determinants of diffusion speed, as it has been noted before. Moreover, the 
fact that they focus on individual decision making has helped to this bias in their use. 
Although this kind of papers are interesting to design the list of the main determinants of 
innovation diffusion from the demand side, the kind of empirical analysis performed in them 
can not be applied straightforward in our case since we will not work with individual 
decisions.  
 
According to Karshenas and Stoneman (1995), stock effects models modify the probit 
models by introducing the assumption that the benefits from adoption are not independent of 
the number of users of new technologies (Reinganum, 1983). This way, as the number of 
users of new technologies increases, the gross benefits of adoption declines. Among the most 
interesting contribution of these models we find those of Reinganum (1981a, 1981b, 1983) 
and Quirmbach (1986). 
 
I.1.2.2. Review of main determinants of innovation diffusion on the demand-side 
Basically, we could point out that there are three main conditions for innovation diffusion: 
-  being aware of the new technology, which is stressed by epidemic models 
-  being able to use and adapt the new technology, which refers basically to demand 
models, although is also related to the supply side as we will see afterwards 
-  profitability of adopting the new technology: depending on the price, on the 
expected returns, and on the level of risk. 
 
Therefore, from the demand side perspective, several factors are likely to affect the ability to 
be aware of the new technologies and the ability to use and adapt them (what is referred to in 
the literature as the absorptive capacity), as well as the expected returns of adoption: user’s 
investments in human capital and R&D, user’s organizational innovation and size and market 
features, among the main ones, as we analyse below in depth. 
 
User’s investments in human capital 
The investments made by users in human capital play a crucial part in their ability to adopt 
innovations. This human capital is often a condition to be aware of the new technology and to 
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be able to use it. Along with the specific institutional framework of each economy, the role 
played by human capital in the absorptive capacity of a firm or an economy is well 
documented. Nelson and Phelps (1966) argue, for example, how imitation and adoption imply 
an investment in human capital. Hence, the higher the human capital of a lagging economy, 
the faster will be its technological catch-up. Nelson and Phelps (1966) argue how "it is clear 
that the farmer with a relatively high level of education has tended to adopt productive 
innovations earlier than the farmer with relatively little education [...] for he is better able to 
discriminate between promising and unpromising ideas [...] The less educated farmer, for 
whom the information in technical journal means less, is prudent to delay the introduction of a 
new technique until he has concrete evidence of its profitability". 
 
This is to say that, for example, “reverse engineering” on which a considerable part of 
innovation diffusion relies, is more likely to be performed by engineers than by low skilled 
workers. Instead, it is the physical production of the "replicas", used for production of the 
final good, to be carried out by unskilled workers. A more formal discussion of this 
hypothesis can be found in the works of Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) or Basu and Weil 
(1998) where the adoption of very different technologies may imply an increasing difficulty 
for the follower. In particular, it is sometimes assumed how the technological frontier may not 
be immediately appropriate for the follower to be imitated due to the large technical 
differences between the leader and the recipient country. Human capital may facilitate the 
absorption of these distant technologies acting as an enhancing factor for the diffusion of 
innovation. 
 
User’s investments in R&D 
Similarly, investments in R&D made by users can help adapting the new technology. The 
change in the conception of knowledge points out the role of R&D as an absorptive capacity 
(Jovanovic and Rob, 1989): the firms’ own commitment in learning activities and the ability 
of firms to recognise and appreciate the value of new information, ranging from generic 
science to new production equipment, assimilate it, and exploit its economic potential through 
commercialisation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990). A firm’s absorptive capacity largely 
depends on the level of prior related knowledge owned by the firm. Also, the ability of a firm 
or an economy to use the results of research efforts made by other firms or other public and/or 
private research establishments depends on its ability to understand them and to assess their 
economic potential. 
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User’s organisational innovations 
Adoption of innovation often requires organisational innovation (example of ICT that requires 
organisational changes). Thus, the ability of users to make organisational changes may 
enhance their ability to use new technology, and therefore improve innovation diffusion. 
 
Moreover, the kind of organizational structure is an important determinant of how knowledge 
flows inter and intra-firms. Lane and Lubatkin (1998) or Lenox and King (2004) analyze, for 
example, how the organizational structure of a firm influence the internal communication 
processes therefore shaping its absorptive capacity. 
 
Size of the user’s firm 
Size may impact on the profitability of adoption. Indeed, it reduces the level of risk since it is 
distributed over a large number of products. It also reduces the financial constraint. User’s 
financial means are required to be able to adapt the new technology and to lower the critical 
level of profitability. Imitation and adaptation of leading-edge technologies imply a cost for 
the technological follower. This determines the extent of technology flows from a best-
practice technological frontier to the rest of firms or countries. The costliness of imitation is 
widely observed and acknowledged in theoretical and empirical literature. Maskus et al 
(2004), Mansfield et al (1981), Coe and Helpman (1995) or Behnabib and Spiegel (2005) 
point out how the cost of both the adaptation and imitation of technologies discovered at the 
frontier (or in other technological sectors) is usually positive but relatively lower than the cost 
of innovation. As argued by Maskus (2000), imitation usually takes the form of adaptations of 
existing technologies to new markets.  
 
Mansfield et al (1981) point out for instance how, over 48 different products in chemical, 
drug, electronics and machinery U.S. industries, the costs of imitation lied between 40% and 
90% of the costs of innovation. On the same line the empirical results of Teece (1977) 
estimated the cost of technology transfer across countries to be equal, on average, to 19% of 
total project expenditure. Therefore, the larger the firm, the higher the financial means 
devoted to the adaptation and imitation of technologies.  
 
Moreover, the size of the firm is usually regarded as an important factor shaping the 
absorptive capacity. A good deal of empirical evidence seems to show how larger firms are 
more likely to exploit their existing internal knowledge in order to diffuse knowledge 
  23 
internally and increase their productivity (i.e. Levinthal and March, 1993; Dougherty and 
Heller, 1994). The process of full exploitation of the intra-organizational knowledge of each 
firm is usually called “inward absorptive capacity” (i.e. Gambardella and Giarratana, 2004). 
Smaller (or start-up) firms, on the other hand, seem to rely on what is called “outward 
absorptive capacity”, that is, the use of knowledge produced outside their boundaries to rise 
productivity levels and to build their own knowledge stock. However, negative effects due to 
bureaucratic procedures in large firms may reduce the ability to absorb new technologies 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990).  
 
User’s market features 
The main characteristics of the market faced by potential users are also likely to influence 
their propensity to adopt new technologies. The literature review has pointed out the role 
played by the market share of the user (Hall and Khan, 2003). The larger the market share, the 
higher the incentives to adopt, because a large market share increases the ability to 
appropriate the returns from adoption. In addition to market share, the market dynamisms 
may also imply higher rates of adoption. In probit models, demand growth is stressed as a 
positive factor of innovation diffusion, because it increases the expected returns. 
 
Finally, based on epidemic models, we can state that the number of previous adopters on the 
market plays also a crucial part in innovation diffusion. The probability of being aware of one 
technology rises with the number of previous adopters. The information regarding how to use 
the new technology is also becoming more available, increasing the ability of potential users 
to adopt it. Moreover, the profitability may change along the diffusion path. Indeed, a high 
number of previous adopters may give rise to higher expected returns. This would be the case 
in particular if network externalities arise. Conversely, the risk of adoption decreases with the 
number of adopters.  
 
I.1.3.  Supply models and Technology characteristics: Supply-side 
determinants of the diffusion of innovation 
 
I.1.3.1. Theoretical and empirical evidence based on the supply models 
So far, we have focused on the influence of demand-side factors on technology adoption. 
Nevertheless, Rosenberg (1972) clearly argued that one of the reasons for the slow but 
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eventually complete diffusion of new technologies was their relatively poor performance in 
their initial incarnations. In other words, the behaviour of the suppliers of these new 
technologies, both in improving them and in lowering their cost over time, was essential in 
ensuring their eventual acceptance. Specifically, he argued, successful diffusion relies on the 
capability of suppliers to adapt their innovation to the different contexts in which it can be 
adopted and to provide a large scope of complementary products and services. According to 
this author, on the supply side there are several important factors for the diffusion of 
innovation, for instance, the improvements made to the technology after its introduction, 
the invention of new uses for the old technology, the development of complementary 
inputs such as user skills and other capital goods, and the like. 
 
Although in Rosenberg (1972) the author concentrated on certain supply side considerations, 
he recognized that alterations in relative factor and commodity prices also affect the rate of 
diffusion of new technologies. Since the diffusion process shows an apparent overall slowness 
and a wide variation in the rates of acceptance of different inventions, a better understanding 
of the timing of diffusion is possible by probing more deeply at the technological level itself. 
Even where it is possible to identify major inventions which seem to represent entirely new 
concepts and therefore genuine discontinuities, there are usually pervasive technological as 
well as economic forces at work which tend to slow down the impact of such inventions. 
Among others, Rosenberg (1972) points out the need for improvements in inventions after 
their first introduction, the development of technical skills among users and in machine-
making and the characteristics of the institutional context and the regulatory environment. In 
Appendix I.2 we review some of these forces in line with Rosenberg’s arguments in more 
detail. 
 
I.1.3.2. Review of main determinants of innovation diffusion on the supply-side 
Based on the literature focusing on the supply-side factors we can identify two main drivers 
of innovation diffusion: 
 
  Supplier’s R&D and innovation: New technologies are rarely commercialized in 
their very first version. They need to be improved and adapted to the specific needs of 
users. The capability of firms to improve their technology but also to provide users 
with complementary products is very important. Moreover, the price is often high at 
the first stage of innovation diffusion. In order to ensure a higher rate of diffusion, 
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suppliers have to perform innovation in order to reduce the costs. For these reasons, 
the R&D and innovative capacity of new technology suppliers is thus essential.  
  Supplier’s financial means: They are of course important to be able to adapt the new 
technology (to cover the R&D costs) as mentioned above. But financial means play 
also a role to inform potential users, for instance as in Tonks (1986) who puts the 
stress on the advertising costs. The edition of users’ guide may also generate important 
expenditures (in the aerospace industry for instance). 
 
As stressed by the epidemic models, these different factors stemming from supplier features 
(cost reduction, complementary products, etc) are facilitated by the number of adopters 
already present on the market. In other words, innovation diffusion may be driven by 
suppliers and users interaction, as reviewed next.  
 
I.1.4. Review of the literature and the main determinants of innovation 
adoption as a result of the interaction between supply and demand 
 
A more formal modelling of the determinants of innovation diffusion from a supply-side point 
of view concerns to the adaptation of epidemic and probit models literature into interactions 
between demand- and supply-side influences. Thus, albeit most modelling frameworks use 
demand-side factors alone to explain diffusion paths, any diffusion pattern must be the result 
of interactions between supply and demand factors. Specifically, some of the supply issues 
under consideration refer to (Baptista, 1999): 
 
  the nature of the cost function of suppliers and the way costs change over time. 
  the market structure in the capital goods supplying industry. 
  the way buyers (potential adopters) form their expectations about prices. 
 
As it has been mentioned above, within epidemic models literature, Glaister (1974) was one 
of the first who allowed an influence on diffusion of the cost of acquiring technology and 
advertising, although supply-side factors were included in an ad-hoc fashion. Gould (1970) 
and Tonks (1986) used these kinds of models taking into account certain supply-side 
consideration, albeit it was Metcalfe (1981) who constructed a complete epidemic model 
including supply-side influences.  
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As said before, David and Olsen (1984), or Ireland and Stoneman (1985, 1986) explicitly use 
heterogeneous models to address the issue of expectations in the diffusion process, which was 
originally raised in Rosenberg’s work concerning technology improvements. Thus, a 
technology that is expected to improve over time will tend to diffuse more slowly than one 
that is not. Concretely, Ireland and Stoneman (1985, 1986) concluded that, for a given number 
of suppliers, diffusion will be faster if buyers have perfect foresight rather than myopic 
expectations. 
 
Concerning to the relationships between different technologies, Stoneman and Kwon (1994) 
point out that the adoption of any technology will be affected not only by variables relating 
itself, but also by variables relating to other technologies. On the other hand, Ayres and 
Ezekoye (1991) show that competition between technologies for the establishment of a 
standard in the market is observed, but also the existence of complementarities between 
different technologies (for instance, the dependent relationship between computer 
communications demand and advanced telecommunications demand). 
 
An important result of this theoretical literature is that technology transfers do not happen 
spontaneously. The distinction made by Rogers (1995) on hardware and software indicates 
that some information is tacit, and requires interpersonal contact to be transmitted. Therefore, 
being aware of the technology and being able to adapt it requires effective contacts between 
suppliers and users. Interactions between users and suppliers are required for innovation 
diffusion to occur. These relationships support two distinct kinds of exchange between 
suppliers and users: 
 
  Exchanges of tangible assets: Innovation diffusion may rely on flows of products and 
services. Imitation, reverse engineering, technology transfers increase with the 
openness of the economy. For this reason, trade is an important driver of innovation 
diffusion. Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe et al. (1997) argue that international 
R&D spillovers are substantial and that trade is an important channel of such 
spillovers. Their effect on economic growth is also pointed out by Walz (1997). 
During the nineties, a great deal of empirical work has attempted to define the impact 
of foreign knowledge on domestic innovation and productivity. Markusen (1989), 
Verspagen (1997) and Keller (1999) analyzed initially the impact of trade (and in 
particular of the import of intermediates) on the diffusion of technology and 
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innovation within and across countries. Empirical studies such as Syrquin and 
Chenery (1989), Wei (1993) or Sachs and Warner (1995) provided a solid evidence of 
the positive impact of trade on technology diffusion and growth.  
 
A parallel strand of literature tried to shed some light on the specific mechanisms 
which act as channels of the international diffusion of technology. Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI) are generally considered as the main one. One can think in 
particular at the impact of multinational firms (through their subsidiaries) on their 
local suppliers (backward linkages), on the customers (forward linkages) or on the 
competing firms (horizontal linkages). Kokko (1992) identifies different channels 
through which technology may be possibly transferred from Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs) to other firms in the economy. These FDI channels rely, among others, on 
imitation effects, training effects or foreign linkages effects. Hence, an important 
question in the context of technology diffusion is under what conditions a firm would 
choose to service a foreign market through FDI activity.  
 
  Exchanges of intangible assets: Ideas are not freely accessible to everyone. They are 
instead, at least partly, embodied into people (Lucas, 1988). Therefore, the diffusion 
of tacit knowledge and their absorption would rely on effective interpersonal 
interactions. Studies exploring this issue consider two main kinds of interactions: 
the face to face relationship, on the one hand, and the human capital mobility, from 
one institution to another or over space, on the other hand. We detail them below. 
The more numerous opportunities of face to face contact can explain the highest 
labour productivity observed in large cities (Berliant et al, 2001; Charlot et 
Duranton, 2006). These interpersonal relationships would also explain knowledge 
spillovers from public research (Zucker et al, 1994). 
 
The role played by labour mobility has also been highlighted. Almeida and Kogut 
(1997) and Breschi and Lissoni (2003, 2006), for instance, indicate that the higher the 
mobility of scientists, the better knowledge diffuses. Much intelligence remains 
embodied tacitly in knowledge agents and is potentially mobile, as originally 
envisioned by Marshall. Once (potentially) mobile, agents are no longer simply 
knowledge agents employed in some organization; they are the “knowledge 
spillover agents” (KSAs) who are increasingly able to appropriate and profit from 
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at least some embodied knowledge through mobility. Audretsch and Keilbach 
(2003) express the incentive as follows: “When the lens is shifted away from the 
firm to the individual as the relevant unit of observation, ….the question becomes 
“How can economic agents with a given endowment of new knowledge best 
appropriate the returns from that knowledge?” They go on to argue that the most 
rational appropriation is the entrepreneurial route, i.e. spinoffs and startups 
originated by university scientists. Clearly, those who possess such talents and 
abilities are able to appropriate and capitalize on them to the benefit of themselves 
and often to their surrounding localities.  
 
Moreover, mobility needs not to be considered transitive among future employers, 
as mobility could indeed re-circulate KSAs among a sub-set of likely institutions. 
Indeed, Rallet and Torre (1999) argue that infrequent mobility of corporate 
researchers to other sites is often sufficient to transfer key tacit knowledge inputs 
at critical R&D stages. Impediments to elective mobility among European 
knowledge workers are far less frequently encountered in the U.S. Strong cultural 
and linguistic preferences are of course important factors that bind people to 
organizations and locations everywhere.  
 
Following these studies, more recent research suggests that, beyond direct relationships, the 
integration within networks is a key factor for knowledge diffusion. Empirical studies based 
on scientific or technological collaborations (Singh, 2005; Sorenson et al, 2006; Gomes-
Casseres et al, 2006; Autant-Bernard et al. 2007) confirm the impact of social proximity as a 
channel of knowledge diffusion. 
 
Therefore, whatever their nature, interactions between suppliers and users favour the 
exchanges of tangible and intangible assets that are at the root of innovation diffusion. In 
addition, three factors are likely to improve these interactions between supply and demand:  
 
  Information and Communication Technologies: They ease interpersonal 
relationship and they give a better access to information, thus facilitating awareness 
about the new technology. 
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  Market structure: Information and technology flows are favoured by vertical and 
horizontal integration. This latter increases effective contacts and the flows of both 
tangible and intangible assets. 
 
  Geographical concentration: the spatial organisation may be more or less favourable 
to innovation diffusion. The literature points that concentration facilitates for suppliers 
to adapt the technology to potential users (see Lundvall 1992). Spatial concentration 
also facilitates for users to be aware of the new technology, and reduce the risk –local 
trust.  
 
I.1.5. Regulatory environment determinants: Emphasizing the role of IPRs, 
integration and competition 
 
Another important issue regarding the main drivers of innovation diffusion refers to the 
regulatory environment. This dimension is introduced in some models of innovation diffusion 
(Baker 2001, Cutler and McClellan 1996 for instance), but it also refers to a literature that 
does not develop models of innovation diffusion. For instance, the regulatory environment 
and governmental institutions can have an impact on technology adoption and therefore 
diffusion via the ability of a government to sponsor a technology with network effects. 
Several empirical studies in the healthcare sector have stressed the role of regulation in this 
sector on diffusion. As highlighted by Baker (2001), providing reimbursement for the use of 
advanced and costly procedures, a generous insurance system often fosters adoption of new 
techniques and methods of treatment. Also, Cutler and McClellan (1996) found evidence of a 
positive effect of a generous insurance environment on adoption decisions. Specifically, they 
obtained that the insurance environment along with state regulations related to the use of new 
medical technology and the interactions between physicians and hospitals are the most 
important factors determining the use of an advance heart attack treatment procedure called 
angioplasty. Adoption and diffusion of innovation can also be impacted by other types of 
regulations, such as environmental regulations that may even prohibit or require the use of 
certain technology or production methods. For instance, Gray and Shadbegian (1998), using 
annual data from 1972 to 1990 obtain that firms respond to the policy environment they 
function in. They find that newer plants are more likely to use technologies  that  produce less  
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Table  I.1. Innovation diffusion models 
 Issues  Authors    Issues  Authors 
Demand side     Supply side     
Lack of information on new technologies 
slows the diffusion 
Rogers (1995)  Improvements in 
inventions after first 
introduction 
Capabilities of the supplies to adapt the 
innovation to the market  
Rosenberg (1972) 
Population of adopters is constant and 
homegenous 
    Upgrades of the innovations speed up the 
diffusion 
 
Population of adopters does not seek for 
information on new technologies (passive 
agentes) 
  Development of 
technical skills 
Development of skills in the users helps the 
diffusion (learning effects) 
 
Nature of technology is unchanged over time     Development  of  complementary  products 
increases the speed of diffusion among users 
 
        
Economic analysis of diffusion:  Griliches (1957)  Diffusion and 
institutional context 
Market structure study: Larger firms:   
Profitability for the users      Adopt more than small firms  Hall and Khan (2003) 
Innovation location      Have less financial constraint  Dorfman (1987) 
Use of a logistic diffusion curve      Are able to diversify the technology   
Empirical analysis: study of diffusion of 
hybrid corn 
    Enjoy economies of scale, imperfect capital 
markets 
 
     Downsides:   
Information constraint 
Word-of-Mouth diffusion 
Mansfield (1961)    Bureaucratic problems   Henderson and Clark (1990) 
Uncertainty about the profitability of the 
innovation slows its diffusion 
      
Slower initial learning as the cause of the S-
shaped diffusion curve 
    Regulation and institutions 
   Regulatory 
environment 
Government can sponsor a technology and 
create network effects 
Baker (2001) 
Other empirical studies:        Cutler and Mclellan (1996) 

















Empirical models of diffusion with analysis 
of the users' rate of acceptance 
Bass (1969)    Environmental issues may push to the adoption 
of specific a technology  
Gray and Shadbegian (1998) 
          
   Mixed model    
Differences across firms  and population 
(heterogeneity) play a role in the diffusion 
Bonus (1973)    Insert in demand side model some feature of 
supply side models: 
Glaister (1974) 
Analysis of the differences in profitability 
related to heterogeneity 
David (1969, 
1991) 
  Costs of adquiring technologies  Gould (1970) 






Firms size, age of equipment, growth rate, 
industry demand, monopoly power, suppliers 
behaviour, learning costs 
    Reciprocal influence across different 
technologies 
David and Olsen (1984) 
       Competition between technologies  Ireland and Stoneman (1985)  
 
pollution and that new plants in stricter regulatory environments are more likely to use 
technologies that produce less pollution. 
 
Though it is not integrated in the main stream literature of innovation diffusion, this approach 
is important to understand the mechanisms of innovation adoption, and especially when it 
comes to consider the role played by structural reforms such as the one associated to the 
Internal Market.  
 
The regulatory environment displays several factors likely to influence innovation diffusion. 
Firstly, the role played by normalisation and standardisation procedures can be stressed. 
Normalisation reduces uncertainty and creates network effects that increase the profitability of 
adoption (David, 1985 and David and Greenstein, 1990) showing that compatibility standards 
constitute a factor likely to favour innovation diffusion. Secondly, as pointed out in our 
literature review, the insurance system may also reduce the risk, at least for some sectors like 
medicines. Other drivers of innovation diffusion that can be of more interest from our 
perspective of analysing the role of Internal Market measures are those related to the 
competition environment in which firms operate as well as the integration level across the 
countries in which such firms work. Finally, considered as the main driver of innovation 
diffusion stemming from the regulatory environment we find certainly the IPR regime. 
Indeed, it has an impact (not always positive) on all the conditions of the innovation diffusion: 
it produces positive effects by improving awareness about the new technologies, it also gives 
incentives to suppliers to improve the technology or to develop complementary technologies; 
but on the opposite, it generates negative effects on the price, since royalties have to be paid. 
Therefore, its impact on innovation diffusion is not unidirectional. For this reason, we give 
more details below to better understand the specific effects of competition, integration and 
IPR regime on innovation diffusion.  
 
I.1.5.1. The role of IPR regimes 
Knowledge, technology and the outcomes of the innovative activity are typically non-
excludable and non-rival goods. The non-excludability implies that once a blueprint, a design, 
an idea or an organizational procedure is discovered it is very difficult (if not impossible in 
some cases) to prevent other economic agents to take advantage of the new discover and to 
appropriate (at least in part) some of its benefits. The non-rival issue means that once a new 
idea or blueprint has been created its benefits would be maximized if each economic agent 
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could access these “goods” at their marginal costs. Setting the price of a new technology 
equal to its marginal cost, however, would result in a severe damage to the incentives to 
innovate and therefore lead to a decrease of the innovative activity which, in many 
economies, represents the major engine of economic growth. 
 
From a general point of view, intellectual property rights (IPRs) are legal mechanisms 
designed to represent a barrier to the possibility of free riding and imitation of new ideas, 
blueprints or technologies by agents which did not incurred in the costs of producing these 
innovations. Maskus (2000) argues how "absent such rights, economically valuable 
information could be appropriated by competitive rivals". It is straightforward to understand, 
therefore, how IPRs are aimed at ensuring the innovator with an adequate monetary 
compensation for the investment in R&D.  
 
Hence, as pointed out by Maskus (2000) IPRs may encourage new business development by 
stimulating technology innovation and compensating innovators for incurring in the fixed 
costs of R&D. The artificial creation of a temporary monopoly power for the successful 
innovator compensate for the fixed costs incurred during the risky process of technology and 
knowledge creation (Maskus, 2000). Additionally, IPR may facilitate the creation of a market 
for ideas and mitigate disincentives to disclose and exchange knowledge which might 
otherwise remain secret (Merges and Nelson, 1994).  
 
However, strong IPRs will create market distortions through the creation of monopoly power 
for the innovator (see for example Deardorff, 1992). At the same time, IPRs work on the 
imitators side by prohibiting free imitation and, therefore, rising the relative costs of copying 
a new blueprint and inhibiting the flow of ideas and technology, and therefore the ability of 
researchers to cumulatively build on each other’s discoveries (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; 
Murray and Stern, 2005). 
 
Also, Gilbert and Newberry (1982) show how, granting sufficient monopoly power to the 
successful innovator, will allow the monopolists to delay the entry to the markets to possible 
competitors by “sleeping patents” long enough and impeding technology diffusion. Deardorff 
(1992) shows, also, how the returns of strengthening IPRs decrease as more and more 
countries apply the highest IPRs standards. This is because the extra market that can be 
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covered (as well as the extra innovation that can be stimulated) by the application of stronger 
IPRs is finite. 
 
Also, Rodrik (1994) argues how the enforcement of IPRs irrespective of the market structure 
of an economy (for example when an economy lacks a developed R&D sector) may end up 
shifting resources and welfare from the least developed countries (LDCs) to the industrialized 
and developed countries which perform innovation at the technological frontier. A similar 
reasoning can be done when looking at the relative costs of performing technology innovation 
and technology acquisition (imitation). 
 
All in all, ceteris paribus within the same economy, the enforcement of IPRs implies a trade-
off between the positive incentive given to the R&D sector and the negative effect coming 
from an increase in the cost of imitation. If, on the one hand, increasing the protection of IPRs 
theoretically ensures the innovator to be rewarded for its investment in R&D it is argued, on 
the other hand, how strengthening IPRs protection significantly rises the costs of imitation. 
Levin et al. (1988) and Gallini (1992), for instance, argue how "patents raise imitation costs 
by about forty percentage points for both major and typical new drugs, by about thirty 
percentage points for major new chemical products, and by twenty-five percentage points for 
typical chemical products”. Also, Helpman (1993) and Lai (1998), among others, link 
negatively the speed of imitation to the extent by which IPRs are enforced in the follower 
country. Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) and Lerner (2002), instead, find that domestic 
patent applications seem not to respond significantly to changes in patent policy.  
 
Branstetter et al (2004) assess empirically the impact of tighter IPR on the technology flows 
from the country undertaking FDI to the host country. The impact of IPR should then not be 
disconnected from the innovation-diffusion which relies on FDI, since it can impact on the 
local efforts on R&D, not only in local firms but also through FDI of transnational companies 
and relationships linking the agents of innovation system. Indeed, IPR, as well as 
interpersonal relationship and absorptive capacity affect diffusion both within and between 
countries.  
 
Finally, as pointed out by Barro (2000), "the economic effects of secure property rights and a 
well-functioning legal system are reasonably straightforward. Since people are, to a 
considerable degree, self-interested, they tend to undertake hard work and investments only if 
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they have a reasonable probability of enjoying the fruits of their efforts. Thus, if property 
rights are insecure - for example, because of high crime rates or high rates of taxation or high 
chances of government expropriation - people tend to work less and invest little". Recent 
empirical and theoretical works, therefore, point to the protection of property rights (and 
among of these of IPRs) as essentials for long-run economic growth. Acemoglu (2004), Barro 
(1998), Hall and Jones (1999), Knack and Keefer (1995), Aghion and Howitt (2005) are only 
some among the authors who claim property rights enforcement to be crucial for a country's 
economic performance.  
 
Table I.2. Effects of IPRs on economic growth and innovation diffusion 
    
Encourage new business development  Acemoglu (2004)  
Compensate fixed costs of R&D and 
incentivize innovation 
Barro (2000) 
Ensure FDI and increase trade flows  Hall and Jones (1999) 
  Knack and Keefer (1995) 
 Maskus  (2000) 








IPRs impact differently countries at different 
stages of their development 
Helpman (1993) 
  Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) 
  Aghion and Howitt (2005) 
  Connolly and Valderrama (2005) 
  
It can create distortions to the market  Deardorff (1991) 
It may inhibit technology diffusion in LDCs 
by distorting the incentives to imitation 
Helpman (1993), Lai (1998) 
  
It may shifts resources from profitable 
imitation to non-profitable innovation 
depending on the specific country 
characteristics 
Levin et al. (1988) 












Positive effect of IPRs found on economic 
growth (panel studies)  
Chen and Puttitanun (2005) 
  Rapp and Rozek (1990) 
  Gould and Gruben (1996) 
  






 Smith  (1999) 
 
On the other hand, Helpman (1993) suggests that tighter IPR can, under certain conditions, 
decrease global welfare. The analysis of the impact of IPRs on the growth and welfare of the 
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technological innovators and that of the imitators, has therefore provided ambiguous policy 
making insights. For a deeper insight on how IPRs’impact depend on the development of the 
country and the endowment of other factors see Appendix I.3. 
 
Despite the mixed arguments in the relationship between IPRs and innovation diffusion, it is 
common sense to think that the European Union would benefit from a faster diffusion of cost-
effective production technologies supported by better developed Internal Market for 
knowledge. If Europe is to become a region in which innovation and ideas can circulate 
without being impeded by national barriers, there is a clear need for harmonisation of 
European administrative and legal practices in the area of a common system of IPRs. 
However, at the same time a better balance between the need to provide incentives to 
innovators and the goal to encourage the diffusion of innovative technologies and business 
practices is needed. This implies to develop a transparent, inexpensive and uncomplicated 
IPRs system. Although this goes beyond the objective of this project, see Ilzkovitz et al 
(2007) for a review of the main aims that such a kind of system should pursue. 
 
I.1.5.2. The role of integration and competition 
From our perspective, other driver of innovation that is of utmost importance is the role 
played by economic integration across countries. Specifically, product market integration 
such as the Internal Market may have an impact on the incentives to innovate and to adapt 
innovation through different channels: 
 
•  Firstly, the creation of an Internal Market implies a greater market size which in turn 
increases profits and allows writing off the fixed R&D costs over a larger volume of 
production and sales (Schmookler, 1966). In  Arrow (1962)’s words “competition 
leads to more innovation, because competition means more production, and therefore 
more units to spread the fixed costs of innovation”. 
•  Secondly, the creation of a single market should lead to increased knowledge 
spillovers because of more intensified trade and investments. Indeed, the reduced 
barriers to cross-border flows of products and factors favours trade and investments 
across countries belonging to the same economic area so that innovation can be more 
easily transmitted and adapted. 
•  Thirdly, the integration of economies makes them a more attractive location to do 
business. By attracting inward FDI, integration would encourage the diffusion of new 
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technologies developed elsewhere. Therefore, the Internal Market stimulates 
technology transfer and diffusion via the increased FDI flows.  
•  Fourthly, a higher integration of the market implies a higher productive 
specialisation, so that the presence of MAR externalities
6 would lead to higher 
innovation diffusion. Following Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986, 1990) it is claimed 
that geographical agglomeration of industries produces knowledge externalities which 
can have positive effects on the rate of innovation (MAR-externalities) since 
agglomeration describes efficiency gains from the existence of technological 
spillovers due to the existence of a pool of specialized labour, the location of 
customers and suppliers, and physical and institutional infrastructures, and arise from 
the collocation of firms of the same industry. In the EU case, following Midelfart-
Knarvik et al (2004), the single market has led to specialised regions and an uneven 
distribution of manufacturing industries in Europe. Thus, allegedly, integration leads 
to specialization and, therefore, to more innovation. 
•  Internal Market can imply an increase in the standardisation of products and 
processes. The question which is not so clearly answered is whether setting internal 
EU standards promotes the diffusion and development of technologies or, on the 
contrary, by pre-empting competition among standards, slows down improvement of 
existing standards and the development of more efficient alternatives.  
•  In integrated economies, the mobility of labour is higher. Labour mobility is a source 
of knowledge spillovers, which are a diffusion mechanism of innovation (Crespi, 
2004). 
•  Finally, firms operating in a more integrated market are therefore exposed to higher 
competition, having stronger incentives to innovate in order to retain their market 
positions and stay ahead of the competitors (Aghion et al, 2005; Griffith et al, 2006). 
Since integration and competition go hand by hand, we go deeper in this last channel 
in the rest of this section.  
 
Within an integrated area, such as the Internal Market, competition is expected to increase due 
to the removal of non-tariff barriers which is targeted to creating a large integrated market for 
goods and services, allowing the realisation of economies of scale. Indeed, integration 
generally changes the conditions of competition by facilitating market entry by new firms and 
                                                 
6 Marshall-Arrow-Romer externalities  
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by reducing the ability of firms to segment national markets geographically. In the case of the 
European Internal Market, empirical evidence shows that on average, price-cost margins of 
the sectors most affected by the Single Market Programme declined (Ilzkovitz et al, 2007). 
European companies reacted to this decline in profit margins by reducing their costs and 
obtaining efficiency gains through an increased presence on the markets of other Member 
States (increased multinationality) and a concentration of activities on the core businesses of 
companies (reduced sectoral diversification). Additionally, the on-going process of 
liberalisation in the network industries, while taking account of the need to provide services 
of general economic interest, implies a stepwise opening up of the telecommunications, postal 
services, energy and transport sectors to competition. Also, the creation of the EMU has 
reinforced the integration and the competition effects of the Internal Market by reducing the 
costs of cross-border activities (elimination of the costs of managing multiple currencies and 
of exchange rate risks) and by increasing the transparency of prices. 
 
The consequent fiercer competition in integrated markets is expected to result in (allocative 
and productive) efficiency gains. This would stimulate innovation because the risks of being 
eliminated from the market are higher, providing increased incentives for producers in such 




According to economic literature, Porter (1990) argues that local competition encourages 
innovation by forcing firms to innovate or fail. In this view, for any given set of industrial 
clusters, competitive pressure enhances innovation and productivity. In Gilbert (2007)’s view, 
competition can promote innovation by reducing the value failing in R&D, but with no-
exclusive IPRs, competition can decrease innovation incentives by lowering post-innovation 
profits. Also, Aghion et al (2001, 2005) defends the existence of the “escape-the-competition” 
effect, where the market is indeed competitive. According to their arguments, competition 
                                                 
7  Although the theoretical reasons behind the argument that internal market implies higher innovation and 
innovation diffusion are several, the evidence suggests that the Internal Market in the EU does not seem to have 
been a sufficient catalyst for innovation and resource reallocation towards technology intensive activities despite 
the observed reduction in mark-ups and evidence pointing to a reorganisation of production activities. While the 
effect of the Internal Market on R&D and innovation has been positive, it has not been strong enough to 
significantly improve the innovation and productivity growth performance of the EU. The innovative 
performance of the EU as a whole and of most EU countries lags significantly behind that of top performers such 
as the US and Japan. European companies are not sufficiently encouraged to innovate and, in this respect, the 
Internal Market has been an insufficient driver of innovation. See Ilzkovitz et al (2007) for some explanation 
behind this result.  
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discourages laggard firms from innovating, whilst encourages neck-and-neck firms to 
innovate.  
 
With the emphasis on the impact of competition on innovation adoption, Reinganum (1981) 
stresses the double edge, that is, on the one hand, one might expect that competitive pressure 
accelerate the adoption of innovations in order to be more productive and achieve its own 
monopoly. But on the other hand, each firm will capture less of the post adoption of the 
innovation, and so may have less incentives to adopt.  
 
According to Geroski (2000) the  net effect of competition on the rate of diffusion is 
ambiguous. Not all of the statistical results point in the same direction, and most suggest that 
measures of competition like concentration ratios of counts of the number of firms in an 
industry experiencing diffusion are not all that important as a driver of diffusion. There is an 
extensive case study literature which suggests that incumbent firms are often very slow to 
adopt new technologies when entry barriers are high, and this suggests that it may be that it is 
competition from entrants or threats of entry which matters most in stimulating diffusion. 
“Initially competition is between the old technology and different variants of the new 
technology. When ‘‘the’’ new technology has been legitimized, competition is between the 
various firms who use the new technology to serve the market. In short, competition probably 
does speed diffusion rates, but the degree of competition felt by adopters and non-adopters at 
any time probably depends on the rate and extent of diffusion which has occurred up to that 
time”.  
 
Redmond (2004) also stresses that competition among firms frequently involves product 
innovation, and sometimes telecommunication technologies. This in turn would increase the 
telecommunication infrastructures of the society, which facilitates information flows, and 
therefore, the diffusion of innovations. Additionally, as Gruber (2000) stresses in a study 
analysing the diffusion of mobile telecommunications in Eastern Europe, the speed of 
diffusion increases with the number of firms. The argument behind this stresses that 
telecommunication technologies increases the potential subscribers that can be served, and the 
market potential therefore increases. The argument in such technological fields is the same as 
Redmond (2004), that is, more technological progress support the existence of firms in the 
market and their entry, then increase the market competition and therefore the speed of the 
diffusion of a certain technology. According to his results, competition has a positive impact 
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on diffusion. As the World Bank (1994) points out for the case of the telecommunication 
market, the entry of new firms is the single most powerful tool for encouraging 
telecommunications development because monopolies rarely meet all the demand. More 
competition, moreover, attracts capital, especially foreign capital, which carries a high degree 
of technological knowledge. Therefore, the results of his investigation provide support to the 
view that competition accelerates the diffusion of innovations. 
 
I.1.6. How innovation diffusion is formalised in empirical literature  
 
So far, we have reviewed the main theoretical and empirical literature on innovation 
diffusion/adoption so as to identify its main determinants. Now we turn to the analysis of how 
innovation diffusion has been formalised in such empirical literature. 
 
Innovation diffusion in the explanation of economic growth. Based on the paper in 1966 
by Nelson and Phelps, many empirical researchers afterwards tried to provide evidence on the 
certainty of their hypothesis to explain economic growth: while the growth of the technology 
frontier reflects the rate at which new discoveries are made, the growth of total factor 
productivity depends on the implementation/adaptation of these discoveries, and varies 
positively with the distance between the technology frontier and the level of current 
productivity. Applied to the diffusion of technology between countries, with the country 
leading in total factor productivity representing the technology frontier, this is a formalization 
of the catch-up hypothesis that was originally proposed by Gerschenkron (1962).  
 
Therefore, much empirical literature on innovation adoption has focused on its impact on 
productivity or productivity growth. In one set of papers, if R&D of firm j is positively 
correlated with TFP in firm i, all else equal, this is consistent with technology spillovers from 
firm j to firm i (e.g., Keller, 2002). A variant of this approach replaces TFP by the number of 
patents (e.g. Branstetter, 2001, and Peri, 2002) presents a hybrid approach by relating patents 
in region i to patents in other regions, where the latter is instrumented by R&D expenditures. 
 
According to Hall and Khan (2003) there are two alternatives to this basic approach, a 
generalization and a simplification. In the former, a particular channel of technology diffusion 
is added to the analysis. Coe and Helpman (1995), e.g., analyze the relationship between 
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productivity and foreign R&D conditional on imports from that foreign country, finding that 
R&D abroad benefits domestic productivity, possibly through the transfer of technological 
know-how via trade. Nadiri and Kim (1996) suggest that the importance of research spillovers 
across countries varies with the country: domestic research seems important in explaining 
productivity in the US but the contribution of foreign research is more important for countries 
like Italy or Canada. Additionally, the role of human capital in facilitating technology 
adoption is documented by Welch (1975), Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) and Foster and 
Rosenzweig (1995). Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), using cross-country data, conclude that 
technology spillovers flow from leaders to followers, and that the rate of the flow depends on 
levels of education. The other alternative to the international R&D spillover regressions, a 
simplified one, is to relate productivity not to foreign R&D, but to other measures of foreign 
activity: Aitken and Harrison (1999), for instance, study the correlation of inward FDI and 
domestic firm productivity (so-called FDI spillover regressions). 
 
Determinants of innovation diffusion. In contrast to the empirical literature on the analysis 
of the impact of innovation diffusion on economic growth, the literature analysing the 
determinants of innovation adoption at an empirical level is more micro than macro-oriented. 
As argued in Hall and Khan (2003), the review of the literature on adoption of new 
technologies has focused to a great extent on microeconomic determinants, in part because 
these have proved to be the most important in explaining the broad patterns of technology 
diffusion, especially within a single country or economic system. This is the reason why most 
empirical papers on the determinants on the adoption of innovation focus on a specific 
technology and analyse some specific determinants that can be behind the adoption of such 
technology. Although many of them have already been named in the sections above, we just 
review now a few of them to provide an idea of how they formalise innovation diffusion.  
 
In Hannan and McDowell (1984) for instance, using a failure time estimation procedure, it is 
found that market concentration, bank size, whether or not the bank is owned by a holding 
company, and market conditions like prevailing wage levels all significantly affected the 
adoption of Automated Teller Machine (ATM) by U.S. banks during the period 1971-1979. 
Through the estimation of a logistic model of diffusion, by Gruber and Verboven (2001), 
these authors explained variations in the rapid diffusion of mobile telecommunications in 
Europe using two factors: the market structure of mobile phone providers, and the 
improvements in mobile telephony technology achieved by the transition from analog to 
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digital technology. The impact of technological improvements was obtained to be the most 
important factor, but they also found that the concentration of mobile telephone suppliers was 
negatively correlated with consumer adoption of mobile phones providing support for the idea 
that competition increases adoption by lowering prices. Similar results were found in Parker 
and Röller (1997) for the diffusion of mobile telecommunications in the United States during 
the 1984 to 1988 period using also a logistic model of diffusion.  
 
However, of more interest for our project is to have an idea of how to formalise the study of 
the determinants of innovation adoption at a macroeconomic level, and specially to analyse 
the impact that the regulatory environment may have. In this respect, when looking across 
countries, other factors such as the level of economic development, geography, or culture may 
play an important role. For example, the relatively rapid diffusion of “wireless” or “trackless” 
technologies such as mobile telephony or air travel in developing countries may be largely 
attributable to their relatively late development and to geographical constraints that increase 
the cost of physical networks. 
 
As for the regulatory environment and governmental institutions, as surveyed above, it can 
have an effect on technology adoption, although at an empirical level, the impact has been 
studied for specific regulations and for specific technologies. In many cases, the impact goes 
via the ability of a government to “sponsor” a technology with network effects. The exact 
effects observed will depend partly on the particular price-setting mechanisms chosen by the 
regulator. For instance, several empirical studies in the healthcare sector have highlighted the 
role of regulation in this sector on diffusion. Baker (2001) studied the effects of the provision 
of health insurance on the adoption of new medical procedures with information for American 
hospitals in the period 1983-93. He argues that by providing reimbursement for the use of 
advanced and costly procedures, a generous insurance system often fosters adoption of new 
techniques and methods of treatment.  
 
Adoption of new technology is impacted not only by regulations about market structure or the 
insurance environment, but also by other types of regulations, such as environmental 
regulation. Environmental regulations directly affect adoption because in many industries 
regulations will either prohibit or require the use of certain technology or production methods. 
Gray and Shadbegian (1998) use a regulatory shift in the US to estimate the effect of 
regulation on investment strategies of firms in the paper industry, where environmental 
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regulations could have encouraged adoption of new production technology if they required 
replacement of older, more pollution-creating machines or methods. However, they might 
also have reduced overall investment and therefore the diffusion of new innovations if it was 
costly for firms to purchase pollution abatement technologies or remodel older plants. Using 
Census data for individual paper mills from 1972 to 1990, Gray and Shadbegian find that 
firms indeed respond to the policy environment they function in. They find that new plants in 
stricter regulatory environments are more likely to use technologies that produce less 
pollution. Third, they show that regulation-driven investment and productive investment 
crowd each other out, i.e., more investment in pollution-abating technologies has led to a 
decline in investment in production technology. Mowery and Rosenberg have argued in a 
1981 study that rapid diffusion of technological innovations in the U. S. commercial aircraft 
industry to U. S. airlines during the mid-twentieth century was due in part to actions of the 
regulatory agencies, first the Post Office and then the Civil Aeronautics Board. Because price 
competition was limited during some period, airlines focused on the rapid adoption of new 
types of aircraft in an effort to compete on quality.  
 
Therefore, as we have surveyed above, both micro- and macro-economic analyses of the 
determinants of innovation adoption refer to specific technologies. The same is true for the 
study of the impact of regulation measures on innovation adoption since most studies analyse 
the effect of one measure of regulation on a specific innovative technology. In our study, 
though, we will consider a wide spectrum of measures such as the ones covered by the 
functioning of the Internal Market and we will consider their impact on the rate of adoption of 




Based on the theoretical and empirical literature several drivers of innovation diffusion have 
been highlighted (see Table I.3 for a review). Their impact on innovation diffusion relies on 
the fact that they increase the awareness about the new technologies, the ability of adopters 
and suppliers to adapt and use the technologies as well as the profitability of the adoption of 
new technologies.  
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Table I.3. Determinants of innovation diffusion 
Demand side: 
  Users’ investment in human capital (increases ability to adopt innovations) 
  Users’ investment in R&D (increases ability to adopt innovations) 
  Level of prior related knowledge owned by the firm adopting the innovation 
  Balance between specialisation and diversity in order to absorpt external knowledge 
  Organisational innovation, ability of users to make organisational changes, kind of organisational 
structure 
  Size of the user firm 
  Market characteristics of potential users; share of the market; market dynamism; demand growth; 
number of previous adopters in the market 
Supply side: 
  Suppliers’ R&D and innovation capacity of new technology suppliers 
  Suppliers’ financial means (advertising costs, users’ guide, …) 
  Interaction between users and suppliers: 
  Exchanges of tangible assets: trade, FDI,… 
  Exchanges of intangible assets: face to face contacts, labour mobility, … 
  ICT facilitates awareness about the new technology 
  Market structure: horizontal integration favours flows of tangible and intangible assets 
  Geographical concentration facilitates the awareness of the new technology 
Regulatory environment determinants: 
  Role played by normalisation and standardisation procedures 
  Insurance system 
  IPRs (see table I.2 for a more detailed discussion) 
  Competition 
  Integration of the economies 
 
Some of these drivers result from the user features or from supplier features. But innovation 
diffusion also relies on the interaction between users and suppliers, and on the regulatory 
environment. The Internal Market aims at modifying the functioning of the European markets. 
Therefore, it is likely to produce changes in the user and supplier features or in their 
interactions. For these reasons, the Internal Market may impact on innovation diffusion, as we 
will analyse in detail in the next subsection.  
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I.2. Internal Market and innovation diffusion/adoption 
 
Internal Market (IM) may impact on some of the drivers of innovation diffusion. But it is not 
obvious which determinants it impacts on, and through which channels. In order to 
understand it, we first come back to the objectives and nature of the IM. 
 
I.2.1. The IM objectives 
 
The IM is one of the European Union’s most important and continuing priorities. Its main 
target is to benefit the Union’s citizens and businesses by granting them with: 
  greater European market integration, 
  removal of obstacles to the free movement of services and capital and  
  freedom of establishment.  
 
Hence, the IM Directorate-General designs and delivers policies of economic reform that 
make the Union’s economy dynamic and competitive. Some areas of direct interest when 
coming to the implementation of the European IM are: 
  regulated professions, services, company law and corporate governance, 
  public procurement and  
  intellectual and industrial property and postal services.  
 
In the area of financial services, it aims at establishing the legal framework for the integration 
of the Union’s capital markets and the creation of a single market for financial services. 
 
Therefore, the IM cannot be simply defined by an indicator such as GDP or consumption 
indexes. This is due to the fact that the IM is a “set of rules of the game” which has to be put 
in place for the EU citizens and firms in order to be able to freely move, locate, compete and 
exploit market potential wherever within the European boundaries.  
 
Within the framework offered by the IM, and more specifically related to the innovation area, 
it was possible for the Commission to propose the European Research Area (ERA) in 
January 2000, as the major research policy debate in Europe (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2000). The development, at European level, of an area for the coherent and co-
  45 
ordinated pursuit of research activities and policies, and an area in which researchers and 
knowledge move freely was supposed to encourage the expression of European excellence in 
several ways:  
 
•  First, by making it possible to establish a 'critical mass' of potential excellence, by 
networking the capacities present in different Member States, particularly through 
intensive use of information and communication technologies.  
•  Second, by releasing people and teams from the protection of national barriers, thus 
introducing competition and increasing the general level of excellence.  
•  Third, by attracting to Europe the best researchers from the rest of the world, in the 
same way that American campuses are currently attracting researchers. 
 
Related to it, the Lisbon European Council Summit held on in March 2000 set an objective to 
‘make the European Union the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world by 2010’. This has since then been interpreted as requiring focused community-
wide investment in research, and the improvement of innovation and entrepreneurship. In 
comparison with the IM, the Lisbon Strategy was much wider in scope, reforms in product, 
capital and labour markets as well as measures to stimulate R&D and innovation. 
Additionally, it pursued to exploit the synergies between the different structural policy areas, 
among others the area of the knowledge-based economy. In other words, the IM strategy can 
be seen as an important element of the Lisbon Strategy.  
 
Therefore, the objectives pursued by the ERA and the Lisbon Strategy are therefore 
supposed to improve not only the generation of innovation but also its adoption, 
generating a good environment for it. In the next sub-section we try to analyse why IM 
may impact on the drivers of innovation diffusion. 
 
I.2.2. Why IM may impact on the drivers of innovation diffusion? 
 
It is important to define accurately the channels by which IM may affect innovation diffusion. 
The creation of an IM has possibly many effects on the innovation diffusion across countries 
and firms. This is because it sets up new (better) conditions (legal directives) which should 
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encourage movement of goods, people and services, a better allocation of resources and 
therefore increases in productivity.  
 
The channels by which the set up of an IM affects innovation diffusion, therefore, are indirect 
in the sense that the IM influences and affects other macro-magnitudes such as competition, 
trade, labour mobility or mergers and acquisitions possibilities, firm easiness of location 
within the EU boundaries and so on.  
 
All these above mentioned macro-magnitudes influence the speed and extent by which 
innovation diffuses both within and across countries and firms. A better functioning job 
market (one which allows workers to move freely and find the best job opportunities as well 
as for firms to find the more suitable human capital) is achieved by permitting the free 
movement of people as well as setting a common legal framework on a EU basis giving 
similar incentives (or at least decreasing the barriers to the entry) to work in all Member 
States. The same reasoning goes with all the norms and legislations regulating, for example, 
the weight of each national government on the functioning of its market. If the national 
government is heavily present in the markets by transferring resources or subsidies or by 
participating in the markets with Government Enterprises, less incentives are given to firms 
(and especially European firms) which may want to enter those heavily regulated markets. 
One of the goals of the IM is to reduce the burden (direct or indirect) that firms have to face 
when entering a EU market. So, reducing State intervention is likely to make European 
markets more attractive for FDI, trade, firms’ investment location since it increases 
competitiveness. All these factors are fundamental in promoting innovation diffusion. 
 
Hence, we can identify how IM may impact on the three main conditions of innovation drawn 
from the theoretical literature, namely, (i) being aware of the new technology, (ii) being able 
to use and adapt the new technology, and (iii) the level of profitability of the adoption of the 
new technology. For each, the channels by which the IM may impact on innovation diffusion 
are highlighted. 
 
I.2.2.1. IM and the awareness about new technologies 
Firstly, the IM is likely to improve the potential awareness about new technologies. Four main 
channels drive this effect. 
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  Labour reforms associated with the IM, based not only on active labour market 
policies but also on portability of pension rights, recognition of qualifications, and 
eligibility of pensions, among others, aims at providing higher mobility, better job-
matching and more even distribution of skills and resources across countries. Human 
capital and its mobility have been identified as key factors in order to be aware of the 
new technology and to be able to assess its economic value. Therefore, labour reforms 
constitute a first channel through which the IM may impact on the awareness about 
new technologies. An homogeneization of these reforms at the European level would 
then imply the possibility for workers to cooperate and move across national 
boundaries and therefore ignite the technology diffusion mechanism. 
  Trade policies associated with the IM are also likely to play a part. Awareness about 
new technologies increases with flows of goods and services within which these 
technologies are embedded (i.e. reverse engineering). Promoting trade, IM may 
enhance awareness about new technologies and thus innovation diffusion.  
  The IM may also result in an increase in cross border mergers and acquisitions. As 
pointed out in the previous section, the industrial structure, the size of the firms as 
well as the competition between them influence the ability to be aware of new 
technologies. The way foreign firms can compete and possibly acquire other firms in 
non-EU markets is likely to affect innovation diffusion. 
  Finally,  FDI resulting from the IM may also favour awareness about new 
technologies. Capital market policies associated with the IM facilitate FDI, by giving 
access to foreign capital markets. Of course, FDI may take several forms and 
sometimes involve only financial flows. But, as demonstrated by the empirical 
literature, when they are associated with the creation of new plants or labour mobility, 
technology transfers may occur. 
 
I.2.2.2. IM and the ability to use and adapt the new technology 
A second set of channels may drive the impact of the IM on innovation diffusion, by 
influencing the ability of users and suppliers to use and adapt the new technologies. 
 
Labour reforms associated with the IM do not only affect the ability of potential adopters 
to be aware of the new technology. They may also improve the level of human capital that is 
necessary, in both demand and supply-side, to be able to adapt the new technology and to 
introduce complementary organisational innovation.  
  48 
 
Financial means have also been stressed as crucial factors to adapt new technologies to the 
users. Capital market reforms insure a better access to financial means, and are therefore 
likely to improve innovation diffusion. 
 
I.2.2.3. IM and the profitability of adoption 
Finally, the IM is likely to enhance innovation diffusion by increasing the profitability of 
the adoption of new technologies. Indeed, the reforms associated with the IM aim at 
reinforcing competition. As stressed in the previous section, competition between potential 
adopters but also between suppliers are drivers of innovation diffusion. Market structures 
faced by users affect the expected returns of adoption. Competition between suppliers may 
give them incentives to improve their technology and to reduce its price.  
 
The IM may also reduce the price of technology thanks to the enlargement of the market. 
The size of the market faced by supplier influences the price at which they are going to sell 
their technology. From a theoretical point of view, the larger the market, the lower the price.  
 
From a demand-side perspective, the market size can also impact on innovation diffusion by 
increasing the expected returns. The demand growth faced by potential adopters has been 
identified as a positive determinant of their propensity to adopt, because it increases the 
profitability. 
 
In a more indirect way, profitability of adopting new technologies may also be affected by the 
reforms of the IM on the labour market. As mentioned in the previous sections, the risk of 
adoption is an important driver of innovation diffusion. This risk can be limited by the 
establishment of trust between agents. In this sense, providing the EU countries with higher 
worker mobility, labour market reforms resulting from the IM can favour more trustful 
relationships, likely to enhance adoption profitability.  
 
Finally, IM regulations may lead to the normalisation and standardisation productive and 
innovative procedures. Cooperation will be then enhanced since workers will be able to 
apply similar frameworks (software, methodologies and so on) interchangeably across 
European countries without the cost of adapting their work to that already carried out in other 
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EU countries. Therefore, the EU directives regarding normalisation and standardisation are 
likely to boost cooperation effects and ultimately the diffusion and adoption of innovation.  
 
It is difficult to categorize all these concepts under univocal definitions. However, even if 
with shortcomings, it is possible to define the types of IM regulations which may affect 
specific “innovation transmission channels” such as (i) trade, (ii) cooperation and (iii) 
competition. These channels, and their effect on innovation adoption, will be analyzed in 
more detail throughout the rest of this report. For a review of the main ideas on how IM 
affects innovation diffusion see Table I.4.  
 
Table I.4. How IM affects innovation diffusion 
Awareness about new technologies: (“Trade Channel”) 
  Trade policies 
  Increase in cross-border merges and acquisitions 
  Capital market policies, which facilitates FDI, giving access to foreign capital markets 
Awareness to use and adopt new technologies: (“Cooperation Channel”) 
  Labour reforms 
  Facilitation of the mobility of workers,  
  Normalisation and standardisation procedures 
Profitability of adoption: (“Competition Channel”) 
  Reforms reinforcing competition  
  Capital market reforms 
  Enlargement of the size of the market (increasing the expected returns) 




As we have highlighted above, the EU reforms associated with the IM may act on innovation 
diffusion through several main channels: Trade (implying larger markets), higher 
competition, FDI, labour mobility and cooperation and cross-border merges and 
acquisition. 
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The model and the empirical strategy that we will derive in the next subsection have 
therefore the following novelties if compared to the previous empirical literature we have 
surveyed: 
•  Contrary to most empirical studies on innovation diffusion in which the determinants 
of the adoption of a specific technology is analysed, in our theoretical and empirical 
model we analyse the determinants of general innovation diffusion across countries 
and sectors in the European Union. Therefore, an important issue will be the definition 
and design of the variable proxying such innovation diffusion/adoption process. 
•  Although the main determinants of innovation diffusion at the EU level are considered 
as control variables, the model focuses on the impact of some regulatory environment, 
specifically the reforms followed to achieve the Internal Market.  
•  The model aims at catching the role the IM has on innovation diffusion through the 
analysis of two dimensions: on the one hand, the impact of the reforms on some 
specific channels of innovation adoption (trade, competition and cooperation), on the 
other hand, the impact of these channels on innovation adoption itself. 
 
 
I.3. Theoretical model and empirical strategy 
 
The model we propose to use aims at describing the diffusion of innovation both from a cross-
country and inter-firms perspective. To do so we are going to formalize the diffusion of 
innovation by means of a S-shaped curve. As in other standard models which rely on a 
logistic diffusion curve (surveyed in section I.1), which is the most widely used to analyse the 
innovation diffusion/adoption process, this is initially a slow process but, as the number of 
adopters increases, also the speed of adoption of innovation rises. Crucial to our analysis will 
be the role played by the functioning of the Internal Market as a driving force shaping the 
different paces at which innovation is adopted across/within countries and firms. To do it we 
control for the main determinants of innovation adoption that have been analysed in section 
I.1 (firm size, human capital, R&D activity, among others) and focus on the impact that the 
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I.3.1. Setup of the basic model 
 
Let us first assume that the aggregate production function for each country is a standard 
Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale as follows: 
 
(1)        
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where   is output produced by country i (where  ) i Y I i ... 1 =
8,  is capital while 
represent labor-augmenting technological progress. We choose to formalize the 
technical progress as of being “labor augmenting” following the standard growth literature. 
As pointed out by Acemoglu (2002) and Jones and Scrimgeour (2005) this assumption allows 




9. Also, expressed in its intensive form, we can define the output along the transitional 
dynamics path as a function of time: 
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I.3.2. Endogenous technology 
 
We innovate on the standard Solow-Swan framework, which we have been using up to now, 
by endogenizing the behavior of   along the transitional dynamics path. The idea is to 





The underlying hypothesis of our theoretical model is that the productivity level of each 
economy in any point of time (again,  ) will be a positive function of the extent by which  ) (t A
                                                 
8 For easiness of exposition we drop the i subscript and use it only when a comparison across countries is made 
in the text.  
9 The Steady State Growth Theorem (which is usually known as the Uzawa (1961) theorem) states that if a 
neoclassical growth  model exhibits steady state growth then it must also be that technical progress is labor 
augmenting.  
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this same economy is able to  adopt the outcomes R&D
10 activity and transpose them  into 
productive activities. The rationale is simple and goes as: the more the number of innovations 
adopted/diffused into the economy, the higher will be the productivity level of this same 
economy
11. 
The endogenous level of productivity for each country at time t is then expressed as follows: 
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where with γ  we denote the productivity augmentation term related to the adoption of the 
new technological paradigm. This is to say that  ) ( n t A − γ represents the maximum 
productivity level attainable with any given technological paradigm. The arrival of new 
technological paradigms over time continuously shifts this value upwards. 
 
) (t A , therefore, represent the productivity level given by the difference between the 
maximum productivity level and the amount of new blueprints that have not yet been adopted 
in the productive process (the term in square brackets).  
 
Let us now analyze the variables which define the amount of blueprints not already adopted in 
the square brackets. With ω  we denote the effort exerted in the R&D sector by each economy 
whose result is a flow of blueprints
12.   is the number of already adopted blueprints 
(innovations) for production in each economy over the total pool of blueprints available in 
each point in time. The parameter
Δ
ε  is the speed by which innovation diffuses within the 
economy. It is easy to notice how, increases in the value of all these three parameters ( Δ , ω  
and ε ) imply an increase in the number of already adopted blueprints in each point in time 
                                                 
10 As regards to innovation, this is taken to be the result of R&D effort in each economy. The outcome of R&D 
takes the form of new blueprints or ideas (from an empirical point we may assume them to be proxied by patents 
for example). 
11 Productivity is the result of the adoption of these innovations (blueprints, patents and so on) discovered in the 
R&D sector which then translate into productive activities. Hence, for example, the discovery of a new blueprint 
may not imply a corresponding productivity increase for a long time. The invention of personal computers did 
not immediately increase the productivity of developed economies until their diffusion reached a critical mass. 
The time which elapses in between the invention of a potentially profitable blueprint and the increase in 
productivity will be a function of the speed of innovation diffusion. 
 
12 The arrival flow of blueprints may be formalized by using a Poisson arrival rate as in the model of Aghion and 
Howitt (1992). 
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(i.e. a higher level of innovation diffusion), and therefore a lower value of the term in square 
brackets and a subsequent higher productivity.  
 
The parameter σ  instead, represents peculiar spatial effects attached to each economy. This 
parameter captures whether a firm (or a country) is operating within a industrial or 
technological cluster or not. We will describe this point more in detail in the Appendix I.4. 
 
As in the model of Aghion and Howitt (1996) we assume that blueprint creation is the 
outcome of research and that these are assumed to arrive discretely with a Poisson rate  ω λ ~  
where  0<ω ~<1  is the fraction of population employed in the R&D sector while the overall 
result of the R&D sector is then given by  ω λ ω ~ = . 
 
To be slightly more precise, as the R&D effort increases, the number of available blueprints 
will increase accordingly and so the variable   (the number of blueprints already adopted in 
each point in time) will decrease. More formally we suggest: 
Δ
 
(4)     ) / 1 ( ω f = Δ        
 
Hence, the productivity level of each economy in equation (3) is a function of the effort 
exerted by each economy in the R&D sector (ω ). Similarly to other standard endogenous 
growth models (see Romer, 1990), an increase in the effort in the R&D sector implies (under 
some weak conditions) an increase in the long run technology stock of the economy. This 
result is also consistent with a large empirical evidence which we already treated in the review 
of the literature in section I.1. 
 
I.3.3. Innovation diffusion/adoption and the role of the IM 
 













. The second term into the parenthesis represents the logistic diffusion 
curve and the amount of blueprints which are adopted in each point in time within an 
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economy
13. The parameter ε  plays the crucial role of defining the speed by which the 
innovation is adopted within an economy.  
 
As an identifying assumption of our theoretical formalization, and differently from other 
endogenous growth models, we propose to analyze the behavior of the diffusion of innovation 
by linking it to the functioning of the IM and other institutional country-specific 
characteristics. In particular, we relate the speed by which innovation diffuses throughout an 
economy with the functioning of the Internal Market within its boundaries. In more analytical 
terms, we assume the following: 
 
( ) θ ε f =       (5)    
       
where   and  0 ) ( > ⋅ f θ  represent the degree/quality by which the IM of each economy works. 
Higher values of θ  are associated with a better functioning of the IM. In principle the relation 
in eq. (5) states that better functioning of the internal market will lead to a faster rate of 
innovation adoption. However, as we will point out in the econometric part III of this report, 
the IM regulations are usually aimed at affecting some macro-magnitudes (trade flows, 
cooperation or competition) and not the adoption of innovation directly. This is because we 
have to think of IM regulation as a set of rules put in place by the EU whose aim is that of 
allowing freer trade, more competition and cooperation across firms and countries.  
 
However, as we pointed out in the literature review, trade, competition and cooperation are 
the “transmission channels” through which innovation adoption takes place and is facilitated. 
Hence, there is a substantial indirect effect of IM regulations on innovation adoption mediated 
through the direct effects that such regulations have on the transmission channels, trade, 
competition and cooperation.  
 
More formally we may re-write eq. (5) as follows: 
 
( 5 . 1 )        ) ~ (θ ε f =  
and where  
                                                 
13 Hence the overall quantity within the parenthesis can be thought as being the amount of blueprints still 
available for adoption, that is, the “amount to be learnt”. 
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( 5 . 2 )        ) ( ~ IM f = θ  
 
θ ~ proxies here for the effect that IM have on the transmission channels of (i) trade, (ii) 
competition and (iii) cooperation. In the empirical specifications which we are going to 
present in part III we will estimate eq. (5.1) and (5.2) by means of a two stage least squares 
estimation where eq.(5.2) will study the impact of IM regulations on the transmission 
channels and eq. (5.1) the effect that these channels (and indirectly of IM) on the rate of 
adoption of innovation.  
 
In Appendix I.4 we leave a broader description of other features of the theoretical model and 
of the different paths for the diffusion of innovation.  
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Endogenous productivity 
level : it represents the 
actual productivity level of 
the economy at time t. 
 
    
γ   Productivity augmentation 
term: it proxies for the 
technological paradigm 
positive shift in between (t-
n) and t. The higher γ  and 
the bigger the difference 
between the old 
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γ  is constrained to 
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achieved in each moment 
starting from the date of the 
technological paradigm 
shift. 
Positive and in the 
limit equal to zero. 
    



























Amount of innovations 
available but not yet 
adopted into productive 
processes in each moment 
in time. It is a function of 
the blueprints (innovations) 
which are 
introduced/adopted into the 
productive process. 
The sign is expected 
to be negative on total 
productivity. 
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Logistic diffusion function. 
It shapes the slowly process 
of adoption of new 
innovations into productive 
processes for each 
economy.  
The sign is expected 
to be positive. 
    
 
 




Speed by which innovation 
diffuses (or it is adopted) 




Function is positive in 
its argument. The sign 
on total 
productivity  is 
expected to be 
positive. 
) (t A
    
θ   Internal market directives  Sign on the speed of 
innovation diffusion, 
ε , is expected to be 
positive. Overall sign 
on producitivity is 
positive. 
    
ω   R&D effort exerted. It 
proxies for the 
expenditures of each 
economy in Research and 
Innovation. 
The sign on total 
productivity  is 
expected to be 
positive. 
) (t A
    
) / 1 ( ω f = Δ   Number of already adopted 
innovation into the 
productive process relative 
to the overall pool of 
innovations for each 
technological paradigm 
across time. As the effort 
on innovation increases,   
decreases since the pool of 
available innovation for 
any point in time is a 
positive function of R&D 
effort (see above). 
Δ
The sign on total 
productivity  is 
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I.3.4. Empirical Approach 
 
I.3.4.1. On the IM approximation 
The theoretical model we developed above is aimed at providing a theoretical background on 
the main relationships between the variables which are likely to affect the process of 
innovation diffusion/adoption. As commented before, an identifying assumption of our 
theoretical formalization, and differently from other endogenous growth models, we propose 
to analyze the behavior of the adoption of innovation by linking it to the functioning of the IM 
and other institutional country-specific characteristics. In particular, our theoretical model 
relates the speed by which innovation is adopted within an economy with the functioning of 
the Internal Market within its boundaries. This linear relationship, as shown in equation (5) 
will be the basis for our empirical model.  
 
From an empirical point of view, however, it is necessary to clearly define what kind of 
variables we intend to use in order to proxy for the IM. In the strand of other recent works 
(Griffith and Harrison, 2004, or Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003) we believe the best 
approximation of the IM is to make use of available data on political and structural reforms 
which have the aim to create such IM. This is to say that the IM can only be approximated by 
making use of variables/categories which proxy for the objectives the IM directives want to 
achieve (i.e. greater European market integration, the removal of obstacles to the free 
movement of services and capital and freedom of establishment). Some of the variables 
(which we are going to detail in Part II) that we are going to use to proxy for the IM will be, 
for example, openness and competition in product markets, business environment and 
entrepreneurship in product markets, regulatory trade barriers, access of citizens to foreign 
capitals markets and others with the idea of proxying the most relevant reforms enacted at the 
EU level in order to achieve the goals of the IM. 
 
All the variables proxying the IM have economic effects. We identify some of the channels 
through which these reforms affect economic performance and, especially for our case, 
innovation diffusion/adoption. We identify these economic dimensions as channels (trade, 
competition, cooperation, for example) which then will affect, as pointed out in the literature 
review, and in equation (5) the speed by which innovation diffuses across countries and firms. 
The same applies to various types of labor reforms which ultimately will affect the degree of 
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labor mobility and job matching across regions and countries (and increasing cooperation, 
therefore understood as a channel). 
 
For the sake of exposition, therefore, we will refer with IM proxies to those variables directly 
representing and proxying the structural reforms aimed at achieving the desired goals of the 
Internal Market. Instead, with channels we will refer to those economic dimensions (Trade, 
Cooperation, Competition and so on) which are directly affected by the structural reforms 
(that is by the IM proxies) and that then influence the extent and speed by which innovation 
diffuses across countries. Here below we detail the empirical strategy we are going to use. 
 
I.3.4.2. Estimating the impact of the IM on innovation adoption
14 
From an empirical point of view, we are going to estimate two stages which allow us to link 
the effect of IM directives on the speed of innovation adoption. This dynamic is captured by 
the relationship between the parameter ε  and θ  as detailed in eq. (5). The relation is assumed 
to be linear such that an increase in the quality of the IM will imply a direct positive effect on 
the extent and speed by which innovation diffuses across the countries and firms operating 
within the internal market itself.  
 
Therefore, the causality within the variables we are going to use for our empirical research 
goes as follows: 
        IM reforms⇒Channels (Trade, Competition, Cooperation) ⇒Innovation adoption 
 
Hence, our empirical strategy has to take into account that the variables proxying the IM are 
not used as direct explanatory variables of the adoption of innovation but as indirect ones 
through their impact on the channels. And the channels have to be considered so, in the sense 
that they are the way through which the IM has its impact on the adoption of innovation. 
Thus, the channels are not considered to be exogenous when explaining the adoption of 
innovation but to be approximated by their own determinants.  
 
There exists an evident problem of simultaneous causality between the variables which we 
define as channels of innovation adoption (Trade, Competition, Cooperation, among the main 
                                                 
14 As it will be shown in Part II of the report, the variables we use for the diffusion/adoption of innovation refer 
more specifically to the adoption process of technologies. Therefore, in the presentation of the empirical strategy 
we refer to adoption of innnovation in order to make it more connected to what it will be presented afterwards in 
Part II.  
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ones) and the degree of innovation adoption itself. From an econometric point of view it 
would be impossible to directly disentangle the causality (and therefore to estimate the 
coefficients) between the “channels” and the degree of innovation adoption due to the fact 
that innovation adoption is very likely impacting trade, competition and cooperation and the 
other channels through its impact on the overall economic performance of each country and 
firm.  
 
Hence, we propose a Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) estimation where in the first stage we 
estimate the impact of IM reforms on the possible channels of innovation diffusion and then, 
in the second stage we disentangle the effect of these channels (Trade, Competition, 




Stage 1:    Trade = f (IM Reforms implementation in each State) 
Competition = f (IM Reforms implementation in each State) 
Cooperation = f (IM Reforms implementation in each State) 
 
Stage 2:    Innovation Adoption=f(Trade (fitted),Competition (fitted),Cooperation (fitted)) 
 
The relation to be tested is given below in the structural model: 
 
(6)   1 1 1 1 1 1 η θ δ μ + + + = Z IM Trade   
   2 2 2 2 2 2 η θ δ μ + + + = Z IM n Competitio  
3 3 3 3 3 3 η θ δ μ + + + = Z IM n Cooperatio  
    
(7)   ε θ β β β α + + + + + = 4 4 3 2 1 Z n Cooperatio n Competitio Trade InnovAdop  
where InnovAdop is going to be our measure of innovation adoption. Trade, Competition and 
Cooperation proxy for the channels by which the IM indirectly affects innovation adoption 
and that we put as explanatory variables in the 2
nd stage of the TSLS estimation. Notice that 
                                                 
15 From now on, the equations in the first stage will cover just three equations, one for the channel related to 
Trade, another one for Competition and one for the channel of Cooperation, since these are the channels through 
which we believe the IM has most of its impact on innovation adoption. However, the same idea could be 
extended to others channels if considered to be important and if good statistical information was available for 
them. 
  60 
for simplicity we name IM the vector of Internal Market Reforms which, on the other hand, 
we will suggest in Part II. 
 
Since we are interested in the specific partial effect of each of the channels in eq. (6) on the 
adoption of innovation, our empirical strategy is to estimate the equations in the first stage (in 
eq. 6) and then use the fitted values obtained in the 2
nd stage (eq. 7 as correct instruments once 
cleaned from the possible correlation that they may experience with the error term ε . Thus, 
the basic assumptions we are concerned with are the possible non orthogonality of the 
explanatory variables in the second stage w.r.t the error process (the endogeneity of the 
channels w.r.t. the innovation adoption). 
(8)     {} 0 ≠ Trade E ε ,  
{} 0 ≠ n Competitio E ε , 
{} 0 ≠ n Cooperatio E ε  
 
If this condition is verified (as there are theoretical arguments for it), then the partial effect of 
the channels of adoption (Trade, Cooperation and Competition) will not be correctly 
estimated by OLS estimation. If so, it would be impossible to define the causality between 
explanatory and dependent variables
16. 
 
To solve this endogeneity problem, therefore, we make use of the variables that we believe to 
be truly orthogonal to the innovation adoption (that is the measure of IM) for which we do not 
observe reverse causality. That is, our identifying assumption is that IM structural reforms do 
cause innovation adoption (through the above mentioned channels) but that innovation 
adoption does not cause IM structural reforms. 
 
Hence,  
(9)     {} 0 = ′ε M I E  orthogonality condition of the excluded instruments. 
 
We propose a more detailed analysis of the empirical model in Part III of this document.  
                                                 
16 This is to say that if conditions in (8) are not violated, then the explanatory variables in eq.(7) are endogenous 
and therefore the generic OLS estimator is inconsistent. 
 









Descriptive statistical analysis of the  
innovation diffusion in EU 
  
 
A first empirical analysis will be carried out in this part. The aim of Part II is twofold. Firstly, 
it analyses, from a descriptive point of view, the dependent variable (the adoption of 
innovation) which will be then used in Part III for the econometric estimations. Hence, the 
descriptive analysis will help us to shed some light on the behaviour of innovation adoption 
both from a cross-country and cross-sector point of view. Indeed, the estimation of our model 
raises the question of the data. The first issue deals with the measure of the dependent 
variable, eg. innovation adoption itself. This is the aim of the first part. Secondly, comes the 
evaluation of its determinants. Although this point will be addressed in more detail in Part III, 
we give a first assessment through preliminary descriptive statistics.  
 
Regarding the evaluation of the dependent variable, previous empirical studies on innovation 
diffusion are mainly based on monographic studies. They quantify innovation diffusion by 
looking at the adoption of a specific technology (ICT, seed,  medical technologies for 
instance). However, our aim is to provide a general picture of innovation diffusion/adoption 
in EU, in order to analyse the impact of the EU Single Market and to assess the effect on 
global performances. Therefore, databases covering all EU countries and a wide range of 
sectors have to be used. Regarding innovation, global dataset allowing international 
comparisons are not numerous. Countries started only recently to collect systematically 
information on this topic, and the issues covered by the surveys remain restricted. Most 
empirical studies rely on three main data sets. 
 
Thirty years ago, countries started conducting R&D surveys. These surveys are structured 
and administered in a possibly comparable way in more and more countries. They provide us 
with statistics on innovation input (R&D expenditure, research staff, software, etc.). This 
information is useful to weight R&D effort in each country and sector (industries or services) 
over time. However, it does not inform about the mechanisms of innovation and about the 
outputs of the innovation process. Therefore, R&D surveys cannot be used to address the 
issue of innovation diffusion. 
 
Data on patents are also available over long time periods and for most countries. At the EU 
level, Eurostat provides patent statistics at national and regional scale. Such data have been 
widely used since the 1990s to proxy knowledge diffusion by looking at patent citations 
(Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson, 1993). They can also be used to observe innovation 
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diffusion through patent applications (Schneider, 2005 on U.S. patents applications). 
However, they do not inform us on the mechanisms driving this diffusion.  
 
In the early 1990s, the Oslo manual set out the guidelines for a new type of survey, the 
innovation survey (OECD, 1992). Such surveys are now conducted in many developed 
countries, including emerging, transition and developing countries. On the whole, over 50 
countries have carried out at least one innovation survey (the US being a notable exception). 
 
In the EU countries under the coordination of Eurostat, the statistical office of the European 
Union, a common core questionnaire was agreed upon and surveys were launched under the 
acronym of CIS (Community Innovation Surveys). These surveys have been repeated every 
four years. Up to now there exist four waves of CIS (CIS 1 for 1990-1992, CIS 2 for 1994-
1996, CIS 3 for 1998-2000, and CIS 4 for 2002-2004).  
 
The different parts of the survey allow us to deal with most of the issues addressed in this 
study. Information is available on the use and adoption of external sources of knowledge and 
innovation, the location of partners (within the same region, the same country, the rest of 
Europe, US or other part of the world), etc. For this reason, we are going to use it as our main 
source of information.  
 
The remainder of this part is organized as follows. The first section discusses the main 
characteristics of the innovation survey. The second section shows how innovation survey can 
be used to measure innovation diffusion/adoption, by distinguishing among innovation 
activities, generation of innovation and adoption of innovation. Section 3 gives us descriptive 
statistics on innovation adoption obtained from the third Community Innovation Survey. The 
fourth section analyses the potential determinants of adoption, focusing especially on 
innovation inputs, market features, and regulatory environment. Finally, the last section 
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II.1. Using innovation survey to account for innovation 
diffusion/adoption 
 
As Mairesse and Mohnen (2008) report, the innovation surveys provide us with three broad 
groups of measures: innovation inputs, innovation outputs, and modalities of innovation.  
 
The innovation inputs encompass besides R&D, other expenditures related to innovation 
such as acquisitions of patents and licenses, product design, training of personnel, trial 
production, and market analysis.  
 
Four types of innovation outputs are distinguished in the version of CIS3, namely the 
introduction of new products (which can be new to the firm or new to the market), the 
introduction of new processes, organizational changes and marketing innovations. Whereas 
patents and bibliometrics measure the technical, scientific, inventive side of innovation, the 
innovation output items, contained in the innovation surveys, measure the development, the 
implementation, and the market introduction of new ideas. Namely they refer to the 
introduction on the market of new products or services and the introduction of new ways of 
organizing production and distribution.  
 
The modalities of innovation are the sources of information that lead to an innovation, the 
effects of innovation or the reasons for innovating, the perceived obstacles to innovation, the 
perceived strength of various appropriability mechanisms, and the cooperation in research and 
innovation.  
 
Several econometric analysis have been performed with the innovation survey data. The next 
part briefly reviews them. Then we enter more deeply into the presentation of the survey. 
 
II.1.1. Innovation survey: a review 
 
Following Mairesse and Mohnen (2008), we can divide studies based on innovation survey 
into four main groups. A first set of studies (Blundell et al. (1999), Hollenstein, (1996) 
Raymond et al (2007) among others) examines the determinants of innovation (sources of 
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information for innovation, cooperation for innovation, obstacles to innovation). Their main 
findings can be summarized as follows: 
  The probability to innovate increases with firm size 
  The intensity of innovation is unaffected or even decreases with firm size 
  Incumbents tend to innovate more 
  Demand pull is often significant and positive 
  Technology push is also positive, but less often significant 
  R&D, especially continuous R&D, matters. 
 
These studies also provide sectoral taxonomy for innovation based on principal components 
analysis (Hollenstein, 1996) or on probability tests of model of innovation determination 
(Raymond et al., 2007). Few studies so far have estimated dynamic models using panel data 
from successive innovation surveys. Peters (2005), Duguet and Monjon (2002), Cefis (2003), 
Raymond et al. (2007) highlight the persistence of innovation. Enterprises that innovate in 
one period tend to innovate also in the subsequent periods. 
 
A second set of studies tests the existence of complementarities between different 
innovation strategies. There are complementarities between innovation strategies when two 
strategies tend to be adopted together rather than in isolation because their joint adoption 
leads to better results. Some studies have tested the joint adoption, others have tested whether 
indeed joint adoption leads to higher performance (super-modularity: the whole is more than 
the sum of its parts). This issue has been investigated for various aspects of innovation: 
complementarities between different types of innovation, e.g. product and process innovation 
(Miravete and Pernías, 2006) or between internal and external technology sourcing (Cassiman 
and Veugelers, 2006). Complementarities between different types of cooperation strategies 
have also been highlighted (Belderbos, Carree, Lokshin, 2006) as well as complementarities 
between internal skills and cooperation (Leiponen, 2005).  
 
A third set of studies explores the effects of innovation, looking at productivity level or 
growth, exports, patenting or employment. For instance, Crepon-Duguet-Mairesse (1998) 
revisit the relationship between R&D and productivity. They estimate a model composed of 
three equations: first, an equation explaining the amount of R&D; second, an innovation 
output equation where R&D appears as an input, and, finally, a productivity equation, in 
which innovation output appears as an explanatory variable.  Their results confirm the rates of 
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return to R&D found in the earlier studies of the 80s and 90s, as long as proper account is 
taken of selectivity and endogeneity in R&D and innovation output.  
 
Finally, a last set of studies relies on innovation survey to deal with innovation policy issues. 
See Arundel et al. (2008) for a summary of the findings regarding government support for 
innovation in various innovation surveys. Linking government support and firm performance, 
most studies find additionality (instead of crowding-out) of government support for 
innovation. Complementarities between innovation policies also occur (Mohnen and Roller, 
2005) calling for a policy mix. 
 
In spite of interesting information provided by these studies, our understanding of the 
innovation process is still far from perfect. In the Mairesse and Mohnen (2002) model, the 
unexplained residual is very high, especially in low tech sectors. Though the magnitude of the 
residual may partly result from the nature of the survey, it also highlights our ignorance in 
matters of innovation, as noted by Mairesse and Mohnen (2002) themselves. 
 
An important issue that remains relatively unexplored is innovation diffusion/adoption. To 
our knowledge, nothing has been done to derive an analysis of innovation diffusion/adoption 
on the basis of this survey. This latter provides statistical data on the modality of innovation 
and the effects of innovation on economic performance. Therefore, innovation survey can be 
used to address the question of innovation adoption. However, we should be careful in 
building indicators of innovation adoption from the CIS. Firstly, innovation adoption is not 
assessed directly. There is no specific item to account for it. We have to deduce it from 
several items. Secondly, CIS faces several problems, due to the target population, data 
collection and methodological specificities. These latter are discussed in the next sub-
sections, while section II.2 suggests different indicators and considers the pros and cons of 
each design. As mentioned by Arundel et al. (2006) in the Trend Chart Methodology report, 
technology diffusion is among the indicators that have to be developed. Our approach can 
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II.1.2. Target population of the CIS 
 
The target population is the population of enterprises related to market activities, with 10 
employees or more. The CIS3 database covers the three-year period from the beginning of 
1998 to the end of 2000
17. However, the CIS3 does not cover all NACE market activities. A 
core target population is observed. “Non-core” activities can be included as well. Activities 
belonging to each population are listed below. 
 
The following 9 sectors shall be included in the target population of the CIS 3: 
 
  mining and quarrying (NACE 10-14) 
  manufacturing (NACE 15-37) 
  electricity, gas and water supply (NACE 40-41) 
  wholesale trade (NACE 51) 
  transport, storage and communication (NACE 60-64) 
  financial intermediation (NACE 65-67) 
  computer and related activities (NACE 72) 
  architectural and engineering activities (NACE 74.2) 
  technical testing and analysis (NACE 74.3) 
  research and development (NACE 73) 
 
This specific focus on some sectors may create an important limitation to make comparisons 
between sectors. In particular, CIS covers only few service sectors. Major service sectors such 
as retailing or hotels are excluded from the CIS on the grounds that innovation is too 
infrequent in these sectors to be efficiently surveyed using the CIS. Then, the comparison 
between industry and services must be made very carefully.  
 
                                                 
17Micro data from CIS4 were not yet available at the EU level in the time of developing this project. This is why 
we focus on CIS3, although we have used CIS4 macro database for comparative temporal analysis. 
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II.1.3. Data collection in the CIS3 
 
Countries can use census or samples or both. For instance, UK and France use a census of 
large firms and sample selection for SMEs. The selection of the sample should be based on 
random sampling techniques, with known selection probabilities, applied to strata. It is 
recommended to use simple random sampling without replacement within each stratum. 
Member States are free to use whatever sampling methods they prefer, as long as the quality 
thresholds for the results are achieved. As usual, this data collection leads to non-response 
problems. More precisely, two kinds of non-response problem arise: unit non-response and 
item non-response. 
 
II.1.3.1. Unit non-response: sampling issues 
The units that do not respond to the CIS 3 survey questionnaire may have different 
characteristics than those that do respond. Therefore, a simple random sample of at least 10% 
of the non-respondents is selected (necessary if non-respondents, as an unweighted percentage 
of all relevant enterprises in the sampling frame, exceed 30%).  However, in nearly all sectors 
SMEs were more likely to respond than large firms. 
 
The form to be used for this non-response survey includes some of the questions of the 
standard CIS3 questionnaire, in order to determine if the non-respondent is an innovator or 
not. Then, several methods can be used to calibrate the data. They rely on a stratification by 
NACE and firm size and, more recently, by region in some countries like UK and Denmark. 
Each stratum is calibrated using turnover and number of firms. If non-response is not equally 
distributed across strata, Member States may use a stratified non-response sample.  
 
On this basis, a set of weights is applied to the raw data, to make inferences about the whole 
population. There are two potential sets of weights that can be used, namely business weights 
and employment weights, to adjust estimates in order to account for firms not included in the 
sample. For CIS1 and CIS2, data have typically been weighted using business weights, which 
are calculated as the inverse sampling fraction of the number of firms in each cell of the 
stratification. Using business weights, each firm in the population carries an equal weight.  
This can provide basic measures of population performance, but does not correct for differing 
firm sizes. Using employment weights, which are calculated using the inverse sampling 
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fraction of employees in each cell of the stratification, allows data to be grossed up and 
corrected for firm size. So the greater the size of the firm, the larger the weight it carries in the 
employment weighted results. Employment weighted data provide a more robust means of 
estimating whole economy performance. 
 
II.1.3.2. Item non-response 
If some items are not filled in, the information is searched elsewhere (firm annual census, 
R&D survey, etc.). If it cannot be found, then imputation is done: a value is attributed 
according to the answer given by the other firms in the same stratum (e.g. same size and same 
NACE). As for metric variables, a weighted mean is calculated and applied as a ratio to the 
enterprises with the missing values, within the stratum concerned. As for ordinal, nominal and 
percentage variables, the technique used is nearest neighbour imputation. This technique 
consists in copying the missing data from a donor (with a record not violating any error 
check). This latter is chosen in such a way that the distance between the donor and recipient is 
minimised. 
 
Unfortunately, this imputation has not been made systematically. Some missings are therefore 
present in the database we have got from Eurostat. A preliminary work has been done to 
identify these missing observations. The database has then been cleaned. The procedure is 
detailed in point II.1.5.4 below.  
 
II.1.4. Characteristics of the data 
 
Some characteristics of the data are likely to raise some statistical problems. Firstly, the CIS 
data are mainly qualitative and subjective data (“new”, “new to the market“). 
Consequently, the quality of these variables is not always very good. The quantitative data are 
also imperfect. Innovation expenditures are rather approximate. They do not correspond with 
the information registered in the R&D surveys (R&D typically higher in innovation than in 
R&D surveys). The share of innovation in total turnover is also estimated by the respondent 
and does not come from vouchers. As Mairesse and Mohnen (2008) report, innovation output 
statistics are noisier than other statistical sources like R&D statistics for instance. They need 
to be instrumented to correct for errors in variables. 
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Secondly, innovation survey provides only cross sectional data. Some studies (Duguet and 
Monjon, 2002, Peters, 2008, Raymond et al. (2007) use several waves of innovation surveys. 
However, such a panel analysis has not yet been done for many countries because it requires 
the existence of multiple observations per firm across successive waves of innovation 
surveys, with a sufficient amount of overlap of sampling across successive waves. At each 
wave of CIS, additional questions are asked to include new dimensions of innovation (like 
questions on knowledge management in CIS3 or marketing innovations in CIS4) and some 
questions are removed, reformulated or their order is modified. For example, between CIS2 
and CIS3 the objectives of innovation were replaced by the impacts of innovation, making it 
impossible to continue examining the role of innovation objectives on innovation behaviours 
(Mairesse and Mohnen, 2008). 
 
In addition to temporal comparisons, international comparisons are still difficult to 
perform. All the EU countries do not follow the same sampling and calibration method. 
Therefore, differences between countries may appear that do not result from differences in 
their firm innovation behaviour, but that come from methodological differences. These biases 
have to be corrected to make comparisons between countries (in particular to compare 




Moreover, innovation survey does not allow us to provide comparison with the American 
case. Indeed, the United States is one of the major countries with no innovation survey, 
although the U.S. National Foundation conducted a pilot innovation survey in 1985. 
 
Finally, some variables are censored data. Indeed, the European Community Innovation 
Survey questionnaire is set up in a way that gives rise to a selection problem. First, firms are 
asked some general questions on their identity, their total sales and number of employees, 
their sectoral affiliation, and whether they belong to a group. Then comes a set of questions 
which define innovating firms versus non-innovating firms. Only innovating firms have to fill 
out the rest of the questionnaire and provide information on their innovation outputs and 
inputs, as well as on various modalities of their innovative activities. Therefore, we have very 
few information on the “non-innovating” firms (turnover, export, number of employees, in 
                                                 
18 We will talk about these corrections in the remainder of part II. 
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level and growth rate, the main industry they belong to, and their potential affiliation to a 
group). This allows us to correct only partially the selection biases that arise when only 
innovators are considered. We will come back to this selection bias issue in the econometric 
part (Part III).  
 
II.1.5. The database building 
 
This research work is based on two samples extracted from the CIS3 survey which concerns 
innovative activities carried out between 1998 and 2000. The first has been provided by the 
European Commission as a micro anonymized dataset whereas the second is a macro-
aggregated dataset available on Eurostat website. 
 
•  The micro dataset contains 49761 firms belonging to 15 different European countries 
and several different NACE2 sectors.  
•  The macro-aggregated dataset covers 26 EU member state countries as well as 
Iceland, Norway, Turkey and provides information for Core sectors aggregated into 7 
sectors. 
 
Before pursuing with the descriptive analysis, a preliminary comparison analysis will allow us 
to underline some main limitations of these datasets (section II.1.5.1). Then we will explain 
how we built the database (II.1.5.2). 
 
II.1.5.1. CIS3 Macro and Micro data comparisons 
The data at the macro and micro level show significant differences in two specific 
dimensions: 
•  the number of countries for which the CIS provides data 
•  the sectoral disaggregation level  
 
The number of countries available 
The data at the macro level would be available for “all 25 EU Member States plus Iceland 
and Norway as well as Turkey and Romania. Furthermore other European and non European 
countries also carried out surveys equivalent to CIS3. The survey in Poland is mainly based 
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on CIS2, but many variables are also comparable with CIS3”.
19 However, when analysing the 
availability of data more carefully, many missing observations are present for some of the 
relevant countries to our research which, de facto, constraints some cross-country 
comparisons and a full exploitation of the data. In particular, the innovation adoption items 
are available only in the CIS3 version for 14 countries. The countries for which data are 
available at the macro level for this CIS3 item are: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Norway.
20 
 
When instead we analyse the data availability for the proposed indicator of innovation 
adoption at the firm level (CIS3 “micro” level) data are available for the following 14 
countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Norway, Portugal, Romania and Slovakia (in bold the ones available in 
both the micro and the aggregated databases). 
 
When we compare the micro CIS3 data with the macro ones some important “core countries” 
are notably missing in the micro database: Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Sweden, Finland 
and Netherlands. It is important to stress that these countries are probably the most important 
ones when the analysis focuses on the adoption of innovation, as they are those with a higher 
level of innovative activity. Table II.1 recaps the countries in the two databases. 
 
Sectoral disaggregation issues 
The CIS3 macro data are normally available for the following sectors: 
1.  Mining and quarrying (NACE 10-14) 
2.  Manufacturing (NACE 15-37) 
3.  Electricity, gas and water supply (NACE 40-41) 
4.  Wholesale trade (NACE 51) 
5.  Transport, storage and communication (NACE 60-64) 
6.  Financial intermediation (NACE 65-67) 
                                                 




20 Notice, these countries are available under the definition: type of innovation breakdown “innovative activities” 
and “Product/process, developed by the enterprise together with other enterprises or institutions or developed 
mainly by other enterprises and institutions”. 
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7.  Computer and other business activities (NACE 72, 73, 74.2 and 74.3)
21 
 
Table II.1. Countries’ presence in macro and micro datasets 
  CIS3 macro  CIS3 micro 
Austria   X  
Belgium  X X 
Bulgaria   X 
Czech Republic   X 
Estonia   X 
Finland   X  
France   X  
Germany   X X 
Greece   X X 
Hungary   X 
Iceland   X  X 
Italy   X  
Latvia   X 
Lithuania   X 
Luxembourg   X  
Netherlands   X  
Norway   X  X 
Portugal   X  X 
Romania     X 
Slovakia   X 
Spain   X  X 
Sweden  X  
Obs. 14  15 
In bold the core countries missing in the CIS3 micro dataset 
 
 
This said, some countries have missing data for some sectors normally available in the CIS3 
macro dataset. This implies that some sector cross-country comparisons will not be possible 
even if the aggregated data at the country level can be actually computed for the 15 countries.  
 
The CIS3 micro dataset allows a much higher disaggregation level than the macro data 
source. However, this level of disaggregation is uneven across countries. Aggregation by 
                                                 
21  computer and related activities (NACE 72), research and development (NACE 73), architectural and 
engineering activities (NACE 74.2), technical testing and analysis (NACE 74.3) 
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sector is not the same according to the countries under consideration (see Appendix II.2 for 
more details on this point). 
 
II.1.5.2. A database built from Micro and Macro data 
In order to obtain the best country coverage, a database was built from micro and macro data 
following the availability of information according to countries (see Table II.2). The sectoral 
classification is as presented above, that is to say, in 7 domains. 
 
Micro data have been favoured for the countries for which we have the two datasets. This 
choice is due to the fact that, using the macro dataset, we face a double counting problem
22 in 
the construction of the indicators of innovation diffusion/adoption (see Appendix II.1). This 
latter prevents to cross some information. As we will see below, this problem constrains a lot 
in the set up of the innovation adoption indicators. 
 
Concerning the micro dataset, we also face difficulties because micro databases are not 
harmonised between countries. In particular, this concerns such areas as the data type, the 
code for non-response, etc. Once more this is likely to constraint some cross-country 
comparisons and a full exploitation of the data. 
 
Moreover on the micro database, some missing or inconsistent observations have lead to a 
reduction of the size of the sample. For example, because of individuals answering ”yes” to 
the items “product and process innovation” and giving no answer to the item “innovation 
mainly developed by others or in collaboration with other firms”, 622 observations have been 
dropped from the sample. So, the dataset contains 49139 firms after cleaning. Deleting 
missing and inconsistent observations has a very weak influence on the spatial and sectoral 
characteristics of the sample. 
                                                 
22 We detail this issue in Appendix II.1. However, briefly, this refers to the fact that at the macro level we are not 
able to verify whether a firms is replying yes to two specific items of the CIS3 data used in the construction of 
the innovation adoption indicator and, therefore, we may double count it. 
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Table II.2. Database source according to countries 
  CIS3 macro  CIS3 micro 
Austria   X  
Belgium   X 
Bulgaria   X 
Czech Republic   X 
Estonia   X 
Finland   X  
France   X  
Germany    X 
Greece    X 
Hungary   X 
Iceland     X 
Italy   X   
Latvia   X 
Lithuania   X 
Luxembourg   X   
Netherlands   X   
Norway     X 
Portugal     X 
Romania     X 
Slovakia   X 
Spain     X 
Sweden X   
Obs. 7  15 
 
 
Finally, the database contains 22 countries. The source is micro dataset for 15 of them. For 
the other 7 countries, the risk of double counting is present because of the use of macro 
dataset. This problem is dealt with as explained in Appendix II.1. However, in order to keep 
in mind that potential differences may arise between the two sources of information, different 
colours are used in the descriptive part for countries coming from micro and macro sources. 
 
Regarding the sectoral coverage, as mentioned above, only seven sectors are available from 
Eurostat website. This is therefore the smaller breakdown we can use once micro and macro 
data are merged. In addition to that, due to the double counting problem, the finance sector 
must be dropped out. Indeed, because of an important number of firms with both product and 
process innovation in this sector, the computation of our adoption rate is strongly biased (the 
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explanation on this point is detailed in Appendix II.1). Thus we finally end up with 22 
countries and 6 sectors. A more detailed analysis by sector is provided in appendix, focusing 
on the micro database information (see Appendix II.2). 
 
As a means to develop the descriptive analysis in this Part II of the report as well as the 
regression analysis in Part III, we have developed a database with considerable information, 
not only on the topic of innovation and innovation diffusion/adoption, but also on the 
different determinants of this innovation adoption and on the Internal Market proxies. 
Therefore, a first deliverable of this project is the database that has been constructed as 
homogeneous as possible for all EU countries and sectors finally included in this project.  
 
 
II.2. Measuring innovation adoption 
 
In the CIS survey, the definition of innovation covers both the generation of innovation and 
the adoption of such innovation. Therefore, it can be used to analyse the process of innovation 
diffusion, by identifying innovation that relies on an adoption process. We first explain how 
we proceed to distinguish adoption and generation of innovation. Then, we discuss the choice 
of an indicator of the magnitude of adoption. Finally we suggest indicators likely to 
characterize the nature of adoption. 
 
II.2.1. Definition and magnitude of innovation adoption based on CIS3 
 
For each firm, the CIS gives information on the way the product and process innovations have 
been developed. Firms have to choose between three answers:  
o  innovation developed mainly by the firm 
o  innovation developed mainly together with other firms or institutions 
o  innovation developed mainly by other enterprises or institutions.  
 
Therefore, we will consider that innovation adoption occurs as soon as the firm declares 
that its process or product innovations have been developed “Mainly together with other 
enterprises or institutions” or “Mainly by other enterprises or institutions”. 
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Two kinds of limitations are associated with this definition:  
 
- A first set of limitations is due to the fact that only part of the innovation diffusion process is 
accounted for by CIS. Our definition refers to innovation adoption and does not allow us 
to address all the issues associated with the process of innovation diffusion. 
In addition, the CIS survey does not allow us to address the question of the diffusion among 
countries. This issue would be of great interest in the context of the EU. However, the items 
of the CIS regarding the way innovation is made do not provide any information about the 
location of the organizations by which or with which the innovation has been developed
23.  
Another drawback is that such a definition prevents us to study organisational or marketing 
innovation for which these items do not appear. This kind of innovation concerns numerous 
enterprises. Indeed, more than one European firm over two (58.8%) has introduced at least 
one organisational or marketing innovation between 1998 and 2000. However, this kind of 
innovations is not yet considered in the official definitions. Eurostat measures innovation rate 
in the state members through product and process innovation activities only.  
 
 - The second set of limitations is due to the inaccuracy of the information contained in the 
CIS. Our definition does not strictly account for adoption in the sense that innovation 
developed together with other enterprises can rely on knowledge sharing more than on 
innovation diffusion. However, as mentioned in the literature review (part I) most studies 
stress the importance of effective collaboration to adapt the technology and make it suitable 
for the adopter. This is thus relevant to consider that in many such cases, innovation diffusion 
occurs.
24  
Moreover, we do not have, for each firm, the number of innovations that fits with the 
definition. This is a strong limitation to account for the extent of adoption.  
 
                                                 
23 As we will see in sub-section II.4, questions are ask to the inventor about the location of their partners. But 
these questions is not related to the items regarding the way the output of innovation has been made, but to the 
items regarding the use of R&D cooperation. In the CIS, this information refers more to innovation inputs than 
to innovation output. Therefore it can hardly be used to assess the innovation adoption processes. Firms that 
mainly innovate by themselves (and thus are not considered as adopting firms according to our definition) may 
have established R&D cooperation links. We will use this information about location of partners in the analysis 
of the determinants of adoption, but it cannot be used to assess innovation diffusion between countries. 
24 Therefore, the indicator we suggest to use accounts more accurately to innovation adoption than to innovation 
diffusion. This is why we will use this concept of innovation adoption from now on for the results of the analysis 
made with our database.  
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Finally, firms are asked about their “main” way of innovation. Therefore, some firms are 
excluded from the definition above while they do rely on innovation adoption, but this is not 
their main way of innovation (some firms answering that their innovations have been 
developed mainly within the enterprises or the group may be at the same time adopters of 
innovation developed elsewhere). We are therefore driven to consider that adoption/diffusion 
is done by the firms whose product or process innovations are developed mainly together with 
other firms or mainly by other enterprises, and that all the information they provide regarding 
inputs and outputs concerns this kind of innovation. 
 
In spite of these limitations, the definition we suggest is the one that covers most enterprises. 
According to it, on average, 39% of the innovating firms adopted a product or a process 
innovation in Europe between 1998 and 2000. This represents less than 14% if we 
compare to the whole sample (and not only to innovating firms). 
 
A more accurate definition of adoption should be built, by adding an additional restriction. In 
the CIS, firms have to indicate whether their product innovations are “new for the market” or 
“only new for the firm”. Focusing on product that are new to the firm only will be more 
efficient to account for “pure” innovation adoption, since it considers only firms that adopt 
existing technologies, developed outside the firm. In other words, adding the “new for the 
firm only” item would ensure that the innovation already existed. This definition would also 
provide us with additional information, namely the turnover associated to innovation. Indeed, 
firms have to indicate the distribution of their turnover due to “new to the market” and to 
“new to the firm” innovations. This distribution gives interesting information. It allows us not 
only to identify innovation adoption but also to quantify innovation adoption. This would lead 
to alternative indicators of the magnitude of adoption. They are discussed in the Appendix 
II.3. 
 
However, this definition accounting for more pure innovation adoption faces several 
drawbacks: 
 
  Firstly, it obliges us to focus on product innovation only. In particular, the second 
item does not exist for process innovation (except in some countries: UK for instance). 
This is a serious problem since the share of process innovating enterprises is quite as 
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high as the share of product innovating enterprises (respectively 24.4% and 28.8% of 
the CIS3 enterprises). 
  Secondly, it requires having information at the firm level, in order to cross several 
items. As detailed in the Appendix II.1, this cannot be done with the macro data 
available on the Eurostat website. 
 
For these reasons, the remainder of the study focuses on the definition given firstly: firms are 
considered as adoptive ones if they declare that their process or product innovations 
have been developed “Mainly together with other enterprises or institutions” or “Mainly 
by other enterprises or institutions”. 
 
Even though imperfect, this instrument built from the CIS is the only systematic information 
available to measure innovation diffusion/adoption within the EU. It will allow us to provide 
a first assessement of the innovation adoption in the Internal Market, and to think about how 
the CIS could be improved to better account for these phenomena.  
 
II.2.2. Magnitude of innovation adoption 
 
On the basis of the definition given above, the magnitude of adoption will be measured as the 
share of adopting firms. Two different ratios could be considered: 
  
(a) Adopting enterprises / Total number of enterprises 
 
Problems of interpretation will arise with this indicator when comparing countries and 
industries. Indeed, the differences between countries or NACE could come from differences 
in the magnitude of adoption but also from differences in the intensity of innovation 
(activities or countries with higher level of innovation will exhibit higher ratio). So, we 
suggest to use a ratio based on innovative enterprises only: 
 
(b) Adoptiong enterprises / Number of innovative enterprises 
 
This will ensure that cross country or cross sector differences in adoption magnitude are not 
due to differences in innovation intensity. It also provides us with more tractable data. Indeed, 
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the percentages are higher than with the first indicator and its variance is higher as well. 
Therefore, the inference made on this basis will be more efficient. 
 
Two alternative definitions of “innovative enterprises” can be considered, with different 
scope: 
 
•  If we strictly follow our definition of innovation adoption, we can refer to product and 
process innovative enterprises only:  
 
Indicator 1: Number of adopting enterprises / Number of process and/or product 
innovative enterprises 
 
•  However, one can also use a broader definition, including “ongoing or abandoned 
innovation activities” (process or product). This latter is the “official” definition used 
by the EU to measure the share of innovation within countries or NACE. For this 
reason, we recommend to focus on this definition. 
 
Indicator 2: Number of adopting enterprises / Number of enterprises with process 
and/or product innovation or with ongoing or abandoned innovation 
activities 
 
One can also imagine adding “organisational and marketing innovation” as well. However, 
we will use this item for other purpose later on. For this reason we should avoid to include it 
at this stage. Therefore, our indicator of the magnitude of adoption will be the last indicator 
above (indicator 2).  
 
II.2.3. Nature of innovation adoption 
 
The nature of innovation adoption refers to two different questions. The first one can be 
summarized by the following question: what kind of innovation is adopted. The second 
one refers to the way innovation is adopted. It is important to get indicators of these 
characteristics, since the determinants of innovation adoption can differ according to them.  
 
  81 
 
 
The first question will be studied by looking at the distinction between product and process 
innovation. The innovation adoption presented above can be different according to the nature 
of innovation (product and process).  
 
Indicator 3: Number of firms identified as actors of innovation adoption and 
introducing product innovation / Number of product innovative firms. 
 
Indicator 4: Number of firms identified as actors of innovation adoption and 
introducing process innovation / Number of process innovative firms. 
 
This will inform us about the nature of the innovations (product or process) that diffuses over 
the industries in the different countries. However, due to the subjective nature of the 
definition of innovation adoption (“mainly”), this indicator must be considered carefully. We 
will not be able, for firms introducing both product and process innovation, to know if 
innovation diffusion occurs for both or for one kind of innovation only. The bias should not 
be neglected. According to the information recorded in the CIS3 micro aggregated database, 
firms introducing both kinds of innovation represent 19% of the adopting enterprises. But for 
some countries or industries this may be more important (see Appendix II.1). 
 
The second kind of characteristics deals with the nature of the adoption process, in reference 
with the channels it relies on. The nature of innovation adoption can differ according to the 
main drivers of adoption. In particular, adoption may result from adoption of external 
technologies. But it also relies often on the joint production of innovation.  
 
One item of the CIS allows us to address this question. Firms indicate whether their 
innovations are developed mainly in cooperation with others or mainly by others. Two 
indicators can be derived from this information. 
 
Indicator 5: Number of firms declaring that their process or product innovation has 
been developed “mainly together with other enterprises or institutions”/ 
Number of innovative firms.  
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Indicator 6: Number of firms declaring that their process or product innovation has 




II.3. Descriptive statistics of innovation adoption in the EU 
 
Based on the definition and measures of innovation adoption given in section II.2, this third 
part will characterize innovation adoption in Europe. We put the stress on three kinds of 
comparisons: 
•  Nature innovation-based comparisons: Since the adoption process may differ 
significantly according to the type of innovation under consideration, a distinction will be 
made according to the nature of innovation: in particular, product vs process innovation 
and collaboration vs external sources of innovation will be analysed. 
•  Geographic comparisons: Comparison across European countries in relation to the main 
variables characterizing innovation adoption. 
•  Sectoral comparisons: For the indicators available at a sectoral level, comparisons will 
allow us to identify some differences across industries in the adoption process and barriers 
to innovation adoption.  
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II.3.1. Descriptive analysis of adoption rates: General strategies  
 
As previously mentioned (section II.1.5.2), the computation of a global adoption rate (at 
country or sectoral level) raises some difficulties. Because micro aggregated data allows the 
crossing of different items, an exact count of the number of adopting firms is possible. This is 
not the case with macro data, for which double counting of product and process innovation 
occurs (see Appendix II.1 for a detailed explanation on this point). Therefore, the values from 
macro database are higher than those from the micro database. In order to cope with this 
issue,  a rescaling procedure has been used to make the two databases information 
compatible. This rescaling procedure and its limitations are explained in Appendix II.1. In the 
following graphs, the clearer colour given to the countries observed from the macro database 
will help us to keep in mind that the global indicator of adoption computed from macro data 
may be affected by this procedure.  
 
Overall, our empirical evidence shows that the percentage of adoptive firms is equal to 
39%.  This rate varies a lot according to countries and sectors,  but this will be analysed 
afterwards.  
 
Now, we turn to analyse the general pattern of the use of adoption made by firms that are 
product innovators and those that are process innovators, to study whether their adoption 
intensity varies as well as the way it is adopted. In this sense, we distinguish two modalities of 
adoption. The firms can:  
- either develop their innovation mainly in cooperation with other enterprises or institutions  










Is innovation adoption more important for process or product innovations and is this adoption 
the result of Cooperation activities with other firms or innovations are acquired directly from 
other innovative firms? 
 
1)  Innovation adoption seems to be more important for Process innovations than 
Product innovations. 
 
2)  Cooperation activities are driving innovation adoption at the EU level while the 
acquisition of innovations from external innovators is a less important source of 
adoption of innovation (both process and product).  
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MAIN INSIGHT: For all the countries, the adoption rate is higher in the case of process 
innovation (41%) than product innovation (28%). So, innovation adoption is more process-
oriented (even if innovation on its own is more product-oriented, 24 % of EU firms make process 
innovations vs. 28% which perform  product innovations). It is not surprising that process 
innovations appear highly adopting. Indeed, there is a close relationship between process 
innovation and machinery investment (Conte and Vivarelli, 2005). In turn, such embodied 
technology represents a very tradable component compared to i.e. intangible assets. 
 
These results may seem surprising because process innovations are more often kept secret than 
product innovations. In this context, we could think that firms are more reticent about collaborating 
or entrusting other organisations for innovation development. However, our results seem to suggest 
that process innovations need interactions between the firm and its suppliers and/or clients to 
be successful. Moreover, process innovations are often the results of supplier or client needs. 
This would encourage cooperation or outsourcing strategies to develop this type of 
innovation.     
 
II.3.2. Descriptive analysis of innovation adoption by countries 
 
We will organize the description by firstly analysing the heterogeneity of adoption rates 
across EU countries, and then present the main correlations of innovation adoption vs. the 
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total innovative effort with the idea of understanding whether differences can be actually 
observed among countries which “produce” innovation and those which, instead absorb or 
“adopt” this innovation. This task will be carried out, also, by disaggregating innovation 
adoption by its main “characteristics”, that is of being product or process innovation or that of 
being performed jointly with other innovative firms or as a result of a direct acquisition from 
another (external) firm.  
 
 
1)  No, innovation adoption rates vary substantially across EU member states 
2)  Yes, highly innovative countries seem also to be those which are more engaged in 
adoption activities. 
Are innovation adoption rates homogeneous across EU countries and are they correlated with 
innovation rates?  
 
 
Figure II.2. Innovation and Adoption rates by countries 
 
 
Note: The average adoption rate given on the graph (and on all the following graphs) is computed as an average 
of the country rates and not as a global rate computed from the country and industry database.  























-  These two variables are not significatively correlated if all countries are included in the 
calculation (Pearson correlation = 0.277, p=0.201). 
-  These two variables are significatively associated at a significance level of 5% if we 
exclude Luxembourg (Pearson correlation = 0.449, p=0.036). 
-  These two variables are significatively associated at a significance level of 1% if we 
exclude Luxembourg and Bulgaria (Pearson correlation = 0.569, p=0,007). 
Are Innovation Activities correlated with Adoption both in the case of Product and Process 
Innovations or do we observe differences in both types of innovations across EU members?  
 
EU countries with higher rates of Product Innovation are also experiencing higher rates of 
Product Adoption (apart from the specific cases of Bulgaria and Luxembourg). The same is 
true for Process Innovation activities: those countries innovating more on process are also 
those which seem to benefit from process innovation adoption. 
The analysis of Pearson correlation rates between innovation and adoption shows that: 
-  Luxembourg has a high rate of innovation but the adoption rate is very low. This report 
can also be observed for France and Sweden but in lower proportion. 
-  Bulgaria has a very low innovation rate but an important adoption rate. 
Some countries have specific positions: 
Generally, countries with low innovation rate also record a low adoption rate. This concerns Greece 
and a majority of Eastern Europe countries (Romania, Latvia, Slovakia, Hungary...). On the 
opposite, countries with high innovation rates have higher adoption rates (like Belgium, 
Netherlands, Iceland, Germany, Austria). 
Also, countries with higher level of innovative activities seem to be also those more dynamic in the 
context of innovation adoption. It seems that fostering innovation activities may also be 
associated to some extent to spillover effects (which take place through “adoption mechanisms”) 
leading to higher levels of diffusion and adoption of innovation. It is also interesting to note that 
the rates of innovative firms are similar to those of adopting firms (in this respect, we should 
take into account that the adopting rates are calculated over innovative firms). 
MAIN INSIGHT: Although our empirical evidence shows that the average percentage of 
adoptive firms is equal to 39%, this rate varies a lot according to countries. The maximum 
value is observed for the Netherlands with 61%, then for Belgium with 51%. On the opposite, the 
minimum value is observed for Luxembourg with 18%. This percentage is low if compared to other 
countries since all other values are between 27% and 44%.  
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MAIN INSIGHT:  
Product innovations: We find evidence of a positive correlation between being Product 
Innovators and being also Adopters of product innovations across EU countries. This result seems 
to be in line with the overall observation that fostering Innovation activities (this time leading to 
product innovations) will also be associated to higher rates of adoption. Interestingly again, the rates 
of product innovative firms are similar to those of product adopting firms. If we exclude 
Luxembourg and Bulgaria when computing correlation for product innovation and product adoption, 
the relation is significant and positive (Pearson = 0,460; p-value = 0,041). 
 
Process innovations: Countries for which innovation activities are more process oriented (those with 
high process innovation rates) are also those in which the same processes are more adopted 
(supposedly by closest firms). Again, being innovators (this time process innovators) seems to be 
associated to higher rates of process adoption. Countries which do not make process innovation, 
instead, are also stuck to low levels of adoption. However, in this case, it is interesting to note that the 
rates of process innovative firms is much lower than those of process adopting firms, that is, firms 
tends to rely on process adoption more proportionally than on making their own process 
innovations. When we drop out Slovakia and Bulgaria, we obtain a significant positive correlation 








Are there any differences in the nature of adoption when we look at product and process 
innovation in EU countries? Is more important cooperation or other organizations-based 
adoption and is this pattern consistent across EU countries? 
 
Both the cooperation-based and other organization-based adoption rates are higher for process 
innovation than for product innovation. And similar adoption strategies are followed for product 
and process innovations since cooperation and other organisation-based adoption rates for 
product are positively correlated with the ones of process across EU countries. 
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Figure II.5. Adoption nature by country for product innovation 
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Table II.3. Pearson correlation Matrix 
   Rates related to PRODUCT  Rates related to PROCESS 
   Cooperation  Other 
organization  Adoption Innovation  Cooperation  Other 
organization  Adoption Innovation 
 1  -0,002  0,821**  0,154  0,788**  -0,026  0,588**  -0,112 
Cooperation   0,992  0,000  0,482  0,000  0,909  0,004  0,619 
 1  0,568**  -0,076 0,181 0,753** 0,528* 0,100  Other 
organisation     0,005  0,730 0,420  0,000 0,012  0,659 
   1  0,083  0,751**  0,408  0,785**  -0,035 
Adoption       0,705  0,000  0,059  0,000  0,876 




Innovation         0,145  0,915  0,247  0,000 
       1  0,189  0,861**  0,083 
Cooperation           0,400  0,000  0,713 
         1  0,662**  0,112  Other 
organisation            0,001  0,620 
          1  0,121 
Adoption              0,591 




Innovation               
** The correlation is significant at 0.01 level. 
  * The correlation is significant at 0.05 level. 
 
 
MAIN INSIGHT: According to Fig II.5 and II.6, both the cooperation-based and other 
organization-based adoption rates are higher for process innovation than for product 
innovation. In terms of level, differences between countries are lower for product innovation 
than for process innovation. Indeed, the gap between minimum and maximum rates is larger for 
process innovation.  
 
For process innovation, Belgium and Netherlands strongly appear to be countries with high level of 
adoption based both on cooperation and entrusting to other. Some countries seem more cooperation 
oriented like Finland, Bulgaria, Sweden contrary to Hungary, Spain and Lithuania where the other 
organization-based adoption rate is higher. 
 
For product innovation, even if country differences are smaller, various profiles can be identified. 
Profiles observed for process innovation are often the same as those for product innovation. 
Countries that strongly rely on cooperation for product adoption also strongly rely on cooperation 
for process adoption. 
 
From Pearson correlation matrix (see table II.3), we can see that both the cooperation and other 
organization-based adoption rates for product are significant and positively correlated with the ones 
of process, which means similar adoption strategies are followed for product and process.  
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II.3.3. Descriptive analysis of innovation adoption by sector 
 
The descriptive analysis of innovation adoption is next carried out by productive sector in 
order to provide evidence of whether the innovation adoption patterns evidenced in the 
country analysis are also observed at the sectoral level. Then, we will try to answer questions 
such as if innovation adoption is an activity mainly performed in highly innovative sectors or, 
instead, mostly performed in low-innovative sectors. Are there any differences in the way 







Are adoption rates homogeneous across sectors and do they present any correlation with 
innovation rates?  
 
1) Innovation adoption is far from being homogeneous across sectors ranging from 32% in 
Extractive industries and 62% in Electricity, gas and water supply. 
 
2) No, surprisingly we find a negative correlation between innovation activities (those sectors 
which innovate more) and the adoption of innovation at the sectoral level. Innovation 
adoption seems to be weak in those sectors which instead are the most innovative ones. 
 
Figure II.7. Innovation and Adoption rates by sectors 
 
 




















MAIN INSIGHT: Sectors for which the adoption rates are the most important are Electricity, 
gas and water supply (62%), then Wholesales trade (51%) and Transport and 
communication (48%).  
 
If compared to the country case, the correlation between innovation rates and adoption rates is 
negative. Sectors with high adoption rates (Wholesale trade, Transport and communication, 
Electricity, gaz and water supply) are the ones with low innovation rate. Conversely, sectors 
recording high innovation rates (Manufacturing and Computer and other business services) show 
small adoption rates. Extractive industry has a specific position with both low innovation and low 
adoption rates. 
The lack of correlation between adoption and innovation at the sector level may highlight 
the occurrence of inter-sector technological flows. Generation of innovation would be 
mainly driven by some sectors (namely Manufacturing and Computer and other business 
services) and then adopted in other sectors. 
Is innovation adoption relying on Cooperation activities or on External innovative activities 
when focusing on sectoral dynamics?  
 
For both Product and Process innovations, Cooperation is the channel through which 
innovations are mainly adopted. The direct acquisition of innovation by the outsourcing to 
other organizations is a minor adoption strategy regardless of the sector taken into 
consideration and of its relative adoption rate. 
 



























































Other organisation based product adoption
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Other organisation based process adoption













MAIN INSIGHT:  Adoption is more cooperation-oriented than relying from outside 
resources, whatever sector is analysed.  
 
Concerning adoption behaviour in the sectoral case, we can relate the following facts:  
    
-  Both for product and process innovations, cooperation rates are particularly high for 
Wholesale trade, Financial activities and Transport and communication (and Energy 
only for process innovation adoption). On the opposite, Manufacturing and Extractive 
industry record lowest rates. 
 
-  Whatever the sector and the nature of innovation (product/process), cooperation is more 
frequent than outsourcing to other organisation (except for Energy production and 
supply in the case of product innovations).   
 
-  The adoption is more cooperation-based for process innovation than product innovation 
whatever the sector (except for Extractive industries for which the rates are similar). 
 
-  Concerning the share of innovative firms entrusting with other organisation, this share 
varies a lot according to sector. It is the highest for Energy and Transport (for both 
product and process) and also Trade (for process only). It is the lowest for Computer and 
other business services, Manufacturing, Extractive industry and in lower proportion for 
Finance. 
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II.3.4. Sector composition and country's overall performance 
 
Crossing the descriptive statistics obtained by country and those obtained by sector, one can 
wonder to what extent sector composition impacts on the country’s performances in term of 
innovation and adoption. Countries specialized in highly innovative (resp. adoptive) sectors 
would be indeed more likely to exhibit high rates of innovation (resp. adoption) and 
conversely.  
 
In order to explore more deeply this issue, appendix II.7 gives the detailed descriptive 
statistics by country and sector. This allows to highlight the specialisation of some countries, 
and to see to what extent this specialisation may be at the root of the country’s overall 
performances. Three main conclusions arise. 
 
- In some cases, the sector composition may explain the country overall performance. For 
instance, the high adoption rate recorded for Belgium may result from its specialisation in 
Wholesale and retail trade and in Transport and communications (see fig. A.II.7.1 in 
appendix). Indeed, these two sectors are among the most adoptive ones (see fig. II.7 above). 
Conversely, the low adoption rate registered for Greece might be explained by its 
specialisation in Manufacturing activities (see fig. A.II.7.1 in appendix), a sector in which the 
adoption rate is relatively weak.  
 
- For some countries however, specialisation is not the only explanation of innovation 
performances. In particular, the German specialisation in Computer and other business 
services only partly explains its high rate of innovation. This sector does record the highest 
innovation rate at the EU level (see fig. II.7) and therefore influences positively the overall 
innovation rate in Germany. However, beyond this positive impact of its specialisation, 
Germany also benefits from a positive innovation dynamism: the innovation rates in Germany 
are higher than the EU rates in every sectors (see fig A.II.7.2 in appendix). In the Netherlands, 
the two same phenomena explain the overall high adoption rate: this country is specialized in 
two highly adopting sectors (Wholesales and retail trade and Transport and communication) 
and at the same time, for every sectors, Deutch firms exhibit higher adoption rates than the 
EU average (see fig. A.II.7.3 in appendix). Conversely, the weak performances of Slovakia 
and Latvia in terms of innovation may results from their specialisation in a low innovative 
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sector, Wholesale and retail trade, and at the same time from an overall low propensity to 
innovate. Their innovation rates are lower than the EU ones in every sectors (see fig A.II.7.2 
in appendix). 
 
- Finally, in some other cases, the high level of innovation or adoption cannot be explained by 
the country specialisation. For instance, Austria has no strong specialization in strongly 
innovative sector (see fig. A.II.7.1 in appendix), but it is characterized by high innovation and 
adoption rate. Moreover, some countries specialized in sectors with low innovation and 
adoption performances registered high rates of innovation or adoption. For instance, in spite 
of their specialisation in Wholesale and retail trade and in Transport and communications 
(two sectors characterized by low innovation rates), Belgium and Iceland exhibit high 
innovation rates. Conversely, the low innovation rate observed for Greece cannot be 
explained by the country specialisation. Althought specialized in a relatively highly 
innovative sector (Manufacturing), this country faces very low rates of innovation. 
 
Therefore, the country industrial specialisation only partly explained the strong differences in 
innovation adoption rates. Using descriptive statistics tools, the next section explores the 
determinants that may drive these differences. A more comprehensive analysis will then be 
provided in part III, using econometric tools. 
 
 
II.4. Descriptive statistics of the potential determinants of 
innovation adoption in the EU 
 
As detailed in Part I of the report, several factors are likely to influence the innovation 
adoption rates of firms. Some of them rely on the innovation inputs carried out by both 
adopters and innovators. Other potential determinants are related to other firm and market 
features. Finally, a third set of determinants refers to institutional environment (especially IPR 
regime and Internal Market regulations). In this subsection of the descriptive analysis, we 
study to what extent these three kinds of determinants are related to the innovation adoption 
rates in the EU countries. In Table II.4 we offer a list of the specific determinants of 
innovation adoption for which we will analyse their correlation with adoption rates.  
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A. Innovation inputs 
 
 Sources of information for innovation 
 Innovation expenditure 
 Human capital resources 
 Organisational changes 
 Cooperation in joint R&D 
 
B. Market features  
 
 Competition 
 Barriers to competition 
 Trade 
 Barriers to trade 
 
C. Regulatory environment  
 
¾  Protection methods for inventions 
 Patenting 
 Other legal and informal protection methods 
 Security of property rights 
 
¾  Internal Market regulations 
 Transposition Deficit  
 Product Market Regulations by EFW 
 Product Market Regulations by OECD 
 
 
II.4.1. Innovation inputs and adoption 
 
The literature review provided in Part I of this report highlighted that both demand side and 
supply side determinants are likely to impact the firm ability to adopt new products or new 
processes. We cannot address separately the demand side and supply side factors. Indeed, the 
CIS macro aggregated data from Eurostat website does not allow us to distinguish the features 
of firms that mainly adopt innovation from the one of firms that generate innovation. 
Therefore, the issue of the relationship of innovation inputs with innovation adoption is 
considered as a whole. The five types of innovation inputs studied in this section (sources of 
information, R&D inputs, human capital, organisational changes and cooperation activities) 
can thus reflect both suppliers and adopters’ investments. 
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II.4.1.1. Sources of information for innovation: Different country profiles clearly 
identified but not significatively related to the level of innovation adoption 
The CIS survey includes interesting information regarding the main sources of information 
used by firms in their innovation activities. In particular, a distinction can be made between 
sources of information that are internal to the firm or to the group, and the different external 
sources. As stressed in Part I of the report, the way information circulates among agents is an 
important channel of diffusion. This sub-section aims at analysing whether the different 
sources of information are associated with different level of innovation adoption. With this 
aim, we first characterize the EU countries according to their type of information sources 
(internal sources, market sources, institutional sources, etc.). We then study to what extent 
these different informational profiles are correlated with innovation adoption. 
 
In terms of sources of information for innovation, sources within the enterprise are the most 
used (Fig.II.10). Information from market sources (from clients as much as from suppliers or 
competitors) or from other sources (like fairs or professional conferences) is also frequent.  
Indeed, between 65% and 87% of innovative firms exploit these different sources of 
information. But only between 15% and 20% of firms use them with a high importance. On 
the contrary, the institutional sources, that is to say, information from universities or 
government or private non-profit research institutes are weakly exploited: respectively by 
30% and 23% of innovative firms. However, the percentages of firms using them at a high 
level are relatively high (11% and 9%). 
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In order to analyse correlations between various variables about sources of information for 
innovation and to describe European countries according to the importance of these different 
sources and its relationship with their level of innovation adoption, a Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) was carried out





Is there a link between the use of sources of information for innovation and innovation 
adoption rates?  
 
The link between the type of information sources used for innovation and the level of 
adoption is not really obvious. However, 4 groups of countries can be identified according to 




                                                 
25 The modality internal sources from other enterprises within the enterprise group is excluded because of the 
importance of missing values (39% of the total). Iceland  is also excluded for the same reason.  
26 For technical details (eigen values, correlation circle and matrix), see appendix II.4. 
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Figure II.11. Sources of information for innovation according to countries and adoption rates 
 
 
Figure II.12. Box plot : Main statistics for adoption rate according to information sources group 
 
Statistics represented in this graph are: 
- the minimum (lower line out of the box) 
- the first quartile (lower line of each box) 
- the median (line inside each box) 
- the third quartile (upper line of each box) 
- the maximum or far value (upper line out of 
the box) 





















MAIN INSIGHT:  The factorial map (Figure II.11) clearly shows 4 groups of countries: 
 
-  The first group (Luxembourg, Sweden and France) mainly exploits internal sources and 
market sources related to clients and suppliers.  The use of institutional sources is 
comparatively low (high level use rates varies from 2% to 7%).  
 
-  The second group (Italy, Austria, Netherlands, Finland, and Lithuania) is generally 
characterized by a high level of use of information produced within the enterprise. 
Compared to the first group, the use of market sources is low. Only Finland and Austria 
have a high level of use for client sources. For these countries, the exploitation of 
institutional sources is as low as in the first group (the maximum rate is 6%). But it is also 
the case for competitor and other sources. 
 
-  The third group (Norway, Germany, Slovakia) is very specific due to: 
  a high level of institutional sources (rates are above 20% except for Germany with 18% 
for universities and 13% for the second institutional source)     
  a high level of professional conferences, exhibitions and competitor sources.  
So, this third group is positioned on innovation sources that are currently encouraged in 
technological policies, that is to say, based on relationships between firms and public 
research activities and cooperation between enterprises within the same industry. The level 
of other market sources is also relatively high. 
 
-  The fourth group (Belgium, Romania, Latvia, Spain, Portugal etc.) is close to the average 
situation for institutional sources (except for Hungary for which the two rates are very high: 
30%) and for professional conference, exhibition and competitor sources. The client and 
supplier source rates are limited and internal source rates are very low compared to other 
countries.  
 
More interesting for our purpose of relating the sources of information with the adoption rates of the 
different countries, the box-plot (Figure II.12) shows that for the second, third and fourth groups, the 
different quartiles of the adoption rates are close. Additionally, a one-way analysis of the variance 
confirms that average adoption rates are not significantly different according to groups (F-
statistic being equal to 1,962 and the significance value of the F-test being to 0,158). According to 
the box-plot, only the first group (composed of France, Sweden and Luxembourg, which mainly 
exploit internal sources and market sources related to clients and suppliers) present lower 
adoption rates than the rest.  
 
II.4.1.2. Innovation expenditure nature and the adoption rate are not significantly 
associated 
The amount of expenditure associated with innovation activities has been stressed in the 
literature as an important condition of innovation diffusion. Indeed, the R&D and other 
innovation expenditure made by both the innovator and the adopter are needed to improve the 
technology, to reduce its price, or to adapt it to the adopter needs. The CIS survey contains 
detailed information about these expenditures. The total level of innovation expenditure can 
be observed, but also its distribution among different types of activity. Therefore we can 
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analyse the impact on innovation adoption rates of both the global level of innovation 
expenditure and the different natures of this expenditure. Three countries however contain 
missing values for these items (Luxembourg, Austria and Sweden). They are thus excluded 
from this analysis. 
 
Figure II.13 shows that innovation expenditure is mainly devoted to intramural R&D (with 
45% of expenditure) and to the acquisition of machinery and equipment (24%). The other 
types of innovation activity concern a small part of total innovative expenditure. The 
acquisition of other external knowledge which contains purchase of rights to use patents and 
non-patented inventions, licenses, know-how, trademarks, software represents only 1% of 
European total innovation expenditure.   
 




In order to analyse the correlations between various variables about innovation expenditures 
and to describe European countries according to the importance of these different resources, a 
Factorial Correspondence Analysis (FCA) has been done
28. The factorial map (Figure II.14) 
clearly shows 4 groups of countries: 
 
                                                 
27 In this calculation, Austria, Luxembourg and Sweden are not included because of missing values.  
28 We use here and FCA (and not a PCA) because we work on R&D expenditure. This allows us to use a 
contingence table since the sums of rows and columns have a direct interpretation. The variable “Training, 
market introduction of innovations and  design” is not included in this analysis because it gathers different 
modalities of innovation expenditures. These 3 modalities are three different questions in terms of engagement 
(yes or no modalities) but unfortunately they are gathered in only one question in terms of expenditure. For more 
details, see Appendix II.5. 
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-  The first group of countries (France, Norway, Finland and Netherlands) is 
characterized by an important share of both intramural and extramural R&D 
expenditure. For example, for France, the internal expenditure share is equal to 70% 
and the external one to 29%, that is very high compared to all the countries (Figure 
II.14 below).  
-  The second group has an opposite profile. Indeed, it is characterized by low internal 
and external expenditure rates but by high rates in terms of acquisition of machinery 
and equipment (the share varies from 55% to 86% according to countries) and in 
lower proportion in terms of acquisition of other external knowledge (from 2% to 7%; 
except Slovakia for which the rate is equal to 0). This group essentially gathers 
Eastern European countries and Southern states like Italy, Greece and Portugal.  
-  The third group has an intermediary position. It contains Spain, Belgium, Germany 
and Iceland. 
-  Finally, Hungary belongs to a distinct single country group. This country has a 
specific profile: the share of acquisition of other external knowledge is very high 
(14%). 
 
Figure II.14. Innovative expenditure modalities by country 
 
Intramural research & 
experimental development
Acquisition of R&D 
(extramural R&D)
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Are higher innovation expenditures related to more innovation adoption across EU member 
states? 
 
Evidence seems to point to a positive link between innovation expenditures and total adoption 
of innovation, although it is not significant in most cases (only with the modality of 
Intramural R&D the relationship is weakly and significantly positive). 
 
Table II.5. Pearson correlation Matrix 














1 .409  .134  -.349 -.211  Adoption rate 
    .082  .586  .143  .387 
 1  .551* -.956** -.212  Intramural R&D share 
      .014 .000  .384 
  1  -.749**  .098  Extramural R&D share 
       .000  .691 
    1 .016  Acquisition of machinery 
and equipement share 
  
      .949 
      1  Acquisition of the other 
external knowledge share           
 *  The correlation is significant at a 5% threshold. **  The correlation is significant at a 1% threshold. 
 
 
Figure II.15. Total innovative expenditure (in logs) and adoption rate by country 
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MAIN INSIGHT:  From Figure II.14, we do not clearly see any correlation between adoption 
rate (represented by the bubble size) and the relative importance of the different modalities 
of innovation expenditure. This is confirmed by the Pearson correlation matrix: the adoption rate 
is not significantly correlated with any kind of innovation expenditure (only in the case of 
intramural R&D it is significantly positive at a 10% level). Instead, if we test if total innovative 
expenditure are significatively correlated with the innovation adoption rate, we also observe that: 
-  The amount of total innovative expenditure presents a 0.3% correlation (not significant) with 
innovation adoption rates, that increases to a value of 39%, significant at a 10% of 
significant level, when the total innovative expenditures are taken in logarithms  
-  The share of total innovative expenditure in turnover in innovative firms offers a correlation 
level of 22% with adoption rates, which is not significant.  
 
Therefore, we can conclude that evidence seems to point to a positive link between innovation 
expenditures and total adoption of innovation, although it is not significant in most cases 
(only with the modality of Intramural R&D the relationship is weakly and significantly 
positive, Table II.5).  
 
The positive link between innovation expenditure in logs and adoption of innovation can be seen in 
Figure II.15. Countries with high total innovative expenditure have, by and large, the highest 
adoption rates (except for France and Italy) and, on the opposite, countries with low expenditure 












This relatively low level of correlation may result from the impact of R&D expenditure on the 
overall innovation level. In our indicator of adoption, the denominator is the number of 
innovative firms. Therefore, the positive impact of R&D expenditure on the propensity to 
innovate may reduce the impact observed on the rate of adoption. The correlation coefficients 
between the different R&D expenditure variables and the innovation rate are indeed positive 
and significant. For instance, the correlation between the total innovation expenditure variable 
and innovation rate is 0.63 (p-value: 0.004). R&D expenditure influences at the same time 
innovation adoption and overall innovation performances. The absence of a significant impact 
on the adoption rates points that R&D expenditure do not impact very significantly more 
on innovation based on adoption than on innovation mainly developed by the firm itself. 
The micro econometric part of the report (section III.5) will examine this possible effect of 
R&D on the overall innovation, in order to disentangle the impact on innovation adoption 
from the impact on “generation” of innovation. 
Moreover, if looking at innovation adoption disaggregated by product and process, we can 
detect that, among the many innovation expenditure CIS proxies, only “total innovation 
expenditure” shows to be significantly correlated to process innovation adoption
29. It seems 
                                                 
29 Results are detailed in Appendix II.10 for both product and process innovation adoption separately. 
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therefore that more investments in innovation may actually boost number of process 
innovations which are ultimately adopted. 
 
II.4.1.3. Human capital resources and adoption rate: a positive but non significant 
correlation 
The education level can be a fundamental input in adoption behavior. Indeed, in order to 
assimilate knowledge produced out of the firm or in cooperation with partners, the firm needs 
qualified human resources. The internal absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) 
appears as a necessary condition to adopt external knowledge. This question can be addressed 
using both CIS and non CIS variables. Specifically, we are going to use two different proxies 
for human capital: the average number of employees with high education in innovative firms 
obtained from CIS3 and the percentage of Human Resources in Science and Technology
30 in 
labour force in each country in 2000 obtained from EUROSTAT. In the next Figures we cross 






Is Human Capital directly correlated to Innovation Adoption rates? 
 
The link between different measures of Human Capital and Innovation Adoption rates seems 
to be non-significant even if positive. 
 
There is no correlation between the adoption rates of innovation and the skills of the observed 
workforce. As noticed previously for R&D expenditure, the absence of a strong correlation 
between adoption and human resources can be explained by the positive correlation between 
Human Ressources and innovation. Indeed, as our adoption index is divided by the number of 
innovative firms, the positive impact of Human Resources on overall innovation increases the 
denominator and therefore reduces the rate of adoption. The correlation coefficient between 
innovation rate and human resources in S&T equals 0.49 (with p-value: 0.024). In other 
                                                 
30 HRST is defined according to the Canberra Manual as a person fulfilling at least one of the following 
conditions: 
-  Successfully completed education at the third level in a S&T field of study  
-  OR not formally qualified as above, but employed in a S&T occupation where the above qualifications 
are normally required. 
We have also crossed adoption rate with the core of HRST that is to say people who have: 
-  successfully completed education at the third level in a S&T field of study 
-  AND are employed in a S&T occupation 
In this case, the correlation is smaller than with the total HRST (pearson correlation = 0,1898 ; p-value=0,3976). 
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words, human capital influences positively adoption, but also the other types of innovation. 
The impact of human resources on innovation adoption is not significantly stronger than 
its impact on the “generation” of innovation. This potential direct impact of human 
resources on overall innovation performance will be more deeply dealt with in the 
econometric estimations provided in part III of the report (see in particular the estimations 
made on the microdataset, in sub-section III.5). 
 
 
Figure II.16. Average number of employees with high education in innovative firms and 






































































































Countries with macro data have a clearer color
 
  107 
 





































































































MAIN INSIGHT:  We observe that, for the countries we have available in our sample, there is no 
correlation between the adoption rates of innovation and the skills of the observed workforce.  
 
However, it is possible to notice how many countries with a low percentage of HRST also have a low 
adoption rate. It is the case for a majority of Eastern countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Latvia 
Romania) and Southern countries (Greece, Italy). By contrast, some countries with a high HRST rate 
display high adoption rate. It is essentially the case for countries located in the North of Europe such as 
Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Finland and Germany. But some countries have a disproportioned 
adoption rate compared to the level of HRST. For Portugal, Bulgaria and Austria, the adoption rate is 
relatively high compared to HRST rate. We have the opposite situation for Lithuania, Sweden or France.  
 
Figure II.16 does not show a significant correlation between adoption rates and the number of employees 
with high education level (Pearson correlation = 0.0493; p-value=0.8275). Among countries for which the 
average number of highly educated employees is below the average, some have a low adoption rate (like 
Luxembourg, Greece or Hungary…) but some have, on the opposite, a very high adoption rate (like 
Netherlands or Belgium). Moreover, countries recording the highest average number of highly educated 
employees have a medium adoption rate. 
 
When crossing adoption rate with the percentage of Human Resources in Science and Technology in 
labour force in each country (Figure II.17), the correlation is higher but it is still not significant (Pearson 
correlation=0.2265, p-value=0.3108). This correlation turns however to be significant at 10% threshold if 
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II.4.1.4. A weak positive relationship between adoption rate and organizational changes   
Leading innovation adoption strategies can require changes in organisational structures. CIS 













































































































































Are changes in the organisational structure correlated to Innovation Adoption? 
 
There does not seem to be much evidence that organisational changes is related to more 
Innovation Adoption if all EU countries in the sample are considered. However, if we drop 
the Netherlands and Bulgaria (with high adoption rates and low organisational structures) 
and Luxembourg (the opposite situation), the relationship becomes significantly positive. 
MAIN INSIGHT:  We can see that the percentage of innovative firms with organizational changes 
varies substantially according to countries. Bulgaria and France record very low percentage 
(respectively 12.4% and 15.1%) whereas Romania, Germany and Austria have the highest rate 
(close to 60%).      
 
According to Figure II.18 we observe that the adoption rate increases generally with the 
percentage of firms with organizational changes. The correlation computed from all countries is 
not significant but three states appear as specific: Luxembourg, Bulgaria and the Netherlands. The 
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II.4.1.5. A non significant correlation between adoption and cooperation in joint R&D 
From the CIS survey, it is possible to know the number of firms that are engaged in 
innovation cooperation, that is, active participation in joint R&D and other innovation 
projects with other organisations (either other enterprises or non-commercial institutions). In 
addition to the general information about R&D cooperation activities, the CIS survey 
provides the distribution of these cooperations according to the location of the partners. 
Thanks to this information, two additional variables can be built, in order to assess the 
relationship between cooperation among EU countries and cooperation within EU countries
31.  
In the context of the internal market, a key issue concerns the impact of the diffusion of 
innovation across EU countries. Focusing on R&D cooperations that take place between EU 
countries might give first insights about the potential flows of knowledge that arise between 
firms that belong to different countries. 
 
The overall rates of cooperation in EU countries are given below on Figure II.19. On average, 
only a little more than one innovative firm over four cooperate for its innovation activities. 
Not surprisingly, countries that are most involved in R&D cooperation are Scandinavian and 
Baltic States. Hungary and Luxembourg are also strongly relying on cooperation for their 
innovative activities, with respectively 55% and 38% of their innovative firms engaged in 
R&D cooperation. Conversely, Spain and Italy, but also Germany and Portugal do not rely 







Is there any correlation between cooperation activities and the rates of Innovation Adoption 
across EU member states? 
 
Correlation between these two measures seems to be (surprisingly) weak and therefore non 
significant.  
  
The correlation with innovation adoption is not significant, and the coefficient is even 
negative (correlation coefficient: -0.32, p-value: -0.14). One can think that this could be due 
to a positive impact of cooperation on the overall level of innovation. This would increase the 
denominator of our adoption rate and counterbalance a positive effect on adoption. But this is 
not the case: the correlation rate between cooperation and innovation is not significant (it 
                                                 
31 The micro database contains however missing values for some countries (in particular Belgium, Spain and 
Greece) regarding the detailled information about location of partners. In order to overcome this problem, 
missing values have been replaced by using the macro data available on Eurostat website. 
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equals to -0.20, with p-value: 0.39). This result may seem surprising since the adoption rate 
notably contains information about cooperation in product and/or process innovations. This 
non-significant correlation may result from country aggregated data and from the fact that the 
question about cooperation focuses on R&D only.  
 










































Adoption Bubble size corresponds to innovation
Countries with macro data have a clearer color  
 
If we turn to consider R&D cooperation activities according to the location of partners, we 
can observe from figures II.20 and II.21 that national cooperations are, not surprisingly, much 
more frequent than European cooperations. The average percentage of national cooperation is 
23%, against 14% for inter-EU cooperation. 
 
The share of innovative firms engaged in EU and National cooperations differs significantly 
from one country to another, with a stronger dispersion for national cooperations than for EU 
cooperations. However, the picture is nearly the same as the one observed for the overall 
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cooperation rate, whatever the location of partners: Countries registering cooperation scores 
above the average are exactly the same in the three graphs, except Luxembourg. In this 
country, the high overall cooperation rate is mainly due to cooperation with partners located 
in other countries. This appears clearly on figure II.21. Luxembourg is the EU country that 
exhibits the highest rate of European cooperation. One innovative firm over three collaborates 
with a partner located in other European countries. Conversely, its national cooperation rate is 
below the European average. 
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Figure II.21: European cooperation











MAIN INSIGHT:  Specific profiles arise in term of cooperation.  Not surprisingly, countries that are 
most involved in R&D cooperation are Scandinavian and Baltic States. We observe no significant 
correlation between the share of innovative firms engaged in cooperation and the adoption rate (p-value: 
0.144). This result may seem surprising since the adoption rate notably contains information about 
cooperation in product and/or process innovations. This non-significant correlation may result from 
country aggregated data and from the fact that the question about cooperation focuses on R&D only. 
                                                 
32 European Union countries include Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom while European Free 
Trade Association countries includes Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland. 
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II.4.1.6. Conclusion on the relationship between innovation inputs and innovation 
adoption 
From all the descriptive analysis in this sub-section, one can conclude that there is a very 
little correlation between innovation adoption rates and the different variables proxying 
innovation efforts such as sources of information, R&D expenditures, human capital 
and the fact of doing organisational changes and cooperation in research. It seems 
therefore that although from a theoretical perspective these variables would influence the 
absorptive capacity of firms and therefore their ability to adopt innovations, the empirical 
evidence for the EU countries do not support such theories.  
 
When we look at innovation adoption disaggregated at process and product level, our results 
show how, among the many “sources of information” CIS proxy only two of them show a 
significant correlation with product innovation adoption
33. These are “Government or private 
non-profit research institutes” and “Suppliers”. The correlation is however negative indicating 
how these sources of information do not seem to lead to the spill over of innovation for firms 
relying on them. 
 
II.4.2. Market features and innovation adoption rates  
 
In this sub-section we analyse to what extent the data we have on innovation adoption rates 
are related to several issues concerning market features such as competition and the level of 
barriers to trade.  
 
II.4.2.1. Competition and innovation adoption rates: no significant correlation 
Competition can be assessed only indirectly through proxy variables and in our study we 
follow the one given in Griffith and Harrison (2004). The markup is measured as the average 
level of profitability at the country-industry level. Specifically, our measure of average 
profitability (or markup) is value-added as a share of labour and capital costs –in country i, 
industry j and year t): 
 
 
                                                
ijt ijt
ijt






33 Results are detailed in Appendix II.10 for both product and process innovation adoption separately 
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This profit level is obtained for manufacturing industries using the OECD STAN database, 
which provides information at the two-digit industry level on value added, labour and capital 
stocks. The higher the profit or markup (above the value of 1), the less the competition 
achieved in the market under analysis since more profits can be extracted by the 
distortion/absence of competition. On the opposite, perfect competition would imply a 
markup with a value equal to the unity. Therefore, the higher the indicator, the lower is 
competition. 
 
As noticed by Griffith et al. (2006), Boone (2000) shows that this measure of competition is 
preferred to most other commonly used measures. It is more theoretically robust, particularly 
than those based on market concentration and market shares, and it is the only commonly 
used measure of competition that is available across countries. In our case, this indicator is 








Are higher levels of Competition in each EU member state related to more Innovation 
Adoption? 
 
No, more competitive markets do not seem to be positively correlated to higher rates of 
innovation adoption.  
Figure II.22. Adoption rate and competition index 
 









MAIN INSIGHT:  We can observe that countries with low levels of competition (and thus high 
markup values) are generally the ones with the lowest adoption rates: Italy, Greece, and Sweden. On 
the opposite, the most adoptive countries like Belgium and Netherlands have the smallest markup index 
(e.g. the highest level of competition). However the correlation rate is not significant. Even if we drop 
Iceland, which seems to be an outlier (high adoption rates with low competition levels) the correlation 
remains non significant (correlation=-0.164, p-value=0.629) indicating that higher levels of competition 
are not significantly associated to higher innovation adoption rates  
  
The absence of significant correlation cannot be explained by a positive impact of 
competition on the overall level of innovation, that would reduce the denominator of our 
adoption rate. The correlation coefficient between mark-up and innovation rate is not 
significant. The correlation coefficient equals -0.09 (with p-value: 0.77). Higher competition 
is thus not associated to higher innovation  
 
Although it is not a measure of competition, there is an indicator from the OECD Product 
Market Regulation indicators database called “barrier to competition” which is expected to be 
highly influencing competition. From this point of view, we think it can be of interest to 
analyse the relationship it maintains with the innovation adoption rates. This indicator can be 
interpreted as follows: “In general, domestic barriers to competition tend to be higher in 
countries that have higher barriers to foreign trade and investment, and high levels of state 
control and barriers to competition tend to be associated with cumbersome administrative 
procedures and policies that reduce the adaptability of labour markets”.  
 
As already obtained above, the correlation analysis in Figure II.23 shows a non significant 
relation between this variable and adoption rates (correlation: 0.1513, p-value: 0.6387). 
Countries with high levels of barriers to competition can have low adoption rates 
(France, Sweden and Italy) as well as high adoption rates (Netherlands and Belgium). 
However, we should bear in mind that this indicator of barriers to competition should be 
understood as an explanatory variable of competition, as it is done in the regression analysis 
of Part III. The divergences between this indicator and the competition index presented on 
figure II.22 should also be noticed. This is due to the very different criteria entering into each 
of these index. This illustrates the subjectivity that arises in defining such variables and the 
necessary caution that is required for their interpretation. 
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II.4.2.2. The innovation adoption rate seems to be not correlated with the level of trade 
and negatively correlated with the barriers to trade 
In this part, we assess to what extent the adoption rate in each country is associated with 
international trade and trade barriers. We wonder if the more opened countries record also the 
highest adoption rates. To this aim, we firstly rely on CIS variables and then we turn to 
consider “trade barriers” measured in the Global Competitiveness Report. 
   
Two items of the CIS can be used to proxy the level of trade. The first one is the information 
relative to the most relevant market of the firm (regional, national or international). We can 
assume that the firms with mainly international market are more exposed to international 
pressure and opportunities. Therefore they would be more likely to adopt innovations. The 
second CIS item gives the total amount of exports. The indicator used is then the share of 
export with respect to turnover. Figure II.24 relates these two variables. Not surprisingly they 
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Is Trade in each EU member state related to Innovation Adoption and do barriers to trade 
have an impact on it? 
 
1)  No, it seems that trade is not significantly related with innovation adoption  























MAIN INSIGHT: The bubble size in Fig II.24 allows us to cross the adoption rate with the trade 
openness degree of the country in terms of share of exports in innovative firms’ turnover and of 
share of firms for which the international market is the more significant. We can see that countries 
with the highest adoption rates are not systematically the ones for which the market openness is the 
most important. For instance, Netherlands and Belgium for which the adoption rates are the highest 
have inverse positions on the Fig: for Belgium, the trade openness degree is very important 
(notably for export share) contrary to Netherlands. Countries with low adoption rates are close to 
the average.  
 
To sum up, the two proxies for trade are not positively correlated to innovation adoption. The 
correlation between the adoption rate and the export share is equal to -0.017 (p-value = 0.762) and 
between the adoption rate and the share of innovative firms with international market as the most 
significant is equal to -0.075 (p-value = 0.812). 
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The relationship between trade and adoption will be explored more deeply in the econometric 
part. In particular, the absence of bilateral correlation may result from the impact of trade on 
overall innovation, which is the denominator of our adoption index. Therefore it is likely to 
lower the correlation observed between trade and adoption rate. As we will see in the micro 
econometric part (sub-section III.5), trade exerts a positive impact on overall innovation, but 
this impact is mainly due to “generation” of innovation and not to “adoption” of innovation. 
In other words, highly exporting firms are more likely to innovate, but they have also more 
incentives to innovate by themselves than to adopt existing innovations. 
 
Additionally, although not measuring trade but proxying for regulatory variables that may 
affect trade, we find an indicator named “Regulatory trade barriers” and more specifically 
“Non-tariff trade barriers” from the Economic Freedom World report. This variable is based 
on the Global Competitiveness Report’s survey question: “In your country, tariff and non-
tariff barriers significantly reduce the ability of imported goods to compete in the domestic 
market.” The index varies between 0 and 10. It is high if a country has low non-tariff trade 
barrier, that is to say, if the freedom of exchange across national boundaries is important. 
Unfortunately, these data are missing for five countries
34. 
 

































































  Countries with macro data have a clearer  color
                                                
 
 
34 Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania.  
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Figure II.25 shows a positive link between this variable and innovation adoption rates. In 
most cases, countries with low values for the index (so, with high non-tariff trade barriers) 
record low adoption rate. It is the case for France, Hungary, Italy and Czech Republic. On the 
opposite, countries with high exchange freedom like Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, record 
higher adoption rate. Nevertheless, the correlation between these two variables is not 
significant (correlation: 0.2293 ; p-value: 0.393).  
 
Finally, we cross with adoption rates a last variable that we find more general but missing for 
seven countries
35. This variable named “Barrier to trade and investment” comes from the 
OECD Product Market Regulation indicators database. This synthesis variable contains 
information about ownership barriers, discriminatory procedures, regulatory barriers and 
tariffs
36. Figure II.26 shows a negative and significant correlation between the two variables. 
The correlation is significant at 5% level. We can see that countries with high barriers to trade 
record the lowest adoption rate. As above, we find among them, France, Hungary, Italy and 
Czech Republic. On the opposite, Netherlands, Belgium and Norway are confirmed to be 
countries with low barriers to trade and high innovation adoption levels.  
 
















































Countries with macro data have a clearer  color
Correlation : -0.5474
p-value : 0,0427




35 Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Luxembourg and Slovakia.  
36 For more details, see P. Conway, V. Janod and G. Nicoletti, 2005, Product Market Regulation in OECD Countries: 1998 to 
2003. Economics department working papers n° 419. 
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We can therefore conclude that, no matter which is the indicator for the barriers to trade, 
the higher they are, the lower the innovation adoption rates in the EU countries. The 
negative correlation found for the overall innovation adoption indicators is shown also in the 
case of the disaggregated item “product innovation adoption”
37. This result is consistent with 
the idea that especially product innovation adoption is affected by barriers to trade due to the 
fact that innovation in products is embodied in tradable goods and when Trade is made more 
difficult (by any kind of barrier) then also innovation spills over less rapidly. 
 
II.4.3. Regulatory environment and adoption rate 
 
As shown in the review of the literature (Part I), another important issue regarding the main 
drivers of innovation diffusion/adoption refers to the regulatory environment. In this sub-
section we present how some of these regulations can be measured and make a preliminary 
descriptive analysis of the relation they maintain with innovation adoption. Specifically, we 
firstly consider patents and other protection methods and secondly we refer to several 
indicators about the functioning of the Internal Market. 
 
II.4.3.1. Patents and other protection methods and adoption rate  
Intellectual property rights (IPR) appear as an important issue for innovation 
diffusion/adoption, although without a consensus on the direction of the impact. On the one 
hand, we have shown in the literature review that IPRs can improve diffusion. Innovators are 
obliged to reveal the content of their invention which increases the potential of related 
innovations. It also gives incentives to improve existing technologies, which is likely to 
facilitate their adoption. On the other hand, IPRs may prevent adoption by forbidding external 
agents to use the technology (except if they pay for a licence). In order to address which of 
these effects are preeminent, we aim at providing the correlation that IPRs maintain with 
innovation adoption. Several items of the CIS may be used to proxy for IPRs. We first 
consider the patenting activity through the consideration of the number of patent applications 
made by the firms in each country (A). Then, we make some comparisons with the 
information on other legal and informal protection methods also given in the CIS (B). Finally, 
we provide a different view about IPRs, using data on the index on “Security property rights” 
from the Economic Freedom of the World (C). 
                                                 
37 Results are detailed in Appendix II.10 for both product and process innovation adoption separately. 
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A. Patenting is the main legal protection mean for firms. But the number of patent 
applications can be very different according to the sector and the nature of inventions. By 
country, we can observe large differences in terms of percentage of innovative firms having 
applied for at least one patent. As shown in Figure II.27, for the majority of countries, this 
percentage varies between 5% (for Iceland) and 20% (for Finland). Nevertheless, two 
countries have a specific position due to their very high patent application rate: France and 
Sweden, with a patent application rate of almost 30%. 
 
According to Figure II.27, we can observe that many of the countries with low patenting rate 
are also those with low adoption rate. It is the case of many Eastern European countries 
(Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Czech Republic) and Southern 
countries (Italy and more specifically Greece). One possible explanation of this low patenting 
and adopting activities may be that in these countries firms may be very cautious in their 
strategy not to diffuse information. In this context, they can prefer to internalize R&D 
activities and to choose other protection methods than patenting. On the opposite side, we find 
the countries of Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Finland and Germany with 
adoption rates over the average as well as high patenting activities. These two patterns (low-
low and high-high) would point to a positive relationship between adopting innovation and 
patenting. However, the Pearson correlation calculated from all data shows a positive but not 
significant correlation (coefficient = 0,1937 ; p-value=0,3878). This is due to the presence of 
some countries which have a specific profile: 
 
-  Portugal, Iceland and Bulgaria with low patenting rates but high adoption rates 
-  and, above all, France and Sweden where a low adoption rate is combined with a very 
high patenting rate. 
 
Therefore, if France and Sweden are dropped because of their particular position, the 
correlation between adopting innovation and patenting becomes significant at 5% level 
(coefficient = 0,4856 ; p-value=0,03). Therefore, we can conclude that, in general terms, 
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B. Other legal and informal protection methods. From the CIS database, we can observe 
that patent application is not the most used method to protect inventions (Figure II.28). 
Indeed, lead-time advantage on competitors and secrecy, which are more strategic than formal 
methods, are the most frequent. Respectively, they are used by 33% and 25% of innovative 
firms. On the opposite, copyright (6%) and registration of design patterns (13%) are the less 
used by EU firms.  
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Which is the relationship between the use of different innovation protection methods and 
innovation adoption in EU member states?   
 
It seems that highest adoption rates are shown in countries in which the recourse to protection 
of invention and more specifically strategic methods is frequent. However, statistically we 
obtain that average adoption rates are not significantly different according to the different 
groups identified according to different profiles in the use of invention protection methods. 
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Bubble size corresponds to innovation adoption
Countries with macro data have a clearer color
Countries in italics : the sum of contributions is less than 50% on the two axis 
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Figure II.30. Box plot: Main statistics for adoption rate according to protection methods 
 
 
Statistics represented in this graph are: 
- the minimum (lower line out of the box) 
- the first quartile (lower line of each box)  
- the median (line inside each box) 
- the third quartile (upper line of each box) 
- the maximum or far value (upper line out of 
the box
 
MAIN INSIGHT: Different countries profiles can be distinguished in terms of the use of invention 
protection methods (Figure II.29, see appendix II.6 for more detail on the PCA): 
 
-  The first (Finland and Austria) and second (France and Sweden) groups are characterized by an 
important use of all methods. For the first group, the percentage of firms having recoursed to 
strategic methods is particularly high, whereas for the second, it is the use of formal methods of 
protection. 
-  On the opposite, in the third and fourth groups (that bring together a lot of Eastern countries) 
the use of protection methods is not very important. For the fourth group, the recourse to 
strategic methods is particularly low.  
-  Finally, there is an intermediary group (Norway, Belgium, Latvia, Netherlands, Germany, Italy 
and Stonia) for which the use of methods is at a medium level or above the average notably for 
strategic methods of protection. 
 
If we cross these different groups with the adoption rate (bubble size), we can observe that 
countries with highest adoption rates are either in the first group or in the fifth group, that is to 
say,  for countries in which the recourse to protection of invention and more specifically 
strategic methods is frequent.  
 
The box plot (Figure II.30) confirms that countries in the first and in the fifth group show higher 
innovation adoption rates, but also that for the third group, the average of adoption rate is high 
whereas the use of protection methods is not very important. The second and fourth groups gather 
mainly countries with low adoption rates but very different pattern of use of protection methods. 
Nevertheless, a one-way analysis variance shows that average adoption rates are not 
significantly different according to the groups identified according to the different patterns in 
the use of invention protection methods (F-statistic being equal to 1,764 and the significance 
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C. Security of property rights. In order to examine more deeply the relationship between 
adoption rates and invention protection methods, we use now an indicator provided by the 
Economic Freedom of the World concerning the security of property rights.
38 This index is 
computed from the Global Competitiveness Report’s question: “Property rights, including 
over financial assets are poorly defined and not protected by law (= 1) or are clearly defined 
and well protected by law (= 7).” This way, high values of the index indicate high protection 
levels. 
 
Figure II.31 shows that in most countries where the security of property rights is high, the 
adoption rate is also high. Luxembourg appears with a specific profile, since the security is 
very high but the adoption rate is the smallest in the sample. The Pearson correlation is not 
significant with all countries (coefficient=0,295, p-value=0,250) but it becomes significant at 
a 5% level if we drop Luxembourg out (coefficient=0,513 ; p-value = 0,042).  
 





























































Countries with macro data have a clearer color
Correlation : 0.295
p-value: 0.3622
                                                
 
NB : Lithuania, Romania, Latvia, Estonia and Bulgaria are not represented because of missing data. 
 
 
38 The Economic Freedom Network considers security of property rights, protected by the rule of law, as 
essential to economic freedom: “Freedom to exchange, for example, is meaningless if individuals do not have 
secure rights to property, including the fruits of their labor. Failure of a country’s legal system to provide for the 
security of property rights, enforcement of contracts, and the fair and peaceful settlement of disputes will 
undermine the operation of a market-exchange system. If individuals and businesses lack confidence that 
contracts will be enforced and the fruits of their productive efforts protected, their incentive to engage in 
productive activity will be eroded” (page 11 of the 2007 Annual Report of Economic Freedom of the World).
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II.4.3.2. Internal Market and adoption rate  
As detailed afterwards in Part III, it is not easy to account for the impact of IM on innovation 
adoption. Only indirect indicators can be used. A first set of indicators refer to the 
Transposition Deficit Index, which measure the percentage of Internal Market directives 
communicated as having been transposed (A). A second set of indicators can be extracted 
from the Economic Freedom of the World report and refer to Product Market Regulations 
(B). Finally, we will consider the indicator of Product Market Regulation of OECD (C). 
These indicators are presented below as well as their correlation with innovation adoption. 
 
A. Transposition Deficit Indices (TDI). Two indicators of TDI are used in what follows: the 
global one that covers the 12 areas of EU directives (agriculture, environment, enterprise, 
innovation, competition, internal market, justice, energy, employment, taxes, education and 
health) and the specific low-level indicator that accounts for internal market directives in 
particular. This way, the first one is a more general one that, among other 11 subindicators, 
considers our second indicator. The higher the value of these indicators, the higher the 








Is the adoption of EU regulations and directives clearly associated to higher rates of 
Innovation Adoption across countries?  
 
Yes, in those countries where more EU regulations and directives are enforced we observe 
also higher rates of Innovation Adoption. The conclusion is even stronger when analysing the 
specific relationship with Internal Market directives. Therefore, the transposition of EU 
directives seems to favour Innovation Adoption.  
                                                 
39 Correlations between innovation adoption with other specific areas of the TDI likely to interfere with 
innovation adoption, such as directives regarding enterprise, competition, education, employment, have also 
been studied. They are not reported here since no significant correlation appears with adoption. 
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MAIN INSIGHT:  If we first consider the global TDI (Fig.II.33), a positive and significant 
correlation is observed. The lower the level of transposition of Community law, the lower the 
level of adoption of innovation and the other way around. Additionally, the correlation would 
even increase if Netherlands and Luxembourg were dropped. 
 
The internal market TDI gives us a more accurate view of the correlation between Internal Market 
and innovation adoption activities. Except Sweden and Portugal, the countries that have 
transposed most of the EU internal market directives are those that generate the highest 
adoption rates (Netherlands, Finland, Spain, Austria and Belgium). Conversely, countries with the 
highest deficit of transposition (France, Luxembourg, Greece and Italy) are characterized by the 
lowest rates of adoption. The correlation coefficient is therefore positive and significant at a 5% 
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Also, when we focus on product and process innovation adoption separately (and on the 
different areas for which the TDI’s are proposed) we can observe how few of the 
Transposition Deficit Indicators (where higher values correspond to higher transposition rates 
of EU regulations in each analyzed area) are found to be statistically correlated to Innovation 
Adoption (product and processes)
40. In particular, the strongest result is shown for TDI 
Internal Market (also for product and process innovation along with total innovation 
adoption). Regulations in the areas of Health seem instead associated to process innovation 
adoption while, on the contrary, the transposition of regulations on Employment matters 
seems to be positively correlated to product innovation adoption. 
 
B. Product Market Regulation indicators by the EFW. In addition to the above measures 
of the IM, we can use another kind of proxy, accounting for product market regulations. A 
first set of variables come from the Economic Freedom of the World report, covering 5 areas: 
•  Size of government: Countries with low levels of government spending as a share of 
total, a smaller government enterprise sector and lower marginal tax have the highest 
rates. 
•  Legal structure and security of property rights: The higher is the protection of property 
in the country, the higher the index rate. 
•  Access to sound money: The index shows high rates for countries that follow policies 
and adopt institutions that lead to low and stable rates of inflation and avoid 
regulations that limit the use of alternative currencies. 
•  Freedom to trade internationally: High rates of the index for countries that have low 
tariffs, a trade sector larger than expected, easy clearance and efficiency of 
administrations customs, a freely convertible currency and few controls on the 
movement of capital. 
•  Regulation of credit, labor and business: The index displays high rates for countries 
allowing markets to determine prices and refrain from regulatory activities that retard 
entry into business and increase the cost of producing products. 
 
Therefore, all the indices have the same interpretation: high values correspond to better 
performance of the regulations and therefore of the system. Correlations among these five 
                                                 
40 Results are detailed in Appendix II.10 for both product and process innovation adoption separately. 
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areas show that three of them are highly correlated one another
41 : Legal structure and 
security of property rights, Access to sound money and Regulation of credit, labour and 
business. In the ACP below (Figure II.34) they are represented on the same axis, labelled 
Other Economic Freedom. Freedom to trade is also correlated to it but to a lesser extent. The 
second axis represents the size of the government. This ACP allows us to cross the 
information about economic freedom with the adoption rates (represented by the bubble size). 
The largest bubbles, which are associated to higher innovation adoption rates, can be 
observed for countries that exhibit also a high level of economic freedom.  
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C. Product Market Regulation indicators by the OECD. Finally, we can use the Product 
Market Regulation indicator built by OECD, for which higher values imply tighter and 
burdensome regulation. In other words, the lower the value of the indicator, the better it is for 
the system since it implies that there is less burdensome product market regulation. 
                                                 
41 Correlation between “Access to sound money and Regulation of credit” and “Legal structure and security of 
property rights” is 0.801 (p-value = 0.000). Correlation between “Access to sound money and Regulation of 
credit” and “Labor and business” is 0.731 (p-vamue = 0.000). And finally, correlation between “Legal structure 
and security of property rights” and “ Labor and business” is 0.879 (p-value = 0.000). 




































The strong negative correlation between total innovation adoption rates and Product Market 
Regulation, PMR (where higher values of the PMR index indicate burdensome and 
oppressive regulations) is also robust in the case of product and process innovation 
adoption
42. Results show negative and statistically significant coefficients of the correlation 
matrixes indicating a negative relationship between adoption of innovation and oppressive 
market regulations at the country level.  
                                                 


















































C orrelation : -0,636
p-value : 0.011
Does burdensome Product Market Regulation have a relationship with Innovation Adoption? 
 
Yes, lower product market regulation seems to be associated to higher rates of Innovation 
Adoption on a EU cross country basis. 
MAIN INSIGHT: Countries with high levels of regulation are characterized by low levels of 
adoption. This result confirms the hypothesis of a positive effect of the IM objective of reducing 
barriers in the product market on the adoption of innovation. The only clear exception would be 
Sweden, where low levels of product market regulation coexist with low levels of innovation 
adoption. It seems therefore that this country relies more on other ways of introducing innovation 
but not that of adopting it from either others or in cooperation with others.  
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All in all, it seems that whatever the indicator used to proxy for the functioning of the IM, 
the correlation it maintains with the adoption of innovation is clearly significant. Reducing 
the intrusiveness of the government and favoring free circulation of goods, people and 
fostering competition at all levels seems to be associated to higher rates of innovation 
adoption. However, we must keep in mind that our IM proxies may be strongly correlated to 
other determinants of adoption. The clear impact/effect of IM must be addressed through 
econometric tools only, in order to control for the effect due to other variables. This is done in 
Part III of this project. 
 
Another way to assess the role played by IM on adoption is to study the evolution of adoption 
rates over time. Indeed, IM is being reinforced and some other countries are new entrants in 
the EU. If a significant increase of adoption rates arise over time, this may at least partly 
reflect the positive effect of IM. This issue is addressed in the next section. 
 
In Table II.6 we offer a summary of the determinants of innovation adoption for which we 
have analysed their correlation with adoption rates. The result of such relationship obtained 
through the descriptive analysis is specified.  
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Table II.6. Potential determinants of innovation adoption analysed in the descriptive 
DETERMINANTS    CORRELATION OBTAINED WITH 
INNOVATION ADOPTION RATES 
    
A. Innovation inputs     
     
 Sources of information for innovation    Non-significant 
 Innovation expenditure    Positive although not always significant 
 Human capital resources    Non-significant 
 Organisational changes    Positive and significant in some cases 
 Cooperation in joint R&D    Non-significant 
     
B. Market features      
     
 Competition    Non-significant 
 Barriers to competition    Non-significant 
 Trade    Non-significant 
 Barriers to trade    Negative and significant 
     
C. Regulatory environment      
     
¾  Protection methods for inventions     
 Patenting    Positive and significant (without France and 
Sweden) 
 Other legal and informal protection 
methods 
  Non-significant 
 Security of property rights    Positive and significant (without Luxembourg) 
     
¾  Internal Market regulations     
 Transposition Deficit  
(high value: high transposition of EU 
directives) 
  Positive and significant 
 Product Market Regulations by EFW 
(high value: better performance of 
regulations) 
  Positive and significant 
 Product Market Regulations by OECD 
(high value: tighter and burdensome 
regulation) 
  Negative and significant 
    
 
 
II.5. Time profile of innovation adoption in EU countries 
 
The aim of this section is to shed some light on the time evolution of adoption in EU 
countries. This can be achieved by comparing the adoption rates recorded in the CIS3 over the 
period 1998-2000 and the adoption rates recorded in the CIS4 over the period 2002-2004. We 
do not have access to previous surveys (CIS2 in particular) that could have given us wider 
  133 
 
time coverage. The two available periods are not very distant but they may help us to observe 
some changes over time. In addition to a global evolution of adoption, these two waves of 
survey may provide some information about potential changes in the way adoption occurs, by 
confronting the evolution of cooperation-based adoption to the one of other organization-
based adoption.  
 
From a methological point of view, it is important to notice that we cannot provide a single 
indicator of adoption. Indeed, this has been possible using CIS3 thanks to the rescaling 
procedure we built to correct the double counting bias that arises on macro data. Regarding 
CIS4, all the data come from Eurostat website. Therefore, it is not possible to have an idea of 
the extent of the bias. For this reason, this part gives separated indicators of adoption for 
product and process innovation. Moreover, some missing observations prevent us to cover all 
the countries. Greece, Latvia and Iceland are therefore not covered. 
 
II.5.1. Towards a more process oriented adoption 
 
The two figures below show that the average adoption rate increases between the two 
periods. This is mainly due to process adoption that increases by 4.2 points of %. On the 
opposite, the product adoption remains stable (decrease of 0.1 point of %).  
 
When crossing this information with the growth of innovation rates, it appears that the 
increase in adoption is not necessarily associated with a global increase in innovation. 
Product adoption growth does go together with an increase in process innovation (+6.3 points 
of %) whereas process adoption may be associated with a decrease in product innovation (-2.3 
points of %).  
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Figure II.36. Growth of product adoption and innovation rates by country 












































Figure II.37. Growth of process adoption and  innovation rates by country 















































In the case of product innovations, this global trend is not shared by all countries. From 
the first graph above, we can distinguish four groups of countries, corresponding to each 
quadrant of the figure. In the bottom right quadrant, only three countries (Lithuania, Hungary 
and Italy) record an increase of the adoption rate but a decrease of innovation. In the bottom 
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left quadrant, we can observe countries facing a reduction in both their product innovation 
and product adoption capability. This is particularly the case for Spain, Belgium, France, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Norway. On the opposite, the top right quadrant brings together 
five countries that improve both their product innovation and product adoption capability 
(Estonia, Sweden, Germany, Czech Republic and Luxembourg). Finally, Bulgaria exhibits a 
specific profile since its innovation rate increases while its adoption rate decreases.  
 
The picture is slightly different for process innovation. Most countries face a positive 
trend for innovation and adoption, with several exceptions: Belgium is characterized by a 
high innovation growth and a strong adoption fall. In lower proportion, it is also the case for 
Bulgaria, Spain and France. Norway and Netherlands have a specific profile as they record a 
decrease of innovation rates.  
 
The analysis by sector confirms that we move towards a more process oriented 
innovation adoption (Fig II.38 and II.39). Regarding product innovation, two sectors face 
decreases in their adoption rates: Wholesales trade and energy supply. This evolution goes 
together with a decrease in their innovation rate. On the opposite, Transport and 
Communication is characterized by an increase in both its innovation and its adoption rate. In 
the other sectors, the magnitude of adoption clearly increases since their adoption rates rise 
while innovation rates fall. 
 
The picture for process innovation is very different. Adoption increases for four sectors: 
manufacture industry, financial activities, extractive industry and energy supply. This last 
sector is nevertheless different from the three first because the innovation rate decreases by 
12% whereas it remains stable for the others. Two sectors face a clearly decrease in their 
adoption rate: Transport/communication and Computer/other business services. This is not 
associated here with a decrease in their innovation capacity. The evolution for wholesale and 
retail trade is close to 0. 
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Figure II.38: Growth of product adoption and innovation rates by sector 
(in percentage points) 
Extractive industry
Manufacture industry
Electricity, gaz and water 
production and distribution




































FigureII.39: Growth of process adoption and innovation rates by sector 
(in percentage points) 
Extractive industry Manufacture industry
Electricity, gaz and water 
production and distribution

































II.5.2. Divergence in the evolution of the nature of adoption for product and 
process innovation 
 
Some changes in the way adoption occurred can also be observed. Here again, we can only 
observe product and process adoption separately. Concerning product adoption 
(figure II.40),  in  average,  firms tend to rely more on cooperation in their innovation 
adoption activities. The percentage of cooperation based adoption increases by 1.5 
percentage points between CIS3 and CIS4 while the percentage of other organization-based 
adoption decreases by 1.7 percentage points. For the majority of countries, the cooperation 
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based adoption raises while the other organisation based adoption decreases. For only four 
countries, we can observe an increase of this last type of adoption. By sector (figure II.42), the 
fact is similar: except for wholesale and retail trade, the cooperation increases for all sectors. 
On the opposite, the other organisation-based adoption decreases for all sectors except for 
transport and communication.  
  
Process adoption is characterized by a different evolution. Because process adoption faces 
an important increase, we observe an increase in both cooperation-based adoption and 
other organization-based adoption, the latter being higher. This fact is observed for 10 
countries among the 22 studied countries (fig II.41). Therefore, product and process 
innovations face opposite evolutions in the way adoption is conducted. By sector (Fig II.43), 
the trend is little different. The increase in both cooperation and other organisation based 
adoption is noticed for manufacture and extractive industries. For the other sectors, the 
cooperation tends to decrease while the other organisation-based adoption increases.  
 
Figure II.40. Growth of product cooperation-based adoption and other organisation-based 
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Figure II.41. Growth of process cooperation-based adoption and other organisation-based 






























































Figure II.42. Growth of product cooperation-based adoption and other organisation-based 
adoption by sector (in percentage points) 
Extractive industry
Manufacture industry
Electricity, gaz and water 
production and distribution
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Figure II.43. Growth of process cooperation-based adoption and other organisation-based 
adoption by sector (in percentage points) 
Extractive industry
Manufacture industry
Electricity, gaz and water 

















































To conclude, the comparison between CIS3 and CIS4 highlight an increase in innovation 
adoption, as well as a change in the nature of this process. This can be observed in most 
countries and several sectors. Several factors are likely to explain this evolution. Among 
them, one can think that the development of the Internal Market may at least partly 
have an influence. Econometric investigations are made in Part III of this report to estimate 
the role played by the different determinants, and the specific role of IM. 
 
II.6. Conclusion: Typology of countries according to their 
innovation adoption patterns 
 
As a conclusion, this section summarizes the main points examined in Part II. Indeed, based 
on the level of adoption, but also in light of innovative activities (input and output), some 
country specificities can be identified.  
 
To be slightly more precise, a typology has been elaborated from the following five variables:  
-  The adoption rate 
-  The innovation rate 
-  The total innovative expenditure (in logs) 
-  Human resources in S&T (in the labour force) 
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-  The cooperation rate. 
The factorial map obtained with a PCA (principal component analysis)
43 is given below. It 
clearly shows a strong heterogeneity in terms of country profiles since we can distinguish 6 
different groups and 3 specific countries. 
 
This mapping allows us to identify the main feature of each group of countries, regarding the 
five variables used to build the map. By crossing this information with other determinants 
such as trade, market features and regulatory environment, it also provides us with additional 
insight about the specificities of country profiles.  
 

















































Countries in italics are not well represented on the two axes in terms of relative contributions. 
                                                 
43 The two first axes account for 72% of the variance. See Appendix II.8 for more detailed results. 
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Group 1: High innovation performance countries with high levels of human 
resources in S&T: Belgium, Germany, Netherlands 
 
This first group brings together countries with high rates of adoption and, specially, high rates 
of innovation, but also with high scores for R&D and human resources. It concerns 3 
countries in the core of Europe: Belgium, Netherlands, and Germany, although Germany is 
less adoption-oriented than the two other countries.  
 
If we cross this information with other potential drivers of adoption, we can observe that the 
firms belonging to this group of countries use intensively patents and more generally all 
invention protection methods (fig. II. 27 and II. 29). They are also characterized by a high 
competition index (see fig. II.22). In spite of different levels of exports, these three countries 
share a low level of barriers to trade (fig. II.26) as well as a low level of product market 
regulation (fig. II.35). 
 
Group 2: High innovation performance countries with high levels of human 
resources in S&T and high rates of cooperation: Finland, Sweden and 
Norway 
 
The second group contains only Scandinavian countries: Finland, Sweden, and Norway. It 
records relatively high level of innovation (less in the case of Norway) and adoption rates 
(Sweden register however a weaker rate of adoption than Finland and Norway). The human 
resources in S&T are also very important, and the non-tariff trade barriers index is also very 
high. Compared to the first group, these countries are characterized by a very high level of 
cooperation. 
 
Crossing this information with other factors, three main common features arise for the three 
countries: As for group 1, all invention protection methods are used intensively (fig. II. 27 and 
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Group 3: Average innovation performance countries with weak cooperation 
activities: Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
 
The third group (Spain, Italy and Portugal) registers relatively good level of innovation and 
adoption rates but the cooperation level is extremely low (Fig. II.19). Average number of 
employees with high educational innovative firms (Fig. II.16) and Human resources in S&T 
are also lower than the EU average (fig. II.17). 
 
Crossing with other factors, this group is also characterized by a relatively low level of trade, 
in terms of export as well as in terms of innovative firms with international market (fig. II.24). 
 
Group 4:  A specific country between group 1 and 3: Austria 
 
Between the first and the third group, we can find Austria which records innovation and 
adoption performances close to the first group but its R&D expenditures, cooperation and 
human resources in S&T are lower. 
 
Group 5: Weak innovation performance countries with strong cooperation 
activities: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Hungary. 
 
The fifth group gathers countries with important cooperation activities but the innovation and 
adoption are relatively low. It concerns Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and 
Hungary. Estonia exhibits however higher innovation and adoption rates than the other 
countries of this group, as well as better trade performances (fig. II.24). Another common 
feature of these countries is their low level of economic freedom (fig. 34). 
 
Group 6: Weak innovation performance countries with low levels of 
cooperation: Greece, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania 
 
For the sixth group (Greece, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania), all indicators 
are generally low. Most of the characteristics of this group are opposed to the one of group 1 
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and 2. Adoption and innovation are weak (except adoption in Bulgaria), and in all cases, 
R&D, human capital and cooperation scores are low. 
 
Crossing with other factors, we can observe that protection methods of innovation are also not 
very used (see fig. II. 27 and II.29). Moreover, as observed for Group 5, the level of economic 
freedom is lower than the EU average one (fig. II.34) 
 
Finally, from the graph II.44, we can see three countries not well represented due to their 
specific profiles: 
-  Luxembourg: the profile is close to group 5 except that the innovation rate is very 
high. 
-  France: adoption is very low, but the innovation rate is close to the average. Also, the 
Product Market regulations index and R&D expenditures are noticeably high 
-  Iceland: adoption and innovation rates are high but competition and R&D 
expenditures recorded in the CIS are extremely low and the other indicators are close 
to the average.   
 
This typology highlights a specific geographical pattern of the EU countries regarding 
adoption, innovation and cooperation performances. Plotting the six group of countries (see 
fig. II.45 below) shows that countries belonging to each group are geographically 
concentrated. 
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Figure II.45 : Geographical pattern of countries according to their adoption, innovation 
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All in all, the typology given above shows that there is no strict correlation between the 
profile of the country and its ability to adopt. With different features, Group 1 and 2 face high 
adoption rates while on the opposite, group 5 and 6 that differ in their innovative and general 
economic features register low adoption rates. This typology shows also that beyond the 
different determinants examined here, some other structural determinants may impact on 
adoption. Country specialisation may partly explain these specificities. Due to the low number 
of sectors for which we have been able to have homogeneous information, it is difficult to 
enter into more detail for sectors. However, the strong differences observed across sectors 
need to be accounted for in the remainder of the study as well, and in particular in the 
econometric estimations made in the following Part.  For these reasons, it will be important in 
the remainder of this study to control for these potential effects through a regression analysis. 
Indeed, the descriptive analysis provides only simple correlations. The econometric part will 
give a more comprehensive analysis of the role played by the different determinants. By 
controlling for all the potential drivers of adoption, the econometric analysis allows to 
consider the specific effect of each of them. 
 










Econometric Analysis of the Impact of Internal Market on 














The so called Internal Market directives is a set of rules of the game which has to be put in 
place for the EU citizens and firms in order to be able to freely move, locate, compete and 
exploit market potential wherever within the European boundaries. In other words, “the idea 
of the IM is therefore that of bringing forward proposals for legislation aiming to remove 
barriers, thus simplifying life for consumers and for businesses, stimulating competition, 
reducing prices and widening choice. This involves not only making it easier for goods and 
services to circulate, but also making it easier for EU citizens to work and to live in other EU 
countries” (Internal Market DG). 
 
In Part II we have analysed the main relationship among innovation adoption and their 
potential determinants, just based on descriptive (bivariant) analysis. This is not enough 
because this relationship is affected by other control variables (indirect effects, spurious 
effects) that affects the real relationship among them. Therefore, it is necessary to do an 
econometric analysis in order to obtain the specific relationship among innovation adoption 
and their IM determinants. 
 
The objective of the present part III is therefore that of proposing the main empirical results of 
the econometric analysis of the impact of IM regulations on Innovation Adoption. As we have 
already argued in previous Parts of this work, the impact that IM regulations may have on the 
adoption of innovation is likely to be channelled through the direct impact that the Internal 
Market (IM) regulations have on some macroeconomic dimensions. It is important to notice, 
as it was pointed out before, that usually the IM regulations are aimed at achieving specific 
goals which usually abstract from the direct objective of fostering innovation adoption or 
creation.  
 
Hence, for example, the IM EU regulations are aimed at fostering the free movement of goods 
and people, at increasing competition and cooperation across member states. These 
dimensions, which we will call “transmission channels” are those which are directly 
affected by the IM regulations. This said, however, the transmission channels are going to 
have an impact on the diffusion and adoption of innovation. 
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More cooperation or trade, for example, are expected to positively impact the possibility that 
blueprints or innovation spill over from firms to firms as well as from country to country. At 
the same time, recent empirical and theoretical literature argues how more competition and 
neck-and-neck markets may incentivize innovation and therefore affect also positively the 
possibility of diffusion of new innovations and technology across countries.  
 
Hence, in order to capture the effect of the IM regulation on the adoption of innovation at the 
EU level we have to carefully analyze the two-stages by which these regulations firstly affect 
the transmission channels and, secondly, how these channels affect directly innovation 
adoption rates.  
 
The data we are going to use come from a selection of relevant variables of different 
international databases. The dependent variable (and some of the control variables) we will be 
using in the regression come from the Community Innovation Survey, CIS3 (already fully 
analyzed in part II of this report). As proxies for the impact of IM regulations, instead, we will 
be making use of the OECD data on Product Market Regulation (and its disaggregation) as 
well as the data of the Economic Freedom of the World index (both of them also already 
analyzed in part II of this report and to which we send the interested reader for their 
descriptive statistics). 
 
In what will follow, then, we will explore different specifications trying to take advantage of 
the variety of data on IM which we have available. The rationale for the use of an indicator 
rather than another will be always that of its statistical significance. The idea is therefore to 
try to achieve the best econometric fit for all the regressions by also combining this with the 
economic intuition in the decision of the variables which will be eventually used in the 
regression. 
 
From an econometric point of view a two-stages estimation (which makes use of Instrumental 
Variables techniques estimations) seems to be the best option to be pursued. In what follows, 
therefore we are going to estimate a set of first stage regressions which put in relation various 
IM regulation proxies with the detected transmission channels. Then, once we find a correct 
specification in the first stage we will use the fitted values of the channels (which will not be 
endogenous to the error process in the second stage) in order to estimate the indirect impact of 
the IM regulation on the share of innovation adoption across countries in the second stage 
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estimation. This second stage is estimated at the global level using 2SLS (section III.4). 
However, in order to perform some robustness checks on the results obtained on aggregated 
data, additional estimations are made using micro data (section III.5).    
 
 
III.2.  First Stage analysis: the impact of IM regulations on the 
transmission channels of Innovation Adoption 
 
III.2.1. Introduction to the first stage 
 
Although several channels have been identified linking IM and innovation adoption, in our 
empirical analysis we focus on three major channels which are usually stressed in the 
literature as conductive to innovation and adoption. These are (i) trade, (ii) cooperation and 
(iii) competition.  
 
(1.1)    i c i c C i c DUM ZTrade IM Trade , 3 2 1 0 , ν β α α α + + + + =
(1.2)   i c i c C i c DUM ZCoop IM Coop , 3 2 1 0 , ε β β β β + + + + =
(1.3)    i c i c C i c DUM ZComp IM Comp , 3 2 1 0 , ξ β γ λ γ + + + + =
 
where IM are the Internal Market proxies; Z_ are the control variables necessary to explain 
each dependent variable and DUM are the dummy sectoral variables. 
 
As we already pointed out before, the impact of IM regulations on the adoption of innovation 
is going to be mediated by the particular impact that these regulations will have on the 
transmission channels which will eventually impact the overall level of innovation adoption 
on each country
44 and sector. Hence, our analysis will first have to focus on the impact of IM 
on the three channels and then, secondly, on the impact that these channels have on the 
overall adoption of innovation. 
                                                 
44 Due to data availability issue, the regression we will propose in this sections (up to section III.4) will be 
mainly based on the following sample of EU core countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, 
Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. However, the actual number of 
countries in each regression will also depend on the particular data availability of the explanatory variables taken 
into considerations. So, some countries may be missing in specific cross-country tables. 
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III.2.2. Trade channel 
 
The first channel we are going to focus on is that of trade. We express the dependent variable 
(LNTRADE) as the log of turnover that is exported in industry i and country c. This measure 
of exports is explained by the matrix of IM variables as well as by a set of control variables 
(when available) denoted ZTrade
45 and a matrix of dummies for each industry in order to pick 
up specific effects that the IM regulations may have at the sectoral level. 
 
Table III.1 shows our preferred specification, that is, the one that will be used in the second 
stage of the estimation in order to check the impact of this channel on innovation adoption
46. 
Our proxy of trade is accurately explained by 3 main explanatory variables as well as by the 
sectoral controls. The R2 is particularly high (0.83) pointing to the very good fit of the overall 
regressions presented in the Appendix III.1, which as the minimum takes a value of 0.76. 
 
First, we introduce, as an explanatory variable, the turnover (as a proxy of the size of the 
different countries and sectors). This is because, in order to correctly disentangle the effects of 
IM regulation we firstly need to control for the heterogeneity of exports which could be 
accounted for by the size of the sectors and of the countries
47. As one would expect, the 
higher the value of the total turnover, the higher will be the turnover exported. The coefficient 
for Log Turnover is in fact positive and statistically significant at 1% significance levels.  
 
Other unobserved effects are then controlled for by the sectoral dummies we inserted in the 
regression so that we may be confident that the remaining variability in the data could be well 
ascribed to the IM explanatory variables.  
 
45 Another possibility for the endogenous variable is considering just the trade that each country makes with 
other EU countries. However, this data seems not to perform well in an econometric context so we decided to 
discard them for the present analysis. However, most trade in the EU countries is intra European. Therefore, not 
much difference should be encountered. 
46 For more details about this specification and some other alternatives, see Appendix III.1. 
47 LNTURNOVER is not directly an IM explanatory variable but a necessary control variable used in order to 
account for the differences in the size of sectors and countries within our sample.  
 
Table III.1. Trade equation 
Dependent Variable  Ln TRADE 
  
Log Turnover  1.143 
  (7.62)*** 
Involvement in 
Business Operation  -0.823 
  (3.34)*** 
Freedom to Trade  1.335 
  (3.09)*** 
   
DUMMY  Yes 
   
Constant  -14.117 
  (4.28)** 
Observations  80 
R-squared  0.83 
t statistics in parentheses 








Table III.2. Cooperation equation 
Dependent Variable: Cooperation   
  
Most People Can 




Regulatory and Administrative 
Opacity  -0.036 
 (-2.86)*** 
Science and Technology 
Graduates  0.008 
 (3.31)*** 










t statistics in parentheses 






Table III.3. Competition equation 
Dependent Variable:  Mark up   
   
TDI Competition  -0.007 
  (-6.32)*** 
State Control  0.016 
  (1.52) 
Sectoral and ad hoc State Aid  
as a % of GDP  0.077 
  (3.29)*** 
Transfers and Subsidies from 
National govts. as % of GDP  -0.039 
  (7.46)*** 
Log of number of  
firms in each sector  -0.007 
  (-1.23) 
Working days spent to  
deal with Bureaucracy  0.000 
  (1.89)* 
Number of bodies to  
be contacted in order to  
open a Business 
0.005 
  (2.85)*** 
   
DUMMY  Yes 
   
Constant  0.855 
  (6.94)*** 
Observations  76 
R-squared  0.70 
t statistics in parentheses 
***, ** and * significant at 1, 5 and 10 % 
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Hence, we switch to the analysis of the impact of IM regulations which may affect the amount 
of turnover exported. Our preferred specification makes use of two main IM proxies. First, 
“involvement in business operation” is shown to be statistically significant and with the 
expected negative coefficient. This variable is the weighted average of two regulation 
indicators coming from the OECD Product Market Regulation database (see Conway, Janod 
and Nicoletti, 2005). In particular (and as detailed Conway, Janod and Nicoletti, 2005) the 
proxy for the Involvement of government in business operation is the weighted average of 
respectively Price Controls (with a weight of 0.45) and Use of command and Control 
regulation (with a weight of 0.55)
48 Price Controls get a higher value if the perceived 
regulation is strengthened. The “Use of command and Control regulation” variable are 
measuring the intensity by which central governments are impeding or distorting the free 
movement of goods across countries or, as in the case of price controls they are actually 
providing retail prices guidelines which may discourage traders to enter specific country-
markets. Hence, for example, if the “government provide (strong) price guidelines to road 
freight companies” (item 4 of the price control proxy) this may discourage road freight 
companies to operate in that particular country and therefore impact negatively the trade 
channel. The same happens when we look at, for instance, the role played by air travel or 
railways regulation policies across countries in the sub-index “use of command and control 
regulation”. The tighter these regulations, for example, in terms of requirements imposed to 
domestic carriers or companies operating in providing railway infrastructures (items 10 and 
11 of the “use of command” sub-index), the more difficult will become trading across 
countries with the regulatory burden imposing an implicit barrier to the amount of turnover 
exported. 
 
An increase in the perceived control of prices and on the use of other control regulation will 
lead therefore to an increase in the value of the Involvement in Business and subsequently to a 
decrease in trade flows across countries. Less burdensome regulations in these two fields are 
                                                 
48 In the table we do not present the results which make use of the more disaggregated sub-indices which 
compose “involvement in business operation”. The same strategy will apply also for other PMR indices which 
will be analyzed below in other tables. We do so because some of the most disaggregated components of the 
indices we analyze are sometimes highly correlated one another and the regression which take them altogether is 
somehow meaningless due to multicollinearity problems. This said, however, we propose in the text the 
description of the main sub-indices (components) of the variables which are actually analyzed in the regression 
(as it is the case here for “involvement in business operation”) with the corresponding weight which are used to 
compute the final variable used in the regression. This way we are able to analyze the deep determinants of each 
PMR proxy and infer something on their impacts on the dependent variable even if we do not directly put them 
in the regression. For more details about these variables see Appendix III.4. 
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therefore expected to reduce implicit trade barriers and to increase trade flows in the 
examined countries. All these reasoning seem to be strongly confirmed by our empirical 
analysis which argues for less burdensome and more uniform set of price and control 
regulations as an important driver for freerer circulation of goods and increased trade 
across member states.  
 
The second IM regulation proxy that shows to be extremely significant in explaining the 
amount of turnover exported (Table III.1) comes from the Economic Freedom of the World 
Index (www.freetheworld.org) and it is called “Freedom to trade Internationally”. Due to 
the way the overall index is built (higher values to countries where trade is made easier by 
regulations) this variable is statistically significant and with the expected positive coefficient 
meaning that regulations which improve the easiness of trade are actually impacting 
positively the volume of turnover exported in our sample. More in detail, also the index of 
“freedom to trade internationally” is the average of other sub-indices.
49  
 
Even if in Table III.1 we propose the best specification in terms of overall fit of the 
regression, other specifications have been tried in order to check the robustness of the result 
and to propose alternative (maybe less important) explanatory variables for the trade channel 
(see Appendix III.1). We have checked whether having an international market as main 
market destination is correlated to the amount of exported turnover. Empirical evidence seems 
to point into this direction. Also, we have tried different IM regulations such as using the 
overall Product Market Regulation OECD proxy. This variable shows the correct negative 
sign but it fails to be statistically significant pointing to the fact that only some of the features 
which attain the PMR index (in our case for example the involvement in business operation) 
are actually explaining the flow of exported turnover but no others such as administrative 
burdens on start-up or communication and simplification rules (which instead will be 
important for other channels such as that of cooperation). Also, we have proposed a 
robustness check of the result on the “involvement in business operation” variable by putting 
it into the same regression with the percentage of firms declaring to have as main market the 
                                                 
49 These are: taxes on international trade (representing the revenues and mean tariff rates applied in each country 
as well as the standard deviation of these tariffs), regulatory barriers (as the average of hidden import barriers 
and cost of importing), actual size of trade sector compared to its expected size (derived from gravity analysis), 
differences between official exchange rates and black-market rate and finally international capital market 
controls (as the average of an index controlling for the access of citizens to foreign capital markets and viceversa 
and the restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital market exchange with foreigners). All these 
sub-proxies together give the index for the easiness by which trade transaction may take place across countries. 
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“international” one. The result shows how it is the IM business regulation to be the important 
determinant of trade flows. 
 
 III.2.3. Cooperation transmission channel 
 
The second channel we are going to focus on is that of cooperation. This comes from the use 
of the CIS3 data. The dependent variable (COOP) is expressed as the percentage of firms 
which have cooperated (within the EU territory) in any kind of activity related to innovation. 
To be more specific we are going to propose as a baseline indicator of cooperation the total 
number of firms in each sector and country which participated in innovative cooperation 
activities divided by the total number of innovative firms. Cooperation activities, however, 
can be carried out both across countries (with firms which do not belong to the country of the 
interviewed firm) and at the national level (with firms of the same country only). The CIS3 
data allows us to define two separate indicators for these channels of cooperation.  
 
Due to the general scope of our research (the effect of the EU internal market on innovation 
adoption) we believe of particular interest the study of the “across-country” cooperation as a 
channel of innovation adoption. This is why we report, as our baseline specification, the 
results by using this specific cooperation channel. However, of interest is also the analysis of 
the impact of IM regulation on the level of cooperation within the same country (and then of 
this on overall innovation adoption). We propose the econometric results for this secondary 
specification in the appendix III.2. 
 
Hence, going back to the interpretation of the transmission channel, the more the cooperation 
in innovation matters (for example fostered by the EU framework programmes, see Varga et 
al. 2008), the more we expect innovation to diffuse across borders, industries and firms. The 
analysis of the determinants of cooperation (that is of those policy regulations which help 
cooperation innovation) is therefore intrinsically important in our study. Table III.2 offers the 
best results for the first stage regression of cooperation, that is the one which is going to be 
used in the second step of the estimation in order to check the impact of this particular 
channel on innovation adoption
50.  
 
                                                 
50 For a more details about this specification and some other alternatives, see Appendix III.2. 
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Cooperation (COOP) is explained, again, by 2 control variables and by a set of IM 
regulations. The first control variable is a proxy of the independent level of social capital 
(TRUST) in each country. It is well known that social and cultural features are at the basis of 
the different level of trust experienced across European countries (see Vadi, 2004). So, before 
testing for the impact of specific regulations on cooperation we argue it is important to 
expunge the likely heterogeneity of social capital and trust by controlling for differences 
across countries. The variable we use is a proxy of the degree of trust (“most people can be 
trusted”) in each country coming from the World Social Survey. This variable shows up to be 
statistically significant and positive as one would expect. The degree of cooperation across 
firms and countries is therefore explained in part by the degree of trust.  
 
Along with the overall trust experienced in each country, another aspect is particularly 
important when accounting for the degree of cooperation: the average size of the sector (log 
of GVA (Gross Value Added) of each sector in each country). We take into account the 
average dimension of the sector in our sample so as not to incorrectly attribute this size effect 
to other variables in the regression. In particular the intuition is that firms operating in smaller 
sectors will be those which more than others rely on cooperation while, in those sectors which 
reached a critical mass, firms have reached the sufficient size so as not to need to rely to 
cooperation as smaller firms may need to. In smaller sectors, then, part of the fixed costs of 
innovation can be therefore better internalized if the innovation is made in cooperation with 
other firms (which cooperate in the same project) rather than individual firms alone. Our 
empirical results confirm this intuition. The average size of the sector is negatively and 
significantly related to the degree of cooperation. This is to say that small firms are more 
likely, on average, to cooperate in innovative projects with other firms, whereas big firms in 
developed sectors would develop their innovations by themselves in a more competitive 
environment.   
 
Also, at a side of this, another explanatory variable results to be very important in shaping the 
extent of cooperation across countries and firms. Human capital (our proxy is the Science and 
technology graduates by EUROSTAT) is found to be statistically significant and positive. 
The intuition behind this result is that better trained workforce is usually more prone to 
cooperation and that especially those graduated in scientific areas are going then to participate 
in bigger cooperative projects. In fact, those projects which usually need cooperation across 
firms (or countries) are those which more than other require high skill levels. It is not 
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surprising, therefore, to find a significant correlation between human capital levels and 
the degree of EU cooperation.  
 
Also, however, one would expect to be able to detect the impact of particular regulations and 
policies which may foster cooperation. The IM variable we propose in our preferred 
specification proxies for “regulatory and administrative opacity” and comes from the 
OECD PMR database. Due to the way this variable has been built, it shows a negative and 
highly statistically significant coefficient pointing that regulations leading to easier 
communication are going to boost cooperation across firms and countries, as expected. 
 
The regulatory index is a composed measure of different sub-indicators. Hence, our 
econometric result is particularly interesting when looking more deeply at the issues that are 
considered in the construction of this OECD proxy (see Appendix III.4). 
 
Within the regulatory and administrative opacity indicator we find the items of the indicator 
“communication and simplification procedure” which measures the extent by which national 
governments reduce information and cooperation costs. Hence, for instance, the third item 
“There are inquiry points where affected or interested foreign parties can get information on 
the operation and enforcement of regulations” is actually providing a measure of the extent by 
which national government foster and ease cooperation across national firms/individuals and 
other firms/individuals in other countries. Another example is the 8
th item of the indicator 
which measures the presence of “a program to review and reduce the number of licenses and 
permits required by the national government”. The presence of such type of  programs is 
undoubtedly helpful in fostering cooperation making the start-up of business relations much 
easier not only at the national level but especially for foreigners who do not have to face too 
many “unknown” procedures in order to undergo their businesses abroad. 
 
The empirical evidence that Table III.2 shows on these regards strongly supports all the 
reasoning above arguing for reducing communication burdens in order to achieve higher 
levels of cooperation across firms and therefore across industries and countries. 
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As done for the other channels, we also provide some additional robustness checks for 
cooperation by using alternative specifications (see Appendix III.2).
51 We propose the 
robustness check by using different variables both on (i) Cooperation across EU countries 
and, on the second definition, (ii) Cooperation within the same country.   
 
In fact, in the last column of table A.III.2 in Appendix III.2 we re-run the baseline 
specification but using as a dependent variable the degree of cooperation within the same 
country. Results are basically the same. We argue, therefore, that the same IM policies 
affecting the cooperation across EU countries are likely to affect also the degree of 
cooperation within the same country as one would expect. 
 
III.2.4. Competition channel 
 
The last channel we believe may affect the diffusion and adoption of innovation is that of 
competition. The economic literature (both theoretical and empirical) has already studied the 
effect that the market structure and the degree of competition may exert on innovative output. 
In particular, recent theoretical models (see Aghion and Howitt 1996) argue that in a situation 
where firms which compete in innovation are leveled (as it is somehow the case for the EU 
firms) the competition neck-and-neck is going to increase the incentives to produce and 
exploit innovation. At the same time, innovation adoption will be affected by competition 
in the way that more innovations will be available and, on average, therefore more 
adoption/diffusion possibilities will be there for firms to be taken (see Part I for a detailed 
review on the impact of competition on innovation diffusion/adoption). Hence, the study of 
the determinants of competition at the EU levels (and in particular of the regulations which 
may foster competition itself) is of crucial importance to our ultimate target, the study of the 
determinants of innovation adoption. 
 
                                                 
51 We tried to insert the Transposition Deficit Indicator for the regulations concerning education (TDI EDUC) 
and other measures of human capital. Apparently the reception of EU regulations in this field does not show to 
be statistically significant and does not explain the degree of cooperation across countries and firms. Also, other 
proxies of human capital fail to be more significant than the one used in the baseline specification. When we also 
account for the total turnover produced (as an alternative measure of the size of the firm) we find this to be 
significant (as expected) but the overall R2 of the regression is lower. If we also insert some other CIS-based 
controls such as belonging to a group (GP, whose sign on cooperation is expected to be negative) and having 
introduced recently some organizational changes (Organizational Changes), these control variables are not 
significant. But even when they are accounted for, the main result of the baseline equation stands. 
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The proxy that we use for measuring competition at the EU level is a measure of the markup 
in the fashion of that proposed by Griffith and Harrison (2004)
52. The higher the markup 
(above the value of 1), the less the competition achieved in the market under analysis 
since more rents can be extracted by the distortion/absence of competition. On the opposite, 
perfect competition would imply a markup with a value equal to the unity. 
 
Our preferred econometric specification is shown in Table III.3. The logarithm of markup is 
regressed again on some control variables as well as on IM regulation proxies. As before for 
the case of cooperation here we control for the average size of the firms. The intuition is that 
in markets where the average size of the firms is high (and therefore fewer firms are active) 
the competition will be lower since the market structure will be similar to an oligopoly and 
further away from high competition. We do not find direct evidence of such an assumption 
since the coefficient for the firm size control variable is not statistically different from zero. In 
our opinion, this may suggest that the sectoral dummies are already capturing much of the 
observed variability in the markup, since the size of the average firm is highly related to the 
kind of industry, leaving little significance to the other control variables. The R2 of the 
regression if quite high (0.70) pointing to a good fit of the specification proposed. 
 
When we analyze the IM regulations which may affect the degree of competition, five main 
variables show up to be jointly significant in column (i). First of all the Transposition Deficit 
Indicator for Competition regulations (TDI COMPETITION). The TDI indicators, as 
already pointed out before, measure the percentage of EU norms and regulations which have 
been correctly applied in each member state in a particular field of interest. In the case of the 
TDI COMP these regulations are those planned to impact and boost competition at the EU 
level. The coefficient is highly statistically significant and negative as expected, the more the 
regulations correctly applied, the lower the markup in each economy under 
consideration, and therefore more competition in the market. 
 
The second explanatory variable is the OECD PMR proxy named “state control”. This 
indicator is the weighted average of two items, namely of “involvement in business 
operation” (with a weight of 0.44) and of “public ownership” (with a weight of 0.56). The 
first low-level indicator has already been examined in the text in the analysis for the trade 
                                                 
52 The proxy is calculated as the ratio Value Added/(Labor costs+ Capital costs) 
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channel. The second, instead, is itself a weighted average of three other items, namely “scope 
of public enterprise sector”, “size of public enterprise sector” and “direct control over 
business enterprises”
53. Due to the way the “state control” index has been built this implies 
that higher values of the index imply tighter and burdensome regulation such that this will 
actually impede competition. The expected sign on markup is therefore positive
54. 
 
It is important to notice how the “general constraints” category (one of the items included in 
the “Direct Control over Business”), that is the presence of constitutional constraints to the 
sale of government stakes or direct control over the decisions in publicly owned firms, is 
theoretically linked to a reduction in the competition level. The same happens when national 
governments can use special voting rights (as the golden share) in cases such as mergers and 
acquisitions of national firms by, for instance, foreign firms of private ones. Hence, an 
increase in the sub-index is theoretically (and we see in the table, empirically) related to a 
potential increase in markup values.  
 
Our empirical evidence strongly support this reasoning with the estimated coefficient for the 
overall “State control” index being weakly statistically significant and positive meaning that 
tighter control by the national government is actually reducing competition levels and 
leading to higher markups and rent acquisitions. 
 
Similarly to what happens for the “state control” proxy, the estimated markup level is also 
showed to be empirically explained (in Table III.3) by the value of the “sectoral and ad hoc 
State aid as a percentage of GDP”
55. Intuitively, the more the state aid, the less it will be 
the actual competition among firms since some of them will be actually subsidized while 
others will not. This, inevitably, creates strong market distortions and therefore leads to higher 
rent extractions and less competition. Again, empirical evidence strongly supports this 
reasoning with the coefficient for the measure of the public aid being positive and highly 
statistically significant. 
 
Finally, in our preferred specification we also control for the transfers and subsidies from 
national governments as a percentage of GDP. This proxy comes from the EFW index and 
                                                 
53 The first two sub-items have a weight of 0.30 while the last one of 0.40. 
54 See Appendix III.4 for more details about this variable. 
55 This variable comes from the Internal Market scoreboard, Eurostat. 
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scores higher values for little subsidies granted to the national firms by their national 
governments. Obviously, the less the subsidies, as we were pointing before, the more 
competition will be faced by firms in any given market. Again, empirical evidence 
strongly supports this reasoning with high statistical significance. 
 
Also, other proxies of the quality of bureaucracy in each country are shown to be statistically 
significant. In particular, the Number of bodies to be contacted in order to open a Business 
and the Number of days spent by managers dealing with bureaucracy are positively 
correlated to the level of markup (and therefore negatively correlated to the degree of 
competition as one would expect). 
 
Similarly to what we did for the other channels, in Appendix III.3 we propose some 
alternative specifications through the use of some different explanatory variables. Along with 
“state control” also a proxy for “regulatory barriers” and “barriers to entrepreneurship” 
seem to explain the competition level across countries. The overall significance of the 
specification in column (ii) is lower than our preferred one. In column (iii) these same 
variables are accompanied also to the “outward oriented policy” item of the OECD PMR 
indicators. Again, the signs of the coefficients are those expected so that tighter regulations 
and direct control by the national government on the private business reduce the competition 
level (increases the value of the indicator). Other combinations of the same regulatory proxies 
have been tried in column (iv) and (v) such as “Government enterprises and investment as 
a percentage of total investment” (EFW) and they all show qualitatively the same result. 
The next figure shows the main IM variables affecting the different channels. 
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III.3.  Second stage estimates: the impact of the Transmission 
Channels of Innovation Adoption 
 
The impact of IM regulations on innovation adoption goes through the transmission channels. 
In what follows, therefore, we are going to show the main results of this second stage 
estimation where the fitted values of the chosen first stage regressions of the previous sections 
are going to be used as explanatory variables along with other specific variables which could 
be directly affecting innovation adoption (i.e. R&D expenditures and IPRs controls). 
 
Hence, we are going to estimate the following specification: 
 
i c C i i c i c i c i c i c DUM DUM ZID Comp Trade Coop InnoAdopt , 6 5 4 , , 3 , 2 , 1 0 , ξ λ λ λ λ λ λ λ + + + + + + + =
 
where InnoAdopt is the innovation adoption rate, Coop is the fitted value of the cooperation 
variable obtained from the first stage, Trade refers to the fitted value of trade obtained from 
the first stage, Comp is the fitted value of competition obtained from the first stage; ZID are 
the different control variables of innovation adoption and DUM refer to either sectoral and 
country dummies. 
 
Innovation adoption is computed as the share of innovative firms which have introduced an 
innovation in product or process either in cooperation or in isolation (hereinafter also referred 
to as “other organizations-based innovation adoption”).  This variable, therefore, is aimed at 
measuring the degree of innovation adoption at the country and sectoral level. It is, however, 
a general definition since it does not distinguish between the innovation adoption which is 
done mainly through cooperation (“made in cooperation”) among firms from that which is 
mainly direct adoption of blueprints or innovation developed elsewhere (“made in isolation”). 
Also, it does not distinguish between product and process innovation. These two types of 
innovation (product and process) may require different channels to be adopted or transmitted. 
Also, therefore, the same IM regulation may impact a specific type of innovation adoption 
(i.e. product made in cooperation) in a different way that it impacts another type of innovation 
adoption (i.e. process made in isolation).  
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Due to the very much disaggregated nature of the CIS database that we use for the analysis 
we are able to disaggregate the innovation adoption item into sub-categories and check 
whether the diffusion channels impact these sub-categories differently. 
 
The categorizations of innovation adoption that we propose for estimation are therefore the 
following: 
 
1)  Total innovation adoption  
2)  Product innovation adoption 
3)  Process innovation adoption 
4)  Product innovation adoption made in cooperation 
5)  Product innovation adoption made in isolation 
6)  Process innovation adoption made in cooperation 
7)  Process innovation adoption made in isolation 
 
Each one of these dependent variables will be regressed on the (fitted) transmission channels 
and on specific explanatory variables as well as on sectoral and country controls dummies to 
pick up any unobserved heterogeneity across the sample
56. 
 
III.3.1. Total Innovation Adoption results
57 
 
In this section we are going to present the results of our main econometric specification for 
total innovation adoption. The idea is to check whether (and how much) the transmission 
channels (proxied by their fitted values coming from the first stage regressions) are impacting 
the overall index of innovation adoption. Along with the impact that the channels may have 
we will control for specific regulations (enforcement of IPRs for instance) which the 
economic literature argues may be affecting (boosting or slowing down) the diffusion and 
adoption of innovation and technology across countries, sectors and firms. 
 
 
                                                 
56 We tried also to control for firm size but the result was not significant when we already took into account 
sectoral and country dummies. 
57 A complementary analysis using micro data only has been done in Appendix III.5. Anyway, we should take 
into account that the countries considered are not the same. Also, it is necessary to take into account the merge 
done in micro data in order to include it in the macro database (see appendix II.1)  
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In column (i) of Table III.4 we offer the best specification where we explain total innovation 
adoption with the transmission channels and country and sectoral dummies. The overall fit of 
the regression is quite good (R2 is 0.79).  
  
Table III.4. Determinants of Innovation Adoption 
Dependent 




































              
Cooperation 4.22 4.15  5.53  3.17  2.22 4.58  4.41 
 (2.26)**  (1.86)*  (2.14)**  (1.36)  (0.93)  (2.00)*  (2.05)* 
Markup -7.83  -8.22  -6.28  -2.85  -9.76  -7.69  -3.00 
 (-1.30)  (-1.58)  (1.04)  (-0.56)  (-1.82)*  (-1.48)  (-0.63) 
Trade -0.04  0.01  0.002  0.04  -0.06  0.048  -0.023 


























              
              

























Constant  6.45 5.41 4.48 1.59  6.95 5.91  2.67 
 (1.73)*  (1.61)  (1.15)  (0.49)  (2.04)**  (1.80)*  (0.94) 
Observations  50 52 52 48  48 48  48 
R-squared  0.79 0.64 0.55 0.47  0.48 0.72  0.35 
t statistics in parentheses 
***, ** and * significant at 1, 5 and 10 % 
 
Other control variables inserted in the regression but not reported are: (a.) the firm belongs to a group, (b.) the 
firm has undertaken organizational changes, (c.) R&D expenditures total, (d.)  the firm has been publicly 
financed. 
 
One transmission channel is statistically significant and shows the expected sign. This is 
cooperation which seems to impact positively the degree of total innovation adoption. 
The coefficient for the (fitted) cooperation proxy is statistically significant at 5% confidence 
levels arguing that more cooperation across firms and countries is going to be beneficial 
to the process of innovation adoption. Behind this result, however, lies a more interesting 
consideration to be done on the impact of IM regulations on the total innovation adoption 
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share. In fact, what we are measuring here is the indirect impact that IM regulations (those 
which foster and boost cooperation) are exerting on the level of total innovation adoption 
through the cooperation channel. An increase, for example, in the level of the 
“communication and simplification procedures”, as detailed in the first stage regression for 
the cooperation channel through its impact on the index of “regulatory and administrative 
opacity”, is going to impact positively the fitted value of “cooperation” which is used in the 
second stage regression. Indirectly, therefore, due to the positive and statistically significant 
coefficient of the “fitted cooperation” variable we can infer, for example, that the IM 
“regulatory and administrative opacity” and its subcomponents which foster cooperation (as 
well as the general level of trust and the stock of human capital) will positively affect the 
level of innovation adoption from a cross section point of view. 
 
The coefficient for our fitted markup value (proxying for the channel of competition) is 
negative but not statistically significant at conventional significance levels.  
 
Also the trade channel does not show up to be statistically significant in the regression 
proposed in column (i). We do not find a clear explanation for this result. It may be the case 
that trade acts differently depending on the specific kind of innovation and that, therefore, we 
may be averaging out its effect in the regression so that its coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero. 
 
In column (i) of table III.4 we also insert a control for the legal structure and property 
rights protection of each country
58. Among the dimensions considered in this variable, that 
we consider may have a closer impact on the adoption of innovation, we find the quality and 
strength by which IPRs are enforced in each country. Empirical and theoretical literature 
points to the enforcement of IPRs (and the overall legal structure) as a determinant of 
innovation and technology adoption. If IPRs foster innovation creation, they can be 
considered as a barrier to the free adoption (or appropriation) of innovation. Hence, the 
expected sign, once we control for the other diffusing channels, is negative in the sense that 
the tighter the protection, the more difficult it will be for firms to exploit innovation 
discovered elsewhere. It is important to notice that this result does not imply immediately 
                                                 
58 This variable comes from the EFW index and is based on the Political Risk Component I (Law and Order) 
from the International Country Risk Guide. Source: PRS Group (various issues), International Country Risk 
Guide. 
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that, as a policy making decision, IPRs should be relaxed so as to achieve higher innovation 
adoption rates. In fact, what is important to bear in mind is the balance between innovation 
production (boosted by IPRs enforcement) and innovation adoption (slowed down by IPRs 
enforcement). The two effects are therefore difficult to be disentangled even if, in the case of 
EU countries, we may suspect that the first effect (that of innovation creation) may be 
stronger than the second (innovation adoption) due to the high-tech nature of innovative 
European firms if compared to other regions in the world where countries rely on 
innovation adoption more than in innovation creation.  
 
So, the interpretation of the negative coefficient for legal structure simply goes in the 
direction of saying that, on average, innovation adoption slows down when IPRs (among 
other factors) are strongly enforced. This is a partial effect which abstracts from the overall 
(ambiguous) effect that IPRs may play on the creation of innovation which cannot be 
observed in the results we are presenting here 
 
Additional control variables have been also inserted in column (i). We inserted respectively 
the R&D expenditures (in order to capture country and sectoral differences in the innovative 
effort) and other controls such as “belonging to a group”, “receiving public funds” or “having 
made any organizational change lately”. Even if none of these controls shows up to be 
statistically significant, our main results on the impact of the transmission channels are 
maintained and with a strong statistical significance. 
 
III.3.2. Product Innovation Adoption 
 
As we argued before, the way the transmission channels (or other regulatory proxies) impact 
innovation adoption may depend on the particular kind of innovation adoption we are looking 
at. So for example one channel may be important for product innovation adoption but less or 
irrelevant for process adoption. Next, we try to disentangle this partial effect by using as a 
dependent variable the different categories of innovation adoption starting from the adoption 
of product innovation (Table III.4). 
 
In column (ii) we propose the best specification which makes use of the three fitted 
transmission channels and the control variable for the Legal Structure and Property Rights 
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Protection as well as country and sectoral dummy controls. As we were suspecting the picture 
here changes with respect to the results we obtained for the overall innovation adoption 
dependent variable even if the change is only marginal. 
 
The cooperation channel is again the statistically significant in explaining the amount of 
product innovation adoption across EU member states. It seems that creating a network of 
innovative firms (and therefore promoting and facilitating cooperation) act as a strong 
driver of product innovation adoption. In this line of reasoning, therefore, it should be 
seen as very important the effort made by the EU in order to promote cooperation 
across EU member states and in particular the cooperation among the old member 
states and the new entrants which, more than others, may have benefitted from 
innovation adoption channeled through cooperation in research projects.  
 
On the other hand, competition, even if with correct sign, does not show up as a 
statistically significant channel of adoption when it comes to the analysis of product 
innovation. Instead, the trade channel is still not significant at the conventional confidence 
levels but the change in the sign of the coefficient (from negative to positive) points to a 
potential role played by trade in the adoption of product innovation.  
 
The intuition behind this result may be that, when it comes to adopting a new “product” 
(which is a physical item) the more this item is traded, the more the possibility for this 
product to be known in new markets and therefore eventually adopted by other firms. 
This said, the coefficient is not statistically different from zero so we cannot infer any causal 
relationship from the estimates but only guess on the economic intuition. 
 
Again, also, the Legal structure proxy shows to be a statistically significant explanatory 
variable for the adoption of innovation (and in this case of product innovation). It seems the 
protection of property rights is particularly important for product (the coefficient is slightly 
more significant w.r.t. the case of overall adoption) and especially when this is compared to 
the non significant impact that protection of property rights and legal structure has on process 
innovation adoption as we will show in the next section. 
  168 
 
III.3.3. Process Innovation Adoption 
 
The results on the impact of the transmission channels on process innovation adoption 
confirm those already obtained for the overall innovation adoption and for that of product 
innovation only (Table III.4).  
 
The cooperation channel shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient being 
the only transmission channel impacting positively and significantly the adoption of process 
innovation.  
 
As in previous result the coefficient for trade is not significant pointing to the fact that 
process innovation adoption may not be affected by the trade channel. The competition 
channel also, does not show to be statistically significant in the overall regressions for 
process innovation adoption. 
 
Also, this time, the proxy for the Legal Structure of each country is not found to be 
statistically significant even if, however, this shows the expected negative sign. 
 
The non-significant result is unfortunately robust to the insertion of various control variables 
as we did for the total innovation adoption. We controlled for organizational changes, 
belonging or not to a group as well as total R&D expenditures and public funding. None of 
these control variables have shown statistically significant. 
 
Due to the peculiarity of the CIS databases we are able to check whether the results which we 
have obtained in the baseline regressions are also robust to additional disaggregation of the 
innovation adoption proxy. The channels may be actually working in different ways when 
the process (or product) innovation adoption comes as a result of a cooperative activity 
or whether it comes from the introduction of a process developed mainly by other firms 
(namely “made in isolation). In order to control for these differences in the next section we 
disaggregate the innovation adoption even more into the categories of Product innovation 
adoption made in cooperation, Product innovation adoption made in isolation, Process 
innovation adoption made in cooperation and Process innovation adoption made in isolation. 
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III.4. Additional  disaggregation of Innovation Adoption 
 
In the next paragraphs we are going to check whether the results we obtained on the impact of 
the transmission channels (and ultimately of the IM which lie behind them) are the same 
when innovation adoption is disaggregated into its main sub-components.  
 
As we already pointed out, innovation diffusion may be in principle the result of cooperation 
activities among firms (which then develop a product or a process together) or simply the 
acquisition of a product (usually a developed blueprint) or of a process by one firm which 
simply buys it from another one. Hence, the impact that some specific transmission channel 
may have on these different adoption mechanisms may be ambiguous and it deserves, 
therefore, some additional analysis. 
 
III.4.1. Product Innovation Adoption made in Cooperation 
 
We start the analysis by looking at the case of product innovation adoption made in 
Cooperation. Table III.4 (column iv) depicts the main econometric results.  
 
None of the channels enter the regression with statistical significance even if all the 
coefficients show the expected signs.  This unsatisfactory result is robust to the insertion of 
the legal structure proxy which, differently from the baseline regression is not here 
statistically significant. As pointed out in the descriptive part, however, product innovation 
adoption is relatively less important with respect to the adoption of process innovation 
overall.  
 
III.4.2. Product Innovation Adoption made in Isolation 
 
The Product Innovation Adoption made in cooperation with others is the result of the 
acquisition by a firm of a product which was mainly developed outside the firm itself. For this 
reason we would expect the cooperation channel to loose significance somehow (since all the 
IM regulations which are at the basis of our “fitted cooperation proxy” should not be directly 
relevant in the case of acquisition of innovation as a result of non-cooperative activities). In 
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fact our econometric results in Table III.4 (column v) show how cooperation is not 
statistically significant and showing a strong decrease in its statistical significance w.r.t. 
the case of product innovation adoption made in cooperation. 
 
Instead, competition (which enters with a statistically significant coefficient) seems to 
explain much more strongly the diffusion and adoption of product innovation as a result 
of the direct acquisition from other firms when any cooperation activity took place. This 
is an interesting result if we recall that the IM regulation which we used to proxy for 
competition were referring to the degree by which the state or the national governments enter 
or are involved in business operations. A decrease in such government involvement is here 
proven to raise the “direct” acquisition of product innovation by firms. This seems to 
point to the fact that a more developed competition would allow firms to merge (and 
therefore acquire products) or to simply buy and exchange products in a much easier 
way.  This directly affects the amount of product innovations which are actually 
diffused/adopted. To be slightly more specific, all the IM regulations which we used to 
proxy the competition channel imply that as soon as the involvement of the national 
government decrease competition will rise.  This may happen when the national 
governments reduce their control over firms in different sectors. See, for instance, the 
item “national, state or provincial government control on at least one firm in one sector” 
which we used to proxy for markup levels across countries which is likely to reduce the 
possibility for foreign investors to acquire market shares or compete in the same sector with 
the national governments. Also, the use (or non-use) of the golden share option by the 
national government is likely to reduce the possibility of mergers (and therefore reduce the 
chance of direct product acquisition by foreign firms for instance). All these aspects are then 
likely to affect the amount of product innovation adoption through direct acquisition of the 
innovation from other firms. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, however, no much evidence has been proposed in the economic 
literature about the role played by competition on the adoption of innovation. We may assume 
that the more the effort in innovation, the more the production of new blueprints (innovation 
output). In this situation, theoretical models such as those by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), 
Helpman (1993) or Aghion and Howitt (1992) implicitly assume that also the 
diffusion/adoption of technology will be faster. Therefore, the negative sign of the fitted 
markup is pointing exactly towards this direction arguing for the positive effect that 
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competition (and the IM regulations that we analyzed before which boost competition) 
will have on the adoption of innovation in EU member states. 
 
Surprisingly, instead, trade seems to be statistically significant but with the negative 
coefficient. However, the result may depend on the fact that trade is mainly affecting 
innovation creation (rather than its adoption) and due to the way we built the adoption 
indicator (as a share on the total innovative firms) then trade may show up with a negative 
coefficient overall. This result, however, deserves to be better analyzed in future research 
probably (when it will be fully available) with the use of the CIS4 data and more observations 
for the regression. 
 
The result is robust to the insertion of the legal structure variable (which is again proxying for 
the easiness by which imitation leading to adoption may take place in each country). Again, a 
sound legal structure reduces ceteris paribus the amount of products which are adopted 
(and this is especially true when no cooperation has been carried out between innovative 
firms buying and selling).  
 
III.4.3. Process Innovation Adoption made in Cooperation 
 
As pointed out before, the way the IM regulations, along with the transmission channels, 
impact innovation adoption is likely to be different when we analyze whether process 
adoption is the result of cooperation or not. We start showing in Table III.4 (column vi), the 
results for process innovation adoption made in cooperation.  
 
In column (vi) the best specification shows how, as expected, the cooperation channel is 
significant and with a positive coefficient pointing again that all the IM regulations 
facilitating cooperation are main drivers of process innovation adoption.  
 
The other two transmission channels (trade and competition) do not show to be 
significant. In fact, this is somehow an expected result. 
 
If we take the case of competition, for example, there is no reason to believe that this channel 
should directly foster the production and adoption of process innovation. Process innovation 
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is, in fact, a rather intangible innovation (more related to organizational processes). 
Empirical and theoretical literature, instead, has been looking at the role played by 
competition on the production of patents and tangible products rather than on the 
production or development of “processes”. 
 
Instead, if we take the case of trade, as we already pointed out, this channel works as a 
vehicle of transmission for products which are brought and sold into new markets. Once, 
products reach new markets these are likely to be adopted. However, the reasoning is different 
when it comes to process innovation. Processes are not directly tradable and the way they 
enter new markets is usually by spilling over through direct knowledge (tacit or not) and 
therefore, through direct cooperation across firms and individuals which get to know 
how these new processes actually work and are implemented. It is not a surprise, therefore, 
that the cooperation channels achieves the highest significance exactly in the regression for 
process innovation adoption made in cooperation. 
 
As before, only legal structure shows up to be statistically significant and with the 
expected negative sign while other controls do not seem to qualitatively change the baseline 
results. 
 
III.4.4. Process Innovation Adoption made in Isolation 
 
Finally, we look at the impact of IM regulations and transmission channels on the process 
innovation diffusion made in isolation, that is, of those processes which have not been 
developed in cooperation across firms but that are simply bought or directly acquired by one 
firm from another.  
 
The best specification is included in column (vii) of Table III.4. Again, only cooperation 
shows to be a statistically significant driver of innovation adoption showing how the 
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III.5. Additional estimations on the second stage equation: 
Innovation Adoption equation using micro data
59 
 
In order to check the robustness of our results, additional estimations are made on individual 
firm data. It avoids the aggregation bias that arises when we use sector-country aggregated 
data. And it also allows us to use a homogenous database, since all the data come from CIS. 
The drawback however is that no variable can proxy for competition. Therefore this section 
focuses on two channels only: Trade and Cooperation. Also, not all the countries in the macro 
analysis are now considered, but only those available in the micro database of the CIS. 
 
The dependent variable measures the fact that the firm has adopted an innovation (product or 
process) or not. More precisely, the decision to adopt an innovation is estimated by means of 
a binary choice model. The profit associated with adoption is considered to be the latent 
variable. Since a measure of this profit is not available, we use a probit model where the 
dependent variable takes value 1 if firm i adopted a product or a process innovation 
(developed by others or in collaboration with others) and 0 otherwise. Adoption is assumed to 
occur if the associated payoffs are positive.  
 
In this section, we are just going to present the main results obtained. In that sense, our 
conclusions are basically drawn from table III.5. For more details about this micro-analysis, 
and the extensive explanation of the results obtained, see appendix III.5. In column i we 
explain the total innovation equation; in column iv, the adoption equation; in columns v and 
vii, we explain the product innovation and product adoption, respectively; in columns viii and 
x, the process innovation and the process adoption; and, finally, in column xii, the choice 




                                                 
59 The results obtained in the regression analysis at the micro level are not directly comparable with the ones at 
the macro level, given that the countries considered in both cases are different. The variable accounting for 
cooperation is also a little different. As explained in the descriptive part II, the micro database contains missing 
values for some countries (in particular Belgium, Spain and Greece) regarding the detailled information about 
location of partners. In the macro regressions, this problem has been overcome using the macro data available on 
Eurostat website. For micro regressions, we cannot fill in the missing observation. Therefore, in order to avoid to 
loose all the firms that belong to these three countries, we chose to work with overall cooperation instead of 
splitting in into European cooperation and National cooperation. As shown in the descriptive part II, the 
correlation between these three variable is however very strong.  
60 The number of columns are the same ones as in appendix III.5 
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-0.020***    




LNTURN  Nc  0.044*** 
(0.009)  Nc  -0.0007  
(0.009)  Nc  0.064*** 
(0.009)  Nc 














PATENT  Nc  -0.178*** 
(0.024)  Nc  -0.124***    


















ORGA  Nc  0.061* 
(0.029)  Nc  0.053      




PUBLIC  Nc  0.110*** 
(0.027)  Nc  0.011      




LNEXP  Nc  -0.008** 
(0.003)  Nc  -0.004     




COOP  Nc  0.487*** 
(0.026)  Nc  0.504***     




TURNINC  0.109*** 
(0.028)  Nc  0.089*** 
(0.028)  Nc  0.117*** 
(0.028)  Nc Nc 
TURNDEC  -0.105** 
(0.034)  Nc  -0.086** 
(0.034)  Nc  -0.060 
(0.034)  Nc Nc 
LNWTURN  0.057*** 
(0.005)  Nc  0.004 
(0.004)  Nc  0.023*** 
(0.004)  Nc Nc 
LNEXP*INTMAR  0.021*** 
(0.001)  Nc  0.021*** 
(0.001)  Nc  0.022*** 
(0.001)  Nc Nc 
LNEXP*NATMAR  0.029*** 
(0.002)  Nc  0.029*** 
(0.001)  Nc  0.031*** 
(0.002)  Nc Nc 
LNEXP*LOCMAR  0.014*** 
(0.002)  Nc  0.016*** 
(0.002)  Nc  0.017*** 
(0.002)  Nc Nc 
EST  -0.232*** 
(0.036)  Nc  -0.248*** 
(0.034)  Nc  -0.378*** 
(0.034)  Nc Nc 
Sectoral Dummies (7)  No Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Country Dummies 
(14)  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Lambda  Nc  -0.210 
(0.148)  Nc  -0.001     




Percent concordant  77.5 63.4  73.9  62.8  76.8  64.8 67.9 
Likelihood  -23996.31  -9222.63 -22495.67 -4933.63 -22556.51 -6340.55 -3273.40 
LR test (Beta=0)
62  9848.80***  843.62*** 6141.91*** 721.30*** 8342.67*** 653.24*** 513.47*** 
LR test (dummies=0)  2287.84*** 152***  1402.67***  359.04***  2104.58*** 257.7***  187*** 
Observations  46010 14445  46010  11658  46010  12530  5599 
Note:  LNRTOT: Total innovation expenditure of the firm, LNTURN  : turnover of the firms, LNEMPHI:  higher 
education-skilled workforce, PATENT: takes the value 1 if the firm uses patent protection and 0 otherwise, GP: dummy 
variable indicating whether the firm belongs to a group or not, ORGA: dummy variable for organizational innovation 
PUBLIC: public financial supports, LNEXP: exports, COOP: firms cooperate in innovation, LNWTURN: Firm 
turnover weighted by industry turnover, INTMAR: mainly international market, NATMAR: mainly national market, 
LOCMAR: mainly local market, EST: dummy for new established firm. 
t-ratio are given in parenthesis level of significance: * 10%, **5%,***1% 
(Columns i and iii: without correction of selection bias. Columns ii and iv: with correction of selection bias)   
                                                 
61 The associated selection equation is the same as the equation (i). Moreover, results for total adoption made in 
cooperation are not reported since they are exactly opposite to the one obtained for total adoption made in 
isolation (the dependent variable being dichotomous) 
62 The LR statistics is compared to a Chi2 with the number of constraints as degree of freedom.   
 
Following this table III.5, we can summarize the effects of the different variables over Innovation and Innovation adoption, as follows: 
 
































  +  -  +  -     +  -  +  -  + - + - + - +  - 
R&D 
expenditure            y   e s
e s
e s e s
       




yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes   yes yes 
 
Legal protection 
(patents)          yes    yes    yes    yes yes   
Firms belong to a 
group  yes  yes  yes    yes  yes  yes   yes yes   
Organizational 
innovation ?         y          yes yes   
Public funding of 
innovation         y       y      yes yes   
Exports  yes  yes  yes    yes           yes yes   




yes  yes  yes                      
Closure of an 
enterprise part   yes  yes  yes                    
New established 
enterprises   yes  yes  yes                    
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On the whole, concerning the estimated impact of the different determinants over the adoption 
of innovation, different conclusions arise: 
  
•  The size of the firm positively impacts on innovation adoption. But its effect is due to 
process innovation and does not occur for product innovation adoption.  
•  Firms benefiting from public funding have a higher propensity to adopt innovation, 
and more specifically process innovation. 
•  Organizational innovations are also positively associated with adoption, but weakly 
significant. 
•  Then several variables produce a negative impact on adoption. This is the case for 
membership of a group, absorptive capabilities (measured by innovation expenditure 
and highly educated workers) and exports. This runs counter traditional theoretical 
model as well as empirical studies. This is due to our specific sample that covers only 
innovative firms. The selection equation highlights that a positive impact occurs on 
innovation. Then, compared to innovations developed within firms, these variables 
exert a negative effect on innovation acquired externally. Therefore, these variables 
increase the global propensity to innovate. Among the different ways of innovation 
however they foster generation of innovation instead of adoption.  
•  Cooperation increases the ability to adopt both product and process innovation. The 
impact is however higher on product adoption than on process adoption.  
•  Concerning the choice between adopting in cooperation or in isolation, one can 
distinguish different groups of determinant : 
o  Firstly several factors positively impact the amount of total adoption while 
being neutral on the way adoption is made. This is the case for the size of the 
firm and for cooperation. These variables would thus be important 
characteristics of adoption, whatever the way this adoption is made. 
o  Secondly some other factors which foster innovation adoption have also a 
positive impact on the choice to innovate through cooperation. As public 
fundings are very oftenly used to support collaborative R&D projects, it is not 
surprising that public funding seems to act not only as an incentive to adopt 
new technologies but also to do this in cooperation. Furthermore, adopting in 
cooperation may require a higher organisational flexibility within firms 
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explaining why the capacity of firms to implement organisational changes has 
a positive impact of the choice to adopt in cooperation instead of in isolation.    
o  Finally, the last group of determinant gathers those which simultaneously have 
a negative impact on adoption and a positive impact on the choice to adopt in 
cooperation instead of in isolation. These are higher education, ownership by a 
group, legal protection (patents), and exports which negative impact on 
diffusion is due to their positive impact on innovation per se. Consequently 
these factors appear as the main drivers of innovation in cooperation within 





The impact of IM regulations on innovation adoption is a complex issue to be studied. In the 
empirical analysis that we just proposed we focused on the impact that different IM 
regulations have on some major macroeconomic dimensions (which we called transmission 
channels) and therefore on the impact that these IM regulations have on the intensity of 
innovation adoption through these channels. 
 
Two kinds of issues have been, therefore, tackled in our analysis. 
 
The first relates to the role played by IM regulations on the macroeconomic dimensions: the 
transmission channels. EU Internal Market regulations are put in place in order to grant free 
movement of goods (trade), free movement of people (cooperation) and to remove barriers, 
thus simplifying life for consumers and for businesses (competition). In brackets we have put 
the three transmission channels on which we focus in our analysis. Crucially, therefore, the 
majority of the IM regulations and directives are aimed at boosting these three channels, 
trade, cooperation and competition.  
 
Nonetheless, (and this is the second issue tackled in the present empirical part) these same IM 
regulations are likely to have an impact (this time an indirect one) on the adoption/diffusion 
of innovation across the EU member states. In fact, the IM’s impact is likely to work through 
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the transmission channels; in other words, although most IM measures are not devoted to 
impact innovation adoption, they may have an indirect impact on it through the influence IM 
exert on trade, cooperation and competition, and the ulterior effect of those on the adoption of 
innovation. Recent empirical and theoretical literature points, in fact, to the role of trade, 
cooperation and competition as drivers of innovation and innovation adoption.  
 
In order to correctly disentangle the direct effect of the IM on the transmission channels and 
the indirect one on the degree of innovation adoption we made use of a two-stage estimation 
procedure by using Instrumental Variables estimators. In the first stage we define the impact 
of some major IM regulations on trade, cooperation and competition across EU countries.  
 
Our main results show how the impact of the transmission channels on innovation adoption is 
especially important for Cooperation, leaving Competition and especially Trade as apparently 
a minor channel of overall innovation diffusion. In fact these two channels are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels in the baseline regression for overall innovation adoption. 
 
This said, however, some caveats should be stressed. If Cooperation, and all the IM 
regulations which boost it and that are detailed in the first stage analysis
63, seems to be the 
main determinant of innovation adoption across firms and countries whichever the type of 
innovation diffusion taken into consideration, the effect of the other two channels (Trade and 
Competition) varies, instead, depending on the type of innovation diffusion (whether this is 
made in cooperation or in isolation strategy or whether product rather than process innovation 
adoption is analysed). 
 
So, we find that competition
64 is especially important when looking at the innovation 
adoption made in isolation. Instead, Trade seems to be of minor importance, as we argued 
before, in igniting overall innovation adoption but shows up to be a statistically significant 
driver of Product Innovation adoption made in isolation. 
                                                
 
 
63 The IM regulations and other important factors affecting the Cooperation level across firms and countries are 
Trust, Communication and Simplification Procedures and Human capital. 
64 The IM regulation governing the first stage for competition are found to be: State control, Public Ownership, 
Sectoral and ad Hoc State Aid and other measures of Subsidies of the Govt. as well as the bureacratic quality of 
each member state. 
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Different specifications have also been tried where we inserted a considerable number of 
control variables. In particular, we find that legal structure and protection of property rights, 
once we account for the transmission channels, reduces the speed by which innovation spills 
over across firms and countries. However, this result should be considered within a broader 
context where the legal structure and the protection of property rights (especially of IPRs) will 
lead to an increase in the innovative activity leading, contextually, to a potential increase in 
adoption also not captured directly by the regression analysis. 
 
The econometric results proposed in this section of the report for a variety of variables are 
sometimes not statistically significant at conventional significance levels but still marginally 
significant. Hence, extra care should be used in the interpretation of these results even if, in 
many cases the coefficients seems to show the correct sign. Further analysis is indeed needed 
in order to get more robust estimates. This issue could be tackled by using more recent and 
complete databases such as the CIS4. 
 
The detailed policy implications derived from the results we have obtained in this regression 
analysis can be found in Part V of this report. 














Analysis of the effects of innovation diffusion/adoption 




Technological progress is a priority for all those countries which aspire to support economic 
development since innovation is widely regarded as an essential force for starting and fuelling 
the engine of growth (Romer, 1986). Such force crucially depends on the process of creation, 
accumulation and diffusion/adoption of knowledge which is often strongly localized into 
clusters of innovative firms, sometimes in close cooperation with public institutions such as 
research centres and universities.  
 
This implies that local growth depends on the amount of technological activity which is 
carried out locally and on the ability to exploit external technological achievements through 
the diffusion/adoption of such technologies (Martin and Ottaviano, 2001, Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991, Coe and Helpman, 1995).  
 
The idea in this Part IV is therefore to provide an empirical verification of the relationship 
between innovation adoption and productivity (section IV.2) and between innovation 
adoption and productivity growth (section IV.3). In particular, we are going to provide 
evidence of the above-mentioned relationships through means of descriptive statistics.  
 
 
IV.2. Empirical verification of the relationship between innovation 
adoption and productivity 
 
According to our theoretical model outlined in Part I, the productivity level of each 
economy in any point of time is a positive function of the extent by which this same economy 
is able to innovate through R&D and adopt innovations and transpose them into productive 
activities. The result of the adoption of those innovations into productive processes makes the 
output of each economy rise by leaving constant factor inputs
65. The more the number of 
innovations adopted/diffused into the economy, the higher will be the productivity level 
of this same economy.  
 
                                                 
65This is to say that, if output rises while capital and labor remain constant, this will be the result of an increase 
in productivity levels.  
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We turn now to provide evidence of the relationship between innovation adoption and 
productivity through means of descriptive statistics. We start by providing some scatterplots 
plotting the average productivity level in the Y-axis versus different indicators of the adoption 
of innovation. At a first stage the plots are given at the average level whereas afterwards we 
will turn to a sectoral disaggregated analysis.   
 
IV.2.1. Empirical verification of the relationship between innovation 
adoption and productivity at the global level 
 
The productivity indicator we are going to use is labour productivity, that is, output divided 
by the number of employees obtained from EUROSTAT in year 2001. 
 
In a first step, Figure IV.1 plots the average productivity level in the Y-axis versus the global 
indicator of the adoption of innovation with information at the more disaggregated level, that 
is, for all countries and sectors. The first conclusion that can be drawn is that the coefficient 
of correlation is significantly positive, as expected, although with a moderate value of 
27.1%, confirming the theoretical assumptions.  
 
Secondly, if looking at which sectors/countries the dots in the plot refer to, it can be observed 
how  this positive relationship is mostly due to the positive relationship among both 
variables under analysis for the countries with high productivity levels, that seem to 
benefit more from the adoption of innovation. On the contrary we do not observe such a 
clear relationship for the countries with low levels of productivity, since there are very 
different patterns of some sectors with a very low rate of adoption of innovation (almost null) 
and some sectors with very high rate of adoption both having very low productivity levels. 
This is the case of the sector of Extractive industries in Slovakia or sector of Electricity, gaz 
and water production and distribution in Bulgaria with very low adoption rates and the sector 
of Extractives industries in Portugal with the highest adoption rate of all our observations.  
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Figure IV.1. Scatterplot of Innovation Adoption and productivity with disaggregated 



































To make this point clearer, Figure IV.2 shows the same scatterplot but aggregated at the 
country level. It is clear that there are two differentiated patterns of groups of countries 
according to their productivity level.
66  Those with productivities above the average 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway and Spain) 
present a clear positive correlation with a significant value of 32.4% with the adoption 
of innovation. On the opposite, those countries with low levels of productivity (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and 
Slovakia) do not show a significant correlation (value of 16.4%, not significant). It seems 
therefore that the adoption of innovation affects productivity in those regions that 
experience high levels of productivity, probably due to the presence of other intangible 
assets such as human capital, social capital and entrepreneurship. 
 
                                                 
66 This seems to be consistent with the empirical evidence we showed in Part II in which we argued how 
countries with higher innovation adoption rates were also experiencing higher rates of innovative activities. 
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Note for this figure and followings in this section: Countries with macro data have a clearer color. 
 
In the next figures we analyse the relationship between productivity and adoption rate in the 
case of product and process innovations separately. As depicted in Figure IV.3, we obtain 
again a significantly positive relationship at a 1% level, with a value of 31.3% when 
considering product adoption, slightly higher than when analysed for the global rate of 
innovation adoption. Again, we observe the pattern of sectors and countries with very 
different levels of adoption having very low values of productivity. However, there is a clear 
positive relationship of some sectors/countries whose level of productivity seems to go 
parallel to their rate of adoption. Such is the case of the sector of Electricity, gaz and water 
production and distribution in Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Portugal and 
France (dots in with the highest level of both productivity and adoption in a clear diagonal). 
 
The picture changes substantially when one studies the relationship between productivity 
and adoption of process innovations, which is not significant with a value of 12.1% (Figure 
IV.4). We observe again that the sectors and countries with low levels of productivity are 
associated with very different rates of adoption of process innovations.
67 This is something 
common with product innovation adoptions. The difference in the case of process innovations  
                                                 
67 Recall, however, that our empirical evidence seems to show that much of the observed innovation adoption 
takes place in processes rather than products. 
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Figure IV.3. Scatterplot of product adoption and productivity with disaggregated information at 
the sectoral and country level 

































Figure IV.4. Scatterplot of process adoption and productivity with disaggregated information at 
the sectoral and country level 

































comes from the fact that some sectors in some countries adopt process innovations at an 
intermediate rate whereas they obtain the highest levels of productivity in Europe (sector of 
Electricity, gaz and water production and distribution in Belgium, Sweden, Spain, Italy, 
Denmark, Portugal and France) whereas this same sector in the Netherlands or in Finland 
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adopt process innovations at a much higher rate. Therefore, no clear conclusion can be 
obtained. A possible explanation of the lesser impact of process innovation on productivity if 
compared with the impact of product innovation is that process inovation is more likely to 
result in price declines and not in changes in quantities of goods, which would imply lower 
productivity levels.  
 
Similar conclusions are obtained when plotting the relationship between productivity and 
adoption of product/process innovations in the case of cooperating with other firms or 
institutions (Figures IV.5 and IV.6). Again the relationship is significantly positive for 
product adoption, with a high value of correlation (30.9%) similar to the global case, 
whereas it is not significant at a 5% level for process adoption (but would be at a 10%). 
However, in this second case, the correlation value is of 17.8%, which is higher than in 
the global case of process adoption without specifying the cooperation link. Again, one 
could argue that this lesser impact of process innovation on productivity if compared with the 
impact of product innovation is due to the effect these process innovations have in price 
declines and not in changes in quantities of goods. Using cooperation-based adoption 
however, tends to slightly improve the effect of process adoption on productivity.  
 
Figure IV.5. Scatterplot of cooperation on product innovation and productivity with 
disaggregated information at the sectoral and country level 
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Figure IV.6. Scatterplot of cooperation on process innovation and productivity with 
disaggregated information at the sectoral and country level 
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IV.2.2. Empirical verification of the relationship between innovation 
adoption and productivity at the sectoral level 
 
We turn now to investigate whether the positive relationship between innovation adoption and 
productivity that has been observed at the global level for all sectors and countries in the EU, 
is also obtained when analysing it for each sector under consideration. The scatterplots are 
shown in Figure IV.7. A summary of the correlations obtained for both variables in each 
sector is shown in Table IV.1. 
 
A general conclusion for all sectors, except for the case of Manufactures, is that the 
correlation between productivity and innovation adoption is not significant. In all cases 
we observe that countries with similar low or similar high adoption rates of innovation lead to 
completely different magnitude of productivity. According to a broad theoretical and 
empirical literature, this will point to the fact that productivity at the country level is 
specially related to the existence of physical capital and the endowments of a set of 
intangible assets (knowledge, human capital, social capital, entrepreneurship, among 
others), among which the adoption of innovation would be just a little part. Additionally, 
if disentangling our sample of countries in the two well differentiated groups of productivity 
(EU-15 on the one hand, and the new member states on the other), we do not observe either 
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any kind of separated behaviour. If we compare this conclusion with the one obtained when 
analysing all countries and sectors, we could think that an important part of the correlation 
we obtained before is due to the existence of national correlations between productivity 
and innovation adoption, which vanishes once we take into account different countries with 
different productivity levels and behaviours.  
 
Table IV.1. Correlation rates between Productivity and 
Innovation Adoption Rates by sectors 
Sector Correlation 





Electricity, gas and water 

















Transport and communication  28.3% 
(0.23) 
P-values are given in parenthesis 
 
 
The case of Manufacturing industries should be pinpointed apart since a highly positive 
and significant correlation is found (56%). This positive result is forced by the fact that 
the countries with the lowest rates of innovation adoption are in the group of low 
productivity countries, whereas the ones with highest adoption rates are in the group of high 
productivity. However, among the group of countries with an intermediate level of 
innovation adoption rates, we find both countries with productivities above the average such 
as Germany, Sweden, Finland and Spain, and with productivities below the average (Bulgaria, 
Romania, Portugal and Estonia). Additionally, it can be observed that in case the two groups 
of countries (low and high productivity) were considered separately, such positive 
correlation would not be obtained.   
 Figure IV.7. Scatterplots of Innovation Adoption and productivity in the different sectors under analysis 
Adoption and productivity




















































































































































































































































































































































































IV.3. Empirical verification of the relationship between innovation 
adoption and productivity growth 
 
The expected relationship between innovation diffusion/adoption and productivity growth is 
positive as highlighted in previous empirical and theoretical literature. For instance, the 
Nelson-Phelps (1996) model of technology diffusion/adoption is based on the idea that 
changes in productivity and in total factor productivity depend, among other variables, on the 
rate of technology diffusion from the leader country to each of the countries under 
consideration. We follow the same idea, whereas instead of considering the diffusion from the 
leader country to the rest of countries we will consider a measure gathering the extent of the 
adoption of innovation in each country. In the next figures we will try to get evidence on this 
relationship in the case of the European countries using data for productivity growth in the 
period between 2001 and 2004 from EUROSTAT.  
 
With the information for all countries and sectors, Figure IV.8 offers a non-significant 
coefficient of correlation with a negative value of -2.5%, in contrast with the theoretical 
assumptions and in contrast with the evidence obtained for the correlation between innovation 
adoption and productivity level (which was significantly positive, although with a moderate 
value).  
 
Figure IV.8. Scatterplot of Innovation Adoption and productivity growth with disaggregated 
information (country/sector level) 
 












































Correlation : -2.55 %
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When we plot the same figure but aggregated at the country level (Figure IV.9), the 
correlation is again negative with a low value of -12.9%. Two differentiated patterns seem to 
be observed according to the productivity growth rates of two different groups of countries. 
Those with growth rates above the average (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania and 
Hungary) present a low adoption of innovation (the exemption is Bulgaria, with a high rate of 
productivity growth and high innovation adoption levels). On the other hand, the rest of 
countries display productivity growth rates below the average but without a clear correlation 
with the level of innovation adoption, since some of those countries present innovation 
adoptions above the average (Spain, Italy, Austria, Finland, Norway and Belgium) whereas 
others are below the average (Sweden, France, Portugal, Romainia, Germany and 
Luxembourg)
68. Therefore, the global negative relationship is due to the existence of these 
two different patterns of productivity growth rates, whereas within each group such a negative 
relationship is not observed.  
 
Figure IV.9. Scatterplot of Innovation Adoption and productivity growth at the country level 
 



































































Correlation (country-industry) : -1 2.93 %
 
 
In conclusion, we do not seem to obtain evidence in favour of the existence of a positive 
relationship between innovation adoption and productivity growth. This is in contrast 
                                                 
68 We know from existing literature  that productivity growth is dependant of the initial level of productivity. The higher is the initial level of 
productivity, the lower is the possibility to continue growing. This could certainly explain why highly innovative countries are also countries 
where the productivity growth is the lowest and conversely. 
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with the negative correlation obtained between innovation and productivity growth (Figure 
IV.10), with a significant negative value of -42%. In the case of innovation, we observe how 
Eastern countries with high productivity growth rates clearly present low innovation rates 
whereas the more developed European countries with high innovation rates are at the same 
time those obtaining lower productivity growth rates.  
 
Figure IV.10. Scatterplot of Innovation and productivity growth at the country level 
 
































































Correlation : -42 %
 
 
Figures IV.11 and IV.12 analyse the relationship between productivity growth and the 
adoption rate in the case of product and process innovations respectively. Again, the 
correlation is not significant in any case, although the sign differs. Whereas we obtain a 
negative (almost null) correlation for product adoption, the relationship is positive and 
slightly higher (16.6%) for process adoption. These low values for the correlation are due to 
the fact that similar productivity growth rates can be obtained with very different adoption 
rates. The same pattern is displayed when considering cooperation with other firms or 
institutions on innovation adoption (Figures IV.13 and IV.14). Again, the relationship is 
negative but very low in the case of product innovation (-2.8%), whereas it is non-significant 
but positive for process innovations (10.4%). In this latter case, the correlation is, however, 
lower than in the global case of process adoption without specifying the cooperation link.  
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Figure IV.11. Scatterplot of Product Innovation Adoption and productivity growth with 
disaggregated information (country/sector level) 
 










































Correlation : -0,60 %
 
 
Figure IV.12. Scatterplot of Process Innovation Adoption and productivity growth with 
disaggregated information (country/sector level) 
 










































Correlation : 16.6 %
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Figure IV.13. Scatterplot of Cooperation on Product Innovation Adoption and productivity 
growth with disaggregated information (country/sector level) 
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Figure IV.14. Scatterplot of Cooperation Process Innovation Adoption and productivity growth 
with disaggregated information (country/sector level) 
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Correlation : 10.38 %
 
 
We go next to analyse whether this lack of a clear relationship between innovation adoption 
and productivity growth is maintained for each sector under consideration. The scatterplots 
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are shown in Figure IV.15 and Table IV.2 offers a summary of the correlations obtained 
between both variables in each sector. 
 
Table IV.2. Correlation rates between Productivity Growth 
and Innovation Adoption Rates by sectors 
Sector Correlation 





Electricity, gas and water 




Extractives industry  -29.9% 
 
Manufacture industry  -16.5% 
 




Transport and communication  -17.5% 
 
Similarly to what happened with the productivity levels, all the sectors except the one of 
Electricity, gas and water production and distribution share a general pattern: the correlation 
between productivity growth and innovation adoption is negative. The highest value is 
obtained for the sectors of Business, repair of car and domestic articles and Extractives 
industry. Again, this result seems to be due to the fact that two differentiated patterns of 
groups of countries are observed according to their productivity growth rates. Those with 
rates above the average (some of the Eastern countries) with low adoption rates of innovation 
and those with productivity growth rates below the average but without a clear correlation 
with the level of innovation adoption. Summing up, the global negative relationship observed 
for most sectors seems to be due to the existence of these two different patterns of 
productivity growth rates, whereas within each one the negative relationship is not so clear.  
 
The case of the sector of Electricity, gas and water production and distribution is an exception 
to the pattern described above, since innovation adoption and productivity growth are 
positively related. Within this sector, a majority of countries obtaining productivity growth 
rates below the average present low innovation adoption rates (Belgium, France, Spain, 
Portugal, Spain, Germany and Italy), whereas some of the countries with high productivity 
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growth rates in this sector offer at the same time high innovation adoption levels (Finland, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Estonia).  
 
All in all, the general conclusion can be summarised as follows: there is no clear 
relationship between innovation adoption and productivity growth. When such a 
relationship seems to be obtained, with a negative sign, it is more related to the existence 
of two groups of countries with different behaviours in the pattern of productivity 
growth: a majority of countries with high rates of productivity growth present low levels 
of innovation adoption (Eastern countries), whereas the countries with low productivity 
growth rates offer at the same time high and low innovation adoption rates.       
Figure IV.15. Scatterplots of Innovation Adoption and productivity growth in the different sectors under analysis 
Adoption and productivity growth
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Correlation : 20.7 





























































Correlation : -29.9 %
 




































































































































Correlation : 10.5 
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Correlation : -17.5 %
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At this stage of the work we have been able to disentangle the effect of the Internal Market on 
innovation adoption across major EU countries. We analyzed how this impact actually works 
through three channels which are identified in trade, competition and cooperation. 
   
We have been able to disentangle specific policies and regulations which may statistically 
affect each one of these channels. These results are of particular interest from a policy making 
point of view since they allow us to directly identify both channels of transmission of 
innovation adoption across EU firms and countries as well as the IM regulations which boost 
these channels and ultimately promote innovation adoption. It should be noted however that 
the results have been obtained thanks to a statistical analysis which includes some limitations. 
Firstly, our measure of diffusion focuses on adoption, and therefore does not allow us to cover 
the whole diffusion process. Secondly, the database used is of weak quality (due to double 
counting problems and missing observations). Therefore the policy recommendations drawn 
below should be taken when keeping this in mind. We first detail, here below, the main 
transmission channels of innovation adoption that we have been able to identify (Trade, 
Competition and Cooperation). Given our definition of innovation diffusion using CIS, we 
highlight how differently the determinants of diffusion can impact the different forms of 
adoption, being they cooperation-based adoption or adoption of technologies mainly 
developed by other enterprises. Indeed, this distinction may have policy implications. Then 
we present the IM policies which are found to statistically affect both the transmission 
channels and their indirect effect (being this positive or negative) on innovation adoption. We 
are also able to say something on the impact that some specific regulations may have on 
different kinds of innovation adoption. In particular, the distinction between product and 
process innovation adoption is worth noting and confirms somehow the necessity of 
considering them separately when defining public policies. Some useful elements concerning 
the relation between innovation adoption and productivity growth are also provided when 
relevant (as detailed in Part IV). Finally, beyond the global regularities identified above, we 
underline the potential impact of the diversity of the countries and sectoral contexts as 
revealed by the descriptive statistics of Part II. Indeed, results of global policies applied to 






V.1. Identifying the determinants of innovation adoption 
 
We start by retracing the results of the macro-econometric analysis of the transmission 
channels (cooperation, competition and trade). Then, we present the main factors of the 
adoption choice as they emerge from the micro-economic analysis. Finally, using macro and 
micro analysis, the specific impact of the IPR environment on innovation adoption is 
underlined. 
 
V.1.1. The transmission channels at the macro level 
 
Using country and sectoral aggregated data, our econometric analysis of the role of 
Cooperation, Competition and Trade as channels for innovation adoption within the EU has 
gone deep into the determinants of innovation adoption not only by focusing on the total 
innovation adoption scores but also by disaggregating innovation adoption into different 
categories related to “product” and “process” and to additional sub-categories linked to the 
way the innovation has been adopted (mainly as a result of some kind of inter-firm 
cooperation or as a direct acquisition of the product or process developed externally from the 
acquiring firm). Summarizing the results we may highlight that: 
 
i.  Cooperation appears as the main factor likely to enhance the rate of innovation 
adoption.  
a.  Total innovation adoption (product + process innovation adoption) is 
strongly statistically correlated with cooperation activities (being these 
carried out across countries or within the same country) 
b.  Cooperation is found to be especially important in the diffusion and 
adoption of new innovative processes. Product innovation adoption is also 
found to be statistically related to cooperation (probably as the result of the 
work of different firms on the same R&D projects). However, it is process 
innovation adoption which is especially found to be highly correlated with the 
establishment of cooperative activities. This is to say that making cooperation 
easier will incentivize process innovation adoption resulting from actual 
cooperation across firms. Thereby this may contribute to an improvement of 
the efficiency of process adoption which generally necessitate direct 
  201 
 
interactions in order to transmit tacit knowledge and know-how (Part IV has 
shown a higher impact of process adoption through cooperation on 
productivity).  
 
Cooperation is a strong determinant of the innovation spillover observed across 
firms/countries and should be strengthened even more in order to achieve higher levels of 
diffusion/adoption. Facilitating cooperation could also lead to a better efficiency especially 
in process innovation adoption by giving incentives to firms to preferably choose the 
adoption through cooperation .  
 
ii.  Competition surprisingly does not show to be always a strong  determinant of 
total innovation adoption. However, results are dependent of the nature of 
innovation adoption. 
 
Particularly, when considering more precisely the nature of innovation adoption, 
our results show that only product adoption acquired from outside the firm is 
positively and significantly impacted by the level of competition. Such a result 
may be interpreted as follows. Competitive pressures often lead to innovation race 
which implies the shortening of the product life cycle and the strengthening of 
innovation protection, being they new products opening new market opportunities 
or new processes allowing a reduction of production costs. In such a context, 
appropriability matters are extremely sensitive implying that direct adoption is 
preferred to adoption through cooperation. Another interpretation is that in fact a 
more developed competition allows firms to merge (and therefore acquire 
products) or to simply buy and exchange products in a much easier way.  
 
Competition foster innovation and it is also a determinant of product innovation adoption. 
Hence, as it eases the market for technology and at the same time contributes to the 
reinforcement of knowledge appropriability constraints within cooperation, competition is a 
significant incentive only for direct acquisition of external new products innovation and 
not for innovation made in cooperation.  
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iii.  The Trade channel does not have a significant effect on the total adoption rate of 
innovation. More sophisticated channels than trade seem to be needed for total 
innovation adoption. It is possible that the Trade effect has not actually been picked up 
in our regressions due to the way we model the indicator of adoption (that is as a ratio 
of adoptive firms on total innovative ones). It is possible, therefore that the trade 
channel will work simultaneously on adoption and innovation creation such that its 
effect would pass unobserved in the econometric estimations. 
 
From a more general perspective, we would like to stress that in various specification the 
estimated coefficients for the some transmission channels do not show the usual statistical 
significance, but are instead, only “marginally” significant. This leads to think that extra-care 
is needed when interpreting these coefficients. Also, we believe that further research may be 
needed (probably using more complete and recent databases such as the CIS4) in order to 
fully test the hypothesis of the current work on a larger number of observations which would 
allow a more robust empirical and statistical analysis. 
 
V.1.2. Micro-economic determinants of innovation adoption 
 
We have shown above to what extent adoption rates are dependent of the macro-economic 
conditions for cooperation, competition or trade. However, apart from these three channels, 
micro-economic analyses have pointed out other determinants of innovation adoption. Indeed, 
the global rate of adoption is also dependent of the innovative strategy of firms and especially, 
when they innovate, of their choice to innovate on their own or to acquire innovation made 
with or by other organisations. According to this micro-economic perspective, results are the 
following:  
 
i.  The size of the firm positively impacts the choice to adopt external innovation 
(larger firms have a greater tendency to adopt external innovations). But its effect 
is seen for process innovation and does not occur for product innovation diffusion 
showing a higher importance of internal capacities of absorption for process adoption 
than for product. 
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ii.  On the contrary firms belonging to a group and being well endowed with skilled 
workers are more likely to choose to innovate by their own than to adopt external 
innovation. For such firms, incentives to innovate may result in a reduction of the 
adoption rate. 
iii. The capabilities of firms to introduce organizational changes show, instead, a 
mixed impact on innovation diffusion. They are proven to be especially important 
(and statistically significant) for the diffusion of Cooperation-based innovation as 
one would actually expect.  
iv. Public financial support acts as incentives to adopt. Public funding of innovation 
appears efficient to foster adoption of innovation, more than generation of innovation 
in itself. This is certainly due to the use of numerous transfer-oriented policy 
instruments and this is especially true for process adoption. 
v.  The role of Cooperation as a channel of innovation diffusion is confirmed at the 
micro-economic level. The impact of cooperation is shown to be even stronger than in 
the macro-econometric analysis which is not surprising. Indeed, when controlling for 
other individual characteristics of firms, being a cooperative firm is important in the 
choice to adopt innovation from other organizations instead of generating proper 
innovation.  
vi. The channel of innovation diffusion that we named “Trade” is in most cases 
showing a negative effect on the diffusion of innovation. This runs counter traditional 
theoretical model as well as empirical studies but it is probably due to our specific 
model which distinguishes effects on innovation from effects on the diffusion of 
innovation. As usually supposed Trade has a positive and significant effect on 
innovation. However, among firms which have innovative activities trade has no 
significant or significantly negative effect on the choice to adopt instead of 
generate innovation. As no variable accounting for competition has been integrated 
within the estimation, one can also assume that the Trade variable gathers 
international openness as well as competitive pressure effects on firms.  
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The size of firms is an important factor in the explanation of the adoption of innovation 
and so it highlights the role of absorptive capacities. Once taken into account the effect of 
such individual characteristics of firms as their size and their belonging to a group, two 
factors seem to significantly contribute to the choice of adoption by firms: benefiting 
from public financial support and working in cooperation with other firms. On the 
contrary, certainly due to the competitive pressure which that supposes, being involved in 
international markets acts as an incentive to innovate internally instead of by adoption.  
 
V.1.3. Role of IPR 
 
The impact of Legal structure and protection of IPRs on innovation diffusion has been 
lately debated in the empirical and theoretical literature. Our results show how: 
 
i. The tighter the protection, the more difficult will be for firms to exploit innovations 
discovered elsewhere.  
 
It is important to notice that this result does not imply immediately that, as a policy making 
decision, IPRs should be relaxed so as to achieve higher innovation diffusion. In fact, what it 
is important to bear in mind is the balance between innovation production (boosted by IPRs 
enforcement) and innovation adoption (slowed down by IPRs enforcement). The two effects 
are therefore difficult to be disentangled even if, in the case of EU countries, we may suspect 
that the first effect (that of innovation creation) may be stronger than the second (innovation 
adoption) due to the relatively high-tech nature of innovative European firms.  The same 
result seems to be found when we focus on micro data where the use of patents exerts a 
negative impact on innovation adoption. Firms which base their innovation strategy on 
legal protection are primarily those who generate internal innovation instead of adopt them 
from other firms. 
 
ii. The effect of Legal structure and Property rights Protection is observed for product 
adoption while it is not statistically significant for processes. This, would imply that it is the 
protection of product innovations (which are tradable) to be related to the speed and extent of 
adoption rather than to the adoption of processes which, instead, are somehow more difficult 
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to be protected by patents or formal legal structures. As somehow expected, the legal structure 
and the protection of property rights seem to play a significant role only in the specific case of 
the adoption of process innovations made in cooperation by ensuring the firms which are 
cooperating on the same process innovation against possible free riding. 
 
Independently of their incentive role on innovation, the reinforcement of Legal structure 
and protection of IPRs reduces the proportion of adopted innovation compared to those 
internally generated. However as it has a clearly positive impact on innovation such 
reinforcement may enhance the absorptive capacities of firms and countries and so 
eventually participate to the growth of innovation diffusion. 
 
 
V.2. Identifying the IM regulations likely to boost the channels of 
innovation adoption 
 
We turn, here below, to our analysis concerning the IM regulations affecting the transmission 
channels. Thus, we present the main conclusions related to the indirect impacts that the IM 
regulations may have on the adoption of innovation. 
 
i.  Cooperation (intended as the propensity of carrying out firm innovative activities 
together at the EU level) is shown to be positively correlated to the degree of social 
trust in each country. Policies aiming at ensuring a higher level of generalized trust 
may be helpful therefore in boosting cooperation.  
 
a.  From a more IM regulation point of view, we have been able to detect a 
statistical significant correlation of cooperation activities with policies 
targeted at “communication and simplification procedures” (a sub-index of 
the “regulatory and administrative opacity” PMR index). In particular, the 
EU regulations should be addressed at making regulations known and 
accessible to affected parties or, among other things, to reduce the number 
of permits and licences required to start any business and cooperative activity 
as well as the administrative burdens imposed by governments on 
enterprises and/or citizens. 
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b.  Also, strengthening Human Capital is shown to be statistically significant 
when explaining the degree of cooperation (especially in innovative projects). 
The use of framework programmes (such as the last EU 7FP) may therefore be 
seen as a way of efficiently exploiting the existing human capital and to foster 
additional cooperation at the EU level which, ultimately, will be conductive to 
innovation adoption and diffusion. 
 
Therefore, policies contributing to reinforce social trust within countries especially through 
“communication and simplification procedures” are likely to develop cooperation among 
firms and consequently to achieve higher levels of diffusion/adoption. Strengthening 
Human Capital also appears as an efficient way to enhance cooperation  and 
consequently innovation adoption. 
 
Moreover, it should be noted that such an incentive to develop cooperation-based diffusion as 
well as the promotion of an increase in human capital levels will also have a positive impact 




ii.  Competition has been one of the main priorities for the EU Commission and its 
various DGs. We have been able to detect how the work of the EU Commission 
started producing its results by increasing the competition level of the member states’ 
economies. The level of competition is shown to be highly correlated with the 
adoption of the “competition regulations” proposed by the EU. In fact we are able to 
show how for those countries which are still lacking the full adoption of the EU 
regulations the markup levels are on average higher. The Transposition of the EU-
Competition regulations is shown to robustly provoke higher competition levels 
across the countries in our sample.  
 
a.  From a more specific regulatory point of view, we detected how the 
intrusiveness of national government (when “national, state or provincial 
government controls at least one firm in one basic sector”) is going to reduce 
competition so these kinds of behaviours should be strongly opposed. 
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b.  At the same time we detected how the size of the public enterprise sector 
should diminish so as to foster more competition. 
c.  Finally, we find a negative relation between competition and the use by 
national governments of the golden rule option, or the presence of any 
constitutional constraint to the sale of the stakes held by national 
governments in publicly controlled firms. 
 
Policies reducing rents, administrative burdens and national government controls 
should be therefore strongly implemented at the EU level in order to achieve higher levels of 
competition and eventually higher shares of adoption of external product and 
productivity growth. On the other hand, augmenting competitive pressure is likely to 
discourage innovation made in cooperation. A sort of trade-off appears here. Indeed, 
augmenting the global level of competitive pressure within Europe could help firms 
developing market exchanges of technologies but, at the same time, it could impede 
cooperation between firms and thereby interactive activities favourable to innovation 
 
iii.  Trade is positively affected by a reduction in the “involvement in business 
operation” by the national governments.  
 
a.  In particular our results show that regulations which imply heavy “price 
controls”, especially those on air travel, road freight, retail distribution and 
telecommunications are going to decrease the amount of turnover exported. 
The intuition is that companies will trade more where they can freely decide 
prices or where the transportation sector (crucial for the export industry) is not 
heavily regulated by national governments. 
b.  Also, we provide evidence that at increasing “use of command and 
regulation” on domestic carriers or companies providing railway 
infrastructures, the volume of turnover exported significantly decreases. 
c.  Trade is also positively affected by less restrictive trade barriers and, in 
general, we showed how trade is positively associated with well known 
indexes of trade openness which suggest how, among other things, providing 
an easier access of citizens to international capital markets and viceversa 
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for foreign investor the access to national capital markets is going to foster 
international exchange also in tradable goods. 
 
We therefore showed how the indirect effect of policies reducing prices controls or the 
national government controls on the transportation sector are going to foster 
international trade and eventually affect the extent by which innovation can freely move 
within the EU borders and eventually been adopted. We have not been able however to 
detect any statistically significant impact of trade on the adoption of innovation (and if any, 
we actually found that this channel is going to rise innovation creation rather than its 
diffusion). This result is puzzling and it seems to need further research.  
 
All in all, we get the general picture that IM regulations undertaken by the European 
Commission are having their impact on the level of adoption of innovation in EU firms. It 
should be highlighted, however, that this influence goes through changes in a specific channel 
such as cooperation. which has been shown to have a real impact on the rate of innovation 
adoption. The importance of the other channels identified vary, instead, according to the type 
of innovation adoption we have considered. In particular, diffusion through cooperation will 
particularly be enhanced by policies aiming at facilitating cooperation whereas diffusion 
through direct purchases from other firms will be enhanced by policies aiming at augmenting 
competitive pressure and reinforcing IPR.  Results obtained by the comparison between CIS3 
and CIS4 certainly show that the development of the Internal Market may already have had an 
influence. An increase in innovation adoption is generally observed which is higher for 
process innovation and innovation made in cooperation. As countries have historically 
constructed themselves around specific mix of theses different features, we should bear in 
mind that the same global policy concerning IM regulation may have different implications 
depending of the context of their application. The descriptive statistics analysis we have done 
in Part II offers us tools to better apprehend this reality. 
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V.3. Dealing with the diversity of national profiles  
 
The descriptive statistics given in part II lead on to the following results: 
 
i.  Generally speaking, countries which display the highest level of innovation 
are also those which show the highest adoption rate and conversely countries 
with weak capacity to innovate are also weak adopters. Thus, the complementary 
dynamics linking innovation and adoption seems to be at work in most of the 
European countries. However exceptions exist which are certainly not to neglect if 
we are to understand how countries can react to European incentives. These 
exceptions are Luxemburg, France and Sweden which display low level of 
adoption compared to their innovative capacities, and Bulgaria which has a 
very high rate of adoption compared to its rate of innovation. Specific 
characteristics of their system of innovation strongly oriented toward internal 
resources or sectoral specializations towards sectors of high intensity of internal 
innovation may explain the three former exceptions. Indeed, some sectors are 
essentially relying on adoption (Whole sale trade, Transport and communication, 
Electricity, gaz and water supply) while others are recording at the same time very 
high innovation rate and very low adoption rate (Manufacturing and Computer and 
other business services). 
 
Generally speaking, the complementary dynamics linking innovation and adoption 
seems to be at work in most of the European countries. However exception exist which 
could be explained by cultural factors or by sectoral specialization. Luxemburg, France and 
Sweden display low level of adoption compared to their innovative capacities, whereas 
Bulgaria has a very high rate of adoption compared to its rate of innovation. 
 
ii.  Globally also, and according to the first point, countries highly endowed with 
resources to innovate and using invention protect methods as incentive to 
innovate, display also high rates of adoption. Exceptions are often the same than 
in the first point: France highly doted in R&D expenditures and human capital 
displays low adoption rate whereas Bulgaria is once more in the opposite place. 
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iii.  Concerning the organizational factors such as the capacity to introduce 
organizational change within the firm or the capacity to cooperate with other 
organizations, differences between countries do not recover exactly their 
differences in terms of innovative potential or adoption. Other cultural 
factors seem at work. Thus, France and Bulgaria record very low level of 
organizational change whereas Romania, Germany and Austria have the highest 
rate of organizational change. Adoption in Scandinavian countries is largely 
cooperation oriented whereas in Hungary, Spain or Lithuania cooperation is less 
used in the adoption process. 
 
iv.  More generally, concerning the IM indicators, it seems that two groups of 
countries correspond to the model described above either disposing of all the 
determinants of adoption and being well integrated in the UE with high 
adoption rate (group 1 and 2 of the typology proposed in part II: Belgium, 
Germany, Netherland, Finland and Norway and Sweden with some 
specificities) or, on the contrary, lacking of most of the determinants of 
adoption, being more weakly integrated with very low adoption rates 
(countries from the Eastern and Baltic countries, group 5 and 6 of the 
typology).  
 
In this last group of countries (Easter and Baltic countries), acting towards a better 
integration to the EU, using the policies presented above may permit to reinforce 
their capacity to adopt innovation. We should underline however that such a policy 
might have no effect if it is not accompanied by actions aiming at reinforcing the own 
innovative potential of these countries in order to boost their absorptive capacity. 
 
v.  Another group of countries (Group 3 of the typology: Italy, Portugal and Spain) 
performs well in innovation performances and is relatively well integrated into the 
Internal Market (Barriers to trade and competition are low within these countries). 
However, some weaknesses in their innovation potential and a low level of 
cooperation prevent these countries to completely enter within the virtuous circle 
of innovation/adoption.  
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In such a context of low barriers to trade and competition, developing IM regulations 
oriented towards the reinforcement of cooperation may particularly benefit to these 
three countries (Group 3) in order to reinforce at the same time their innovative 
potential and their capacity to absorb the innovation adopted. 
 
 
V.4 Suggestions for future implementation of CIS data and 
questionnaires  
 
As a result of the experience working with the CIS dataset in order to study the innovation 
diffusion process in the EU countries, we can offer some suggestions for future 
implementation of CIS data and questionnaires:  
 
•  It is important for policy makers to dispose of precise information about the 
diffusion/adoption of innovation. In spite of the important limitations of the CIS data 
in measuring diffusion and adoption, these data are still probably the most relevant 
tool that is available at the moment, and the only one likely to provide a general 
overview of these processes at the EU level. Some improvements in the survey may 
allow coping with the main limitations highlighted in this study. In particular, 
collecting more quantitative information about the way innovation is produced 
would be of great help in econometric and economic analysis. For instance, the shares 
(or the intensity) of innovation made in isolation, in cooperation or developed by 
others should be registered directly for each case. Moreover, the usefulness of the CIS 
data comes from the possible crossing of several items. Most of these crossing cannot 
be implemented using aggregated data available on Eurostat website while micro data 
are needed. Increasing the availability of data at the micro level (which for now is 
restricted to only few EU member states) would thus provide more tractable 
information and richer analysis of the adoption process and its determinants. 
 
•  A second suggestion would be that of trying to eliminate the subjectivity in some of 
the questions of the CIS questionnaire in order to be able to better define categories 
and quantify the answers. Some of the present questions, for instance, ask to define 
whether an innovation has been developed “mainly” by other firms or in collaboration. 
  212 
 
This subjectivity impedes to measure or consistently define the same processes across 
countries due to the possible biases related to the subjectivity of the answer. As 
suggested above, this subjectivity may be partly solved by asking the share of 
innovation that relies on each type of innovation and not as a result of the 
interpretation of the word “mainly”. 
 
•  In the present CIS questionnaire, the items allowing to deal with innovation 
adoption question, do not provide separated information about diffusion 
occuring within the country and across countries. A revision of this question may 
solve directly this problem. 
 
•  EUROSTAT should provide a technical annex on how the macro data provided in 
their web-site have been treated starting from the micro data. Aggregation issues 
and different methodologies may be in fact a problem for researchers which have to 
know, first, how the statistical office treated micro data in order to obtain macro ones.  
 
•  So far in CIS we know if a firm has made innovation or adoption but not the intensity 
of such processes. Therefore, a firm making some innovation but at a very small scale 
and a big firm making a lot of innovation are, at the moment, considered equally. Both 
of them would answer yes, and this is all the information given in CIS. We have 
information about the share of turnover due to innovation. But this is only available 
for product innovations. This can hardly be asked for process innovations or other 
types of innovation (organizational,  marketing, etc). However a question (even 
qualitative) about the importance of innovation in the firm activity could be 
added. This question should be asked for each type of innovation (innovation made in 
isolation/ innovation made in collaboration / innovation made by others). 
 
•  Finally, in addition to these marginal changes, it may be useful to constitute a working 
group to suggest improvements of the CIS in order to better account for innovation 
diffusion. This working group might suggest for instance a set of items, in order to 
explicit and validate the different channels of transmission between IM and diffusion 
of innovation. 
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Appendices of Part I 
 
Appendix I.1. Deeper analysis of the authors with main 
contributions to the literature on innovation diffusion in the 
demand-side models 
 
Griliches (1957) performed the first empirical study of the diffusion of technology, 
concretely, the hybrid corn seed in the Midwestern US in the period 1932-56. The study 
emphasized the role of economic factors such as expected profits and scale in determining the 
varying rates of diffusion across the Midwestern states. He found that the variation of initial 
start dates for the process depended on the spread with which the seed was customized for use 
in particular geographical areas. Thus, the diffusion process depends upon the capacity of 
technology suppliers to adapt it to local characteristics. This way, technological innovations 
could be analyzed from an economic perspective, objecting to existing economic theories that 
treated technological change as an exogenous factor unrelated to the larger economy. In 
addition, he devised a logistic growth curve to explain the economic factors underlying this 
spatial pattern, whilst his conclusion was that the behaviour of commercial seed producers 
was an important factor. Thus, these seed producers evaluated carefully the market potential 
in each state before introducing hybrid varieties (the hybrid seed did not spread at the same 
speed across states). Thus, states with larger farm, more accessible for seed suppliers, were 
covered the first.  
 
Griliches’ papers were soon considered as reflecting obvious aspects of the adoption of new 
technologies from the demand side, albeit some considerations of the potential profitability 
were taken into account, including the effects of incremental supply-side adoptions upon the 
diffusion process. In fact, his main hypothesis stated that the speed of diffusion would reflect 
the conditions having to do with the innovations profitability for a representative adopter.  
 
Several years later within the epidemic models literature, Mansfield (1961), from the 
demand side, inquired into the diffusion of industrial innovations by applying the Griliches 
econometric approach. According to the author, information constrains hinder technology 
adoptions, but these constraints reduce their influence as soon as knowledge about the new 
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innovation is being known. According to this author, the word-of-mouth diffusion mechanism 
influences more than other economic considerations. In his 1961 study of 12 major 
innovations in the coal, rail, iron and steel sectors, he found weak evidence that firms in 
competitive less concentrated industries adopted new technologies sooner. According to 
Karshenas and Stoneman (1995), it was this author who introduces one of the more successful 
extensions of the epidemic model: it is not so much knowledge on existence that is the 
problem, but rather uncertainty surrounding new technology as a result of poor information on 
the performance characteristics of such technologies. In such a setting, Mansfield constructed 
a model where this uncertainty is reduced over time as a result of learning from experience, 
obtaining a model where the speed of diffusion is a positive function of profitability and a 
negative function of the size of investment required. 
 
Within the literature of the epidemic models from the demand-side, in 1969 Bass published 
the paper “A new product growth model for consumer durables”, which has been widely used 
in market analysis and demand forecasting of new technologies. According to the author, 
consumers have the same tastes and the cost can be constant, but not all consumers are 
informed about the new technologies at the same time: thus, there exists an increasing rate of 
adoption. When, eventually, the market becomes saturated, the rate decreases again. Bass’ 
original models were developed to predict the uptake of consumer products based on various 
advertising campaigns. The Bass Model quantifies the introduction of new technologies 
depending on the take up by innovators and imitators by estimating the introduction and 
acceptance rate variables. The basic model is fascinatingly simple, while at the same time it 
can capture a wide variety of diffusion patterns observed in practice. The model parameters 
can be interpreted in terms of internal effects (imitation), external effects (innovation), and 
saturation level (maturity). 
 
These epidemic models, although being purely demand-based, have suffered some 
modifications especially with the idea of taking into account the supply-side. Glaister (1974) 
was one of the first who allowed the influence on diffusion of the cost of acquiring 
technology and advertising, although supply-side factors were included in an ad-hoc fashion. 
Gould (1970) and Tonks (1986) used these kinds of model considering certain supply-side 
issues, albeit it was Metcalfe (1981) who constructed a complete epidemic model including 
supply-side influences.  
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Appendix I.2. Deeper view of the forces that influence the 
diffusion of innovation according to the supply models 
 
Improvements in inventions after their first introduction. According to Rosenberg (1972), 
most inventions are relatively crude and inefficient at the date when they are first recognized 
as constituting a new invention. The subsequent rate of improvement is an important 
determinant of adoption of the new technology. Indeed, it may be very true the case that such 
improvements will reduce total costs by an amount greater than the reduction in costs of the 
initial invention over the older techniques which it eventually replaced. Part of the economic 
literature points to the fact that the efficiency gain from a new technology is much larger 
during its enhancement stage than during the initial stage. Therefore, the rate of improvement 
of a technology subsequent to its early stage is of utmost importance for the adoption of the 
technology. 
 
The development of technical skills among users. Another important factor affecting 
innovation diffusion from the supply side concerns the development of human skills upon 
which the use of the new technique depends in order to be effectively exploited. A learning 
period thus arises, the length of which will depend upon many factors, that is, the complexity 
of the new techniques, the extent to which they are novel or rely on skills already available or 
transferable from other industries, etc. Since it takes time to acquire certain skills, it will also 
take time to establish the superior efficiency of a new technique over existing ones. The 
development of a highly skilled labour force is crucial to the success of new technologies and 
the lack of such a labour force is one of the main impediments to its rapid diffusion. In fact, 
many of the new skills are acquired directly through the work participation, and if this new 
know-how is partly tacit, such skills are not transferable through formal education. So the 
movement of qualified personnel is highly required.  
 
The development of skills in machine-making. This argument refers not to skills involved in 
using the new techniques, but in developing the skills and facilities in machine-making itself. 
Thus, successful diffusion of innovations requires a growth in the capacity to devise, adapt, 
and produce at low costs certain machinery to produce these new technologies. Historically 
speaking, lots of inventions have not arise to a marketable products due to the lack of the 
appropriate mechanical skills, facilities, and design and engineering capacity required to 
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translate them into working reality. Thus, according to Rosenberg (1972), it is the state of 
development of the capital goods industries, more than any other single factor, which 
determines whether or to what extent an invention is ahead of its time.  
 
Complementarities. A chiefly field affecting the path of diffusion lies in the complementarity 
in productive activity between different techniques. Thus, a given invention cannot fulfil 
anything unless other inventions are made, relaxing constraints which would otherwise 
hamper its diffusion through the existence of important bottlenecks. Needless to say, thus, that 
a single technological invention hardly ever constitutes a complete innovation.  
 
Improvements in “old” technologies. According to Rosenberg (1972), there exist a close 
relationship between innovations and improvements in older technologies. That is, when a 
new innovation is a close substitute for an existing technology, then the innovation itself may 
induce providers of the old technology to make improvements with the aim of retaining their 
market position. What the author suggests is a possible lack of symmetry in the manner in 
which firms respond to alterations in their profit prospects, since the imminent threat to a 
firm’s profit margins which are presented by the rise of a new competing technology seems 
often in history to have served as a more effective stimulus to own technological 
improvements. This will slow the diffusion of the new technology. 
 
Diffusion and its institutional context. The productivity of any technology is never 
independent of its institutional context and therefore needs to be studied within that context, 
since institutional context can account for the very slow diffusion of a superior technology. 
Within the influence of institutional context on innovation diffusion, Hall and Khan (2003) 
consider the market structure and firm size as well as the government and regulation. 
According to Dorfman (1987) there are four arguments in favour of a positive impact of firm 
size and market share in determining the level of innovative activity and the level of use of 
new innovations: 
 
  Large firms are more likely to undertake innovation from outside both because 
appropriability is higher for larger firms and because the availability of funds to these 
firms is greater. Firms with larger market share are more likely to adopt a new 
technology because they have a greater ability to appropriate the profits from the 
adoption.  
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  In the presence of imperfect capital markets, larger and more profitable firms are more 
likely to have the financial resources required for purchasing and installing a new 
technology. 
  Firms with large market share are sometimes better able to spread the potential risks 
associated with new projects because they are able to be more diversified in their 
technology choice and are in a position to try out a new technology while keeping the 
old one operating. 
  Many new technologies are scale-enhancing and therefore large firms adopt them 
sooner because of their economies of scale from production and can spread the other 
fixed costs associated with adoption across a larger number of units. 
 
However, as stated by Henderson and Clark (1990), large size and market power may also 
slow down the rate of diffusion on a twofold base. Firstly, due to the higher levels of 
bureaucracy in larger firms which makes the decision-making process difficult. Secondly, 
because large firms may have many resources and human capital sunk in the old technology 
and its architecture, so that it can be relatively more expensive for them to adopt a new 
technology.  
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Appendix I.3. IPRs and the level of development of the economy 
and the endowment of other factors 
 
One of the main issues when analyzing the impact of IPRs on technology diffusion (and the 
resulting economic growth from it) is to understand under which conditions the potential 
spillovers from the frontier are actually exploited by the technological followers, that is, under 
what conditions the absorption of technology fully works. The impact of tightening IPRs will 
depend on the level of development of the country (Acemoglu et al, 2006; Aghion et al, 2005) 
as well as on the endowment of other factors (Chen and Puttitanum, 2005).  
 
IPRs and the level of development 
A recent strand of literature argues how certain institutions which foster economic growth in 
developed countries may actually hinder the growth of least-developed ones. Acemoglu, 
Aghion and Zilibotti (2006), Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001), Aghion, Burgess, 
Redding and Zilibotti (2005) or Aghion and Howitt (2005) develop the idea of Gerschenkron 
(1962) that countries lagging behind the technological frontier, and that perform primarily 
technology imitation, may be better off by some non-competitive policies in the early stages 
of their development. This reasoning seems to generally apply to the case of IPRs.  
 
As pointed out by Connolly and Valderrama (2005) a similar trade-off exists, on a cross-
country basis, between developed countries (the innovators) and developing ones (the 
imitators). One of the arguments used by developed countries in favour of strong IPRs 
protection standards in developing countries is based on the fact that these are expected to 
promote own based research and innovation (discouraging imitation). On these regards, 
Grossman and Lai (2004) have recently analyzed a North-South environment where both 
regions own an innovative sector. Among other results they show how enforcing IPRs in the 
South may end up increasing the gains for the North at the expenses of the South which sees a 
reduction of its economic growth and welfare. Also, Lai (1998) links negatively the speed of 
imitation to the extent by which IPRs are enforced in the follower country.  
 
IPRs and factor endowments 
It is crucial, also, to notice how the specific impact of IPRs on an economy (especially on a 
developing one) will also depend on factor endowments of the economy under consideration 
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and that the relation between tightening of IPRs and economic growth may not be a linear 
one. In a recent paper by Chen and Puttitanun (2005) it is shown the non linear effect of IPRs 
on economic growth and its peculiar impact in countries at different development stage and 
endowed with different economic fundamentals. In particular, Chen and Puttitanun (2005) 
build a theoretical model suggesting that domestic innovation is increasing in the enforcement 
of national IPRs but that the economic gains of enforcing IPRs diminish when a certain 
(middle income) development is reached. The empirical test of the model (done on a sample 
of 64 developing countries using panel data for the period 1970-2005) shows a U-shaped 
relationship between the tightening of the protection of intellectual property rights and 
economic growth. When they also include an interaction term between the development stage 
and the degree of enforcement of IPRs the empirical results seem to suggest that IPRs exert 
their growth enhancing effects on the countries with the highest level of development and 
which operate at the technological frontier. However, foreign entities generate more 
applications in those countries which reformed their IPR regimes. This suggests FDI as an 
alternative channel through which reforming countries could benefit from tighter IPR. 
 
Schneider (2005) also analyzes the impact of IPRs on high-tech imports, FDI flows and 
economic growth by measuring innovation by U.S. patent applications made by residents of a 
given country. The results of the empirical research on a panel data of 47 countries over the 
period 1970-1990 show an uneven impact of IPRs across countries taken at different stages of 
their development. When the sample is split into developed and developing countries the 
effect of IPRs is positive in the formers while negative in the latter group. 
 
Impact of IPRs on economic growth 
As pointed out by Falvey and Foster (2006), there exists a small empirical literature which 
addresses directly the impact of IPRs on economic growth. The work of Gould and Gruben 
(1996), for example, employs a commonly used indicator of protection of property rights (the 
Rapp and Rozek (1990) index) to check whether there exists any discernable evidence of a 
positive impact of a strengthening of IPRs on economic growth on a wide sample of 95 
countries over the period 1960-1988. The result is that, on average, IPRs exert a positive 
impact on economic growth and that their impact is stronger in countries which are more open 
to international markets.  
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A similar exercise has been undertaken in the work of Thompson and Rushing (1996) who, 
after having regressed the average growth rate of real GDP per capita for 112 countries on 
some control variables (such as education, population growth and investment rates) find a non 
significant effect of IPRs on growth. However, when the sample is splitted by using threshold 
regression techniques
69 the results change dramatically. For those countries below the 
threshold level the direct impact of IPRs on economic growth is found to be insignificant. 
This result is in line with the idea that these countries are found in the initial stages of 
development and that either their innovative and imitative capabilities are not sufficient to 
take advantage of the incentives given to innovation and technology diffusion coming from 
IPRs enforcement. For the other countries above the threshold, instead, the factor 
endowments (the presence of adequate human capital, institutions and a well functioning 
R&D sector) make the IPRs working as a growth enhancing mechanism. The sign of IPRs 
enforcement, when used as an explanatory variable for GDP per capita growth, is therefore 
found to be positive and statistically significant.  
 
Later on, Thompson and Rushing (1999) expanded their previous analysis on the impact of 
IPRs on total factor productivity (in order to isolate the effect of IPRs on a somehow more 
“technologically oriented” measure of economic growth) reconfirming how the major 
(positive) impact of IPRs is experienced in already developed economies with functioning 
R&D sectors and innovative capabilities.   
 
                                                 
69 The threshold regression method was developed by Hansen in his paper in 2000 to standard growh 
regressions. Hansen B. (2000) Sample splitting and threshold estimation, Econometrica, 68 (3), 575-604. 
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Appendix I.4. Different paths for the diffusion/adoption of 
innovation 
 
As a result of assumptions in eq. (4) and (5) it is possible to define different paths for the 
diffusion of innovation and make some cross-country comparisons depending on the R&D 
effort of each economy and on the quality of the implementation of the Internal Market 
features. Here below we propose a simplified graphical representation where, for the sake of 
simplicity, the two countries under consideration only differ in the degree of implementation 
of the Internal Market, (θ ), within their national boundaries.  
 
Proposition 1: An increase in the quality of the Internal Market implementation or in the 
quality of the overall absorptive capacity of the economy (an increase in  ) (θ ε ) will lead to a 
faster diffusion of innovation. 
 
The explanation of this proposition is quite straightforward. Country 1 achieves higher 
technological levels due to a higher speed (ability) of adopting innovation w.r.t. country 2. 
Slightly more formally it is possible to define that whenever  i θ θ θ ... 2 1 > >  then also 
i ε ε ε ... 2 1 > >  and   in eq. (7).  i A A A ... 2 1 > >
 
 
Figure A.I.4.1. Paces of innovation diffusion for different IM levels 
) ( 1 1 θ ε f =  
) ( 2 2 θ ε f =   1 A  
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Proposition 2: Those economies whose industrial composition heavily exploit “technological 
clusters” will experience a higher rate of technology diffusion. 
 
Regarding the spatial distribution of firms we can make two scenarios. In one case, country 1 
owns a relatively high percentage of its firms (over the total) for which the  cluster σ σ ⇒ < 0 
(many firms form part of technological clusters). In the second case, instead, the same country 
(hence with the same degree of IM quality) does not rely on a large share of firms which form 
part of technological clusters (firms do not exploit spatially related technology spillovers). In 
that case we have:   cluster no_ 0 σ σ ⇒ > . 
 
It is easy to show how the diffusion of innovation in this country will take place at higher 
paces in the case of presence of technological clusters ( 0 1 < σ ) rather than when firms are 
spatially isolated ( 0 2 > σ ). 
 
Figure A.I.4.2. Paces of innovation diffusion for technological clusters  








) , ( _ 1 1 cluster no f σ θ ε =  
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More on the effects of R&D on the Adoption of Innovation  
The endogenous level of productivity for each country at time t is expressed as follows in the 
theoretical model: 
 













− + − − = −
−
t
n t A t A
) exp( 1
1
1 ) ( ) ( 1
1
ε
ω γ    1 > γ     
 
where with γ  we denote the productivity augmentation term related to the adoption of the 
new technological paradigm. This is to say that  ) ( n t A − γ represents the maximum 
productivity level attainable with any given technological paradigm. The arrival of new 
technological paradigms over time continuously shifts this value upwards. 
 
) (t A , therefore, represent the productivity level given by the difference between the 
maximum productivity level and the amount of new blueprints that have not yet been adopted 
in the productive process (the term in square brackets).  
 
Let us now analyze the variables which define the amount of blueprints not already adopted in 
the square brackets. With ω  we denote the effort exerted in the R&D sector by each economy 
whose result is a flow of blueprints
70.   is the number of already adopted blueprints 
(innovations) for production in each economy over the total pool of blueprints available in 
each point in time. The parameter
Δ
ε  is the speed by which innovation diffuses within the 
economy. It is easy to notice how, increases in the value of all these three parameters ( Δ , ω  
and ε ) imply an increase in the number of already adopted blueprints in each point in time 
(i.e. a higher level of innovation diffusion), and therefore a lower value of the term in square 
brackets and a subsequent higher productivity.  
 
The R&D effort (or blueprint flow, ω ) and the number of already adopted blueprints for 
production ( ) are obviously linked over time. As the R&D intensity increases, the relative 
number of already adopted blueprints in each point in time will decrease. The intuition behind 
this assumption is quite straightforward. The R&D sector continuously produces new 
blueprints which 
Δ
may be used into production. Some of them will be immediately adopted 
                                                 
70 The arrival flow of blueprints may be formalized by using a Poisson arrival rate as in the model of Aghion and 
Howitt (1992). 
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while others will not. Hence, unless the rate of adoption is infinite (assumption which we rule 
out), any positive innovation shock (let us say an increase in ω ) will imply that the number of 
already adopted blueprints over the total will relatively decrease due to the slowliness by 
which blueprints are being adopted.
71 
 
To put it another way, the R&D intensity determines (along with the Poisson arrival rate) the 
number of available blueprints that could be adopted. If adoption is slow and the creation of 
innovation is fast enough (situation that is experienced in the first part of the logistic curve) an 
increase in the rate of innovation will lead to a decrease in the “relative number of initially 
adopted blueprints” in each point in time. 
 
This is to say that when a new innovation is discovered this will be adopted only with a lag in 
the next period. The time lag between the blueprint discovery and its adoption stands at the 
core of the negative relationship between the flow of new innovations and the number of 




                                                 
71 Notice that this condition holds for whichever positive rate of blueprints discovery. 
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Appendices of Part II 
 
Appendix II.1. Problem of double counting from macro dataset 
and its implications 
 
One of the priorities of this project has been that of having the widest database possible at the 
macro aggregated level so to be able to make comparisons with the major number of countries 
possible when analyzing the innovation adoption phenomena and their determinants. 
 
In order to do so, in the analysis we used both the micro and macro databases provided by 
Eurostat. We aggregated the firm-level information available for 15 countries at a country 
level and then, merged this information with the web-site data whenever needed (that is when 
information for a country was not directly available in the micro-data).  
 
This procedure has the advantage of providing us with a larger number of countries. However, 
due to the way the Eurostat web-site provides the data at a macro level, it is possible that a 
double counting problem arises. This is indeed the case here. Using the macro dataset, we 
face a double counting problem in our definition of innovation diffusion. Indeed, we can 
obtain the number of firms for which innovation has been developed “Mainly together with 
other enterprises or institutions” and “Mainly by other enterprises or institutions” in terms of 
product, on the one hand, and in terms of process, on the other hand. But, this information 
about product and process innovations cannot be crossed. So, firms for which both product 
AND process innovations have been developed in cooperation with others or mainly by 
others, are double counted. The problem here is, therefore, that for those countries for which 
we have data coming only from the web-site the rates of innovation adoption rates may be 
systematically higher than for the countries for which we only have data at the firm level. 
Nonetheless, in order to have the widest coverage as possible, we suggest using, for our 
adoption indicator, a procedure likely to correct the bias due to double counting. We first 
illustrate the potential importance of double counting. Then we detail the rescaling procedure 
we followed to compute a global rate of adoption. 
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In addition to the double counting that arise when computing adoption rates, notice that this 
double counting prevent also to use some information contained in the CIS. On the one hand, 
we can not obtain the definition of adoption based on “the new to the firm” item in particular.  
But also we loss information regarding potential determinants of adoption; for instance it is 
impossible to know what are the sources of innovation used by adopting firms only. 
 
A.II.1.1. Differences by industry and by country in terms of firm adoption 
practices 
 
Due to the double counting of both product and process innovative firms, differences can 
emerge between the micro and macro datasets when measuring innovation adoption and 
moreover rates of adoption superior to 100% can be found in some industries .  
 
To have a better knowledge of this bias, we have analyzed from micro data, sectors for which 
the share of both product and process adopting firms is the most important. Indeed, we can 
observe that for the Finance and insurance industry, the share of both product and process 
adopting firms (29%) is higher than for the other sectors (19% for total). Transport and 
telecommunications is at the second place (23%). So, for these two sectors, the double 
counting problem is more important. The consequence is that the adoption rate calculated 
from macro data is significantly higher than ratios calculated from micro data and can be even 
superior to 100%. 
 











0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
J - Finance and insurance
I - Transports & telecom.
G -Trade
D - Manufacturing
K -R&D, business activities
C - Mining and quarrying
excluded
E - energy production & dist.
Total
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For total adoption rates computation, this results shows that: 
-  It is rather recommended to exclude the Finance and insurance sector because of the 
importance of both product and process adoption firms 
-  The interpretation of these rates for the other sectors must be done carefully even if 
double counting is less important. 
Even by country, the difference between micro and macro rates of adoption can be important. 
The share of both product and process adopting firms is very important in Romania (33%) 
compared to other countries.  
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A.II.1.2. The rescaling procedure: 
 
To correct for these differences, macro data have been rescaled by using a common factor. 
This factor is the average of the ratios between the available observations common in macro 
and micro data. The common rescaling factor is equal to 1.05. All adoption rates calculated 
from macro data have been divided by 1.05.  
 
A “caveat”, when using this re-scaling procedure is that we will have to assume that the “re-
scaling common factor” which we are able to compute for the countries for which we have 
data for both the micro and macro datasets will hold also for all the other countries. However, 
there is no obvious reason to believe that the “double counting problem” should affect the rest 
of the countries more than what it does for the countries we have data from micro and macro 
sources
72. In fact, the double counting problem should apply the same way to all the other 
countries such that the use of the common factor is not a very restrictive assumption. 
 
In order to check the robustness of this method, we compared results obtained from micro and 
macro datasets for informed countries (e.g. countries available in both micro and macro 
databases). The test is done from a panel composed of 44 crossed sector-country records. We 
can see that for 20% of records the gap is superior to 10%. A more precise analysis shows that 
this gap is above all due to the Finance and insurance sector. As underlined above, in this 
sector, the double counting problem is the most important because the share of both product 
and process adoption firms is the highest. So, for the total adoption rates calculation, we 
finally decided to drop this sector out.  
 
Table A.II.1.1. Adoption rate gaps between micro and macro data 
Gap  Number of crossed industry-
country records 
% 
Between -5% et 0%  7  16% 
Between 0% and 5%  12  27% 
Between 5% and 10%  16  36% 
Between 10% and 30%  9  20% 
Total   44  100% 
 
                                                 
72 We can think of the double counting as a random measurement error in the all sample. 
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Appendix II.2. Innovation Adoption by sectors 
 
As noticed in sub-section II.1.5.2 of the report, the lack of information in the micro 
aggregated data base (some main European countries are missing) leads us to complete the 
information by using Eurostat website. This obliges us to restrict our analysis to six sectors. 
Indeed, the finest breakdown provided on the website distinguishes seven sectors only, and 
one of them, the finance sector, has been dropped out because of the double counting problem 
(see appendix II.1). 
 
In order to provide a more accurate analysis of the adoption activities by sectors, this 
appendix focuses on the micro data set, for which a breakdown into twenty sectors is possible. 
The countries under consideration are Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, 
Spain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Lithuania, Latvia, Norway, Portugal, Romania, and 
Slovakia.  
 
Focusing on micro data also allows us to consider different definitions of adoption. Therefore 
several indicators of the magnitude of adoption can be computed as detailed in appendix II.3. 
The remainder of this appendix is organized as follows. Before analysing the magnitude of 
innovation adoption by sector and its nature, we present the main characteristics of the sample 
and the descriptive statistics about the level and the nature of innovation by sector. 
 
A.II.2.1. Main characteristics of the micro data sample by sector 
 
In the CIS survey, firms are classified according to the industry or service sector (NACE2) to 
which they belong. The sectoral breakdown is however not homogeneous between countries: 
-  some NACE2 sectors are merged in some countries 
-  there exist some inconsistent aggregations: for example, Iceland merges 2 very 
different industries: codes 14 and 15 which respectively concern “Other 
mining and quarrying” and “Manufacture of food products and beverages”.  
 
Table A.II.2.1 shows how countries have aggregated the different NACE2 sectors. All groups 
which seem incoherent in terms of economic analysis appear in red in the table.  
Table A.II.2.1. Number of firms by country and sector 
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   Countries 
  Nace2_N  BE  BG  CZ  DE EE  ES  GR  HU IS  LT  LV  NO  PT  RO  SK Total 
10        11  41                                   52 
10_11                             15           45  9  69 
10_11_12     21                                         21 
10_11_13                 32                 68           100 
10_11_14              34                                34 
10_14  12                             25              37 
11_12_14        40                                      40 
11_14                    24                          24 
12_13                                         15     15 
13_14     87                                21     15  123 
Mining and 
quarrying 
14                 142           11     39  21  51     264 
  14_15                          175                   175 
15  42  1354 120 145 172      213 70      188  114  133 93 868 38  3550 
15_15                                      57        57 





  16     30  2  3                             8     43 
17  32  262  87 57 64 321 100  37     63 43 53  104  296  49 1568 
17_18                          15                    15 
18  11  1293 153 27 154 299  149 77      116 81      100  948 82  3490 








  19     186  28  16  30  228  45  33     20  17     52  340  47  1042 
  19_20  16                                            16 
20  6  280  88  29      282  14  20      102  220  139 65 351 58  1654 
20_21              234                                234 
20_21_22                          40                    40 










E  BG  CZ  DE  EE  ES  GR  HU IS  LT  LV  NO  PT  RO  SK  Total 
  22_23  40  244                       27              43  354 
23        5  17                             11     33 
23_24              28  392  67           10              497 
24  99  180  48  107           25     29  17  71  57  135  32  800 










products   26  36  263 108 88 61 416 92 21     63  38  74 83 211 60 1614 
  26_27                          25                    25 
27  46  88  50  56     224  21  10           65  42  83  24  709 
27_28              141              56  84              281 
Metallurgy 
 




8 489 136 253 57 368  69 67  16 41  49  176 57 275  141  2302 
30  6  15  15  13     37                    3  9     98 
30_31              31     20  19        22  57        72  221 
31  37  166  88  106     196  9  16     16        47  93     774 
31_33                          11                    11 
32  14  59  42 37 19  144 4 18     12  8  44 25 30 18 474 
Electronics 
33  18  84  39  83     107  8  16        17  55  28  47  27  529 
  33_34              25              32                 57 
34  30  44  76  48     191  2  15           46  67  79     598 






eqpt  35  12  58  29 29 23  152 28 5    15      158  35 84      628 
Manufacture 
of furniture  36  14     92  56  35  490     5     51  76  107  64  374     1364 
  36_37     371        60        26  18                 64  539 
  36_40_41                    91                          91 
Recycling   37  5     34  14     36           9  9  26  13  57     203 
Electricity,  40     61  34  70  90  47     28  4  39        7  90     470 
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40_41  6                             66  138        37  247  gas, steam 










trade  51 
17
9 2297 761 270 392 526 105 95  116 338 340 237 160 946 279 7041 
60     651  110  85  207  261     21     222  92  98  74  367     2188 
60_61                                55              55 
60_61_62  79                 22  33  25                 70  229 
61           23     11              1  120     28     183 
61_62     25  5     13              10        13        66 
62           5     13                 17     9     44 
62_63                                132              132 
Transport 
63  23 213  97 171  129 183  46 21  23 53      210 54 114 11 1348 
  63_64                                            22  22 
Postes et 
telecomm.  64  15  106 18 45 18  126 14 6    24 27 41 15 67      522 
  64 65 66 
67                          49                    49 
65  41  65  65  97  15  69  8        12  32  105  52  47  17  625 
65_66_67                       17                       17 
66  3  27  37  43     90  12        21  15  38  24  32  15  357 
66_67              20                                20 
Finance and 
insurance 
67  24  53  53  43     44  34        13  8  42  23  13  4  354 
Computer  72  72     133  105     266  38  14     29  32  21  20  250  35  1015 
  72_73     160        45           47        234  17        503 
R&D  73  8     25  64     89     16     14  23        187  26  452 
Other 
business 




73  10279 3300 2906 2384 8024 1543 951 680 1863 1993 3548 1804 7479 1734 49761
 
For this reason, we have built a new classification in order to study if innovation adoption has 
some sector-specific features. This new classification is based on the following constraints: 
-  it relies on the aggregation made by countries 
-  it is consistent with traditional breakdown, 
-  it excludes inconsistent aggregations 
This has lead to a new classification consisting of 20 sectors. They are detailed in table 
A.II.2.2 below. The most represented sectors (in terms of the number of firms recorded in the 
sample) are Wholesale trade, Manufacture of textiles, Manufacture of food products and 
tobacco, Manufacture of wood, paper and publishing, Metallurgy and Transport.  
 
Table A.II.2.2. Distribution between sectors 
Weighted CIS3 
micro data 
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Sector  Nb of obs.   %  
Computer   8472.4   2.7  
Electricity. gas. steam and hot water supply ; Collection. purification and 
distribution of water  
3605.6   1.1  
Electronics   11811.0   3.7  
Finance and insurance   7277.3   2.3  
Manufacture of coke. chemicals. plastic   14657.1   4.6  
Manufacture of food products and tobacco   24705.8   7.8  
Manufacture of furniture   9221.4   2.9  
Manufacture of motor vehicles. other transport  eqpt   4611.5   1.5  
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products   9385.1   3.0  
Manufacture of textiles. wearing apparel. tanning and dressing of leather   25518.2   8.1  
Manufacture of wood. paper and publishing   23066.1   7.3  
Mechanics   15843.8   5.0  
Metallurgy   26255.0   8.3  
Mining and quarrying   2379.9   0.8  
Other business activities   17119.2   5.4  
Postes et telecomm   1994.0   0.6  
R&D   1751.6   0.6  
Recycling   1340.1   0.4  
Transport   38480.8   12.2  
Wholesale trade and commission trade   63837.4   20.2  
Total   315381.3   100.0  
 
A.II.2.2. The role of Innovation at the sectoral level 
 
Before going into the details of innovation adoption we turn to analyze the level and nature of 
innovation activity across sectors. Industries and service sectors show very different patterns 
in terms of level of innovation (see Figure A.II.2.1).  The lowest rates of innovation are 
observed in Manufacture of textile, Transport and Mining. In these three sectors, less than one 
over three is engaged in innovative activities (in the sense of product, process, on going or 
abandoned innovations). Not surprisingly, the R&D sector is the more innovative one, for all 
types of innovations. Just behind R&D, computer sector faces very high rates as well.  
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More than three firms over four in these two sectors are engaged in innovative activities 
against 41.3% for all the sectors together. Electronics and mechanics follow, but with a much 
lower rates (less than two firms over three are innovative ones). In the service sectors, after 
R&D, Other business activities and Finance and Insurance are the most innovative ones. 
Product innovations are predominant in most sectors. Process innovations are predominant for 
only 6 sectors: Metallurgy, Manufacture of wood, Energy supply, Recycling, Transport and 
Mining. 




























Manufacture of coke, chemicals, plastic
Manufacture of motor vehicles, other transport  eqpt
Manufacture of furniture
Metallurgy
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
ALL
Manufacture of wood, paper and publishing
Manufacture of food products and tobacco
Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply ; Collection,
purification and distribution of water
Telecommunications
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Wholesale trade and commission trade
Transport
Mining and quarrying

































Heterogeneity between sectors also arises in the share of turnover due to innovation (see 
Figure A.II.2.2). On average, 30.5% of firm sales are due to innovation. But it raises 42.6% in 
computer sector, and on the opposite it represents only 18.3% in Mining and quarrying. 
Innovative sales appear to be particularly low in service sectors. Finance and insurance, 
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identified as relatively strongly innovative is one of the sectors in which innovative sales are 
the lowest (less than 25% of turnover is due to innovation). Other important service sectors, 
Wholesales trade and Transport, face also a relatively low share of innovative sales.  
 
 


























Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, tanning and dressing
of leather










Wholesale trade and commission trade
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
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A.II.2.3. Magnitude of Innovation Adoption 
 
Several sector specific features may be highlighted when we look at innovation adoption and 
not just general innovation. We first focus on the share of adopting firms and then we 
consider the share of sales due to innovation within adopting firms. 
 
Share of adopting firms 
Two main sectors can be identified as important actors of adoption (see Table A.II.2.3): 
Electricity and Finance and Insurance. These two sectors have the highest rates of adoption, 
whatever the definition. According to the broad definition of adoption, more than one 
innovative firm over two in these sectors is engaged in innovation adoption. On the opposite, 
some sectors do not rely strongly on innovation adoption. This is the case for two different 
kinds of sectors. The first set of sectors concerns high innovative ones: Computer, R&D, 
Mechanics, and to a lesser extent, Electronics. In these highly innovative sectors, innovation 
is mainly based on product and process innovations developed mainly within the firm. 
Therefore their high rates of innovation do not lead to high rates of adoption. The second set 
of sectors concerns conversely industries with few innovation activities: Mining and 
Manufacture of textile. In this case, the low level of innovation is general. It concerns at the 
same time the innovation developed within the firms and the innovation adopted from others 
or in collaboration with others, leading to low adoption rates.  
 
The rates of adoption vary slightly according to the definition. This is the case in particular 
for Manufacture of wood and Recycling. Their adoption rate according to the restrictive 
definition of adoption (based on the item “New to the firm only”) is low, whereas their 
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Table A.II.2.3. Innovation Adoption 
  “New to the firm” 
adoption 
Broad definition of 
adoption 








Computer   344.7  5.4%  1859.0  29.0% 
Electricity. gas. steam and hot water supply   338.0  25.7%  833.4  63.4% 
Electronics   605.0  8.3%  2149.3  29.6% 
Finance and insurance   903.8  22.2%  2160.1  52.9% 
Manufacture of coke. chemicals. plastic   893.7  11.1%  2598.8  32.4% 
Manufacture of food products and tobacco   698.5  7.6%  2996.7  32.7% 
Manufacture of furniture   267.0  6.2%  1266.9  29.6% 
Manufacture of motor vehicles. other 
transport  eqpt  
145.8 6.6% 827.2 37.2% 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
products  
632.5 16.3%  1724.5 44.4% 
Manufacture of textiles   348.8  5.1%  2405.5  35.5% 
Manufacture of wood. paper and publishing   1285.6  14.1%  4688.2  51.3% 
Mechanics   844.0  8.8%  2985.7  31.2% 
Metallurgy    1135.8 10.4% 4293.3  39.4% 
Mining and quarrying   31.1  4.6%  183.1  27.4% 
Other business activities   1393.1  13.5%  3447.4  33.5% 
Postes et telecomm   74.7  10.6%  234.5  33.3% 
R&D   85.6  6.3%  464.3  34.4% 
Recycling   31.8  6.9%  253.0  54.9% 
Transport    1950.8 18.0% 5155.9  47.6% 
Wholesale trade and commission trade   3374.7  15.9%  10710.6  50.4% 
ALL    15518.9  11.9  51862.1  39.9 
 
Share of sales due to adoption of innovation 
Once again, the picture is very different once adoption is accounted for by the share of sales 
(see Figure A.II.2.3). Clearly, the adoption of innovation produces a positive impact on the 
turnover of firms belonging to the industry of transport (Manufacture of motor vehicles and 
other transport equipment). In this industry, firms engaged in innovation adoption declare that 
45% of their sales are due to innovation. If we compare with Figure A.II.2.2, this is larger 
than the share of sales due to innovation in this whole sector (35.4%). This means that the 
impact of innovation on turnover is particularly high when innovation is based on adoption. 
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On the contrary, most sectors have lower share of sales due to innovation when we focus on 
adopting firms. This means that the impact of innovation on turnover is higher when 
innovation does not rely on adoption. This is the case for the whole sample (for which the 
share of sales fall from 30.5% to 27.1% when only adopting firms are considered) and 
especially for Computer, R&D, Manufacture of furniture, Recycling. 
 
Service sectors are here clearly characterized by a low impact of innovation for firms that rely 
on adoption. Less than 20% of sales are due to innovation in adopting firms of Finance and 
insurance industry. Wholesales trade, as well as telecommunications, are also far below the 
average share of sales, with respectively 22.4% and 22.8%. 
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A.II.2.4. Nature of Innovation Adoption 
 
We can characterize sectors according to the nature of adoption that prevails within each of 
them. This is achieved first by considering product vs process innovation adoption. Then, we 
observe the differences between sectors regarding their level of cooperation. Notice however 
that the rates given bellow cannot be directly compared to those presented elsewhere in the 
report. Indeed they rely on ratios in which the denominator is the number of adopting firms, 
whereas the remainder of the report use the number of innovative firms as denominator. 
 
Adoption of product innovation vs. adoption of process innovation 
The Figure A.II.2.4 clearly shows sectors which are rather process-oriented in terms of 
innovation adoption
73. Not surprisingly, they concern essentially industrial sectors like 
Mining, Textiles, Food products, Motor vehicles, wood, metallurgy and furniture. Only one 
service sector is represented here: Transport. The other service sectors are either product-
oriented (Wholesale and commission trade, Finance and Insurance) or close to the overall 
situation (Other business activities, R&D). Manufacture of coke, chemicals and plastics has a 













                                                 
73 Notice that the rates recorded in this graph cannot be directly compared with the product and process adoption 
rates presented in Part II of the report. They are computed here as a ratio of the number of diffusing firms, 
whereas they are computed as a ratio of the number of respectively product and process innovative firms in the 
remainder of the report. 
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Figure A.II.2.4. Nature of innovation adoption by sector
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high (above the average)
                                                
low (below the average)
 
 
Cooperation-based adoption vs. other organizations-based adoption 
Sectors can also be compared by looking at how firms diffuse innovation. As previously 
mentioned, adoption may rely on adoption of product or process mainly developed by other 
firms or institutions, or on joint development of product or process based on cooperation with 
other firms or organizations.  
 
Although cooperation is the main vector of adoption in each sector, important disparities 
between sectors arise
75. Cooperation-based adoption concerns 47% of adopting firm in 
Manufacture of wood, paper and publishing (this industry is the only exception for which 
 
74 X and Y axis correspond to respectively indicators 4 and 5 presented in the part II.2.3.  The adoption rate 
corresponds to definition 2.  
6 Notice that the rates recorded in this graph cannot be directly compared with the cooperation-based and other 
organizations-based adoption rates presented in Part II of the report. They are computed here as a ratio of the 
number of diffusing firms, whereas they are computed as a ratio of the number of innovative firms in the 
remainder of the report. 
  257 
 
cooperation-based adoption is lower than innovation developed mainly by others), whereas it 
exceeds 87% in R&D and Recycling. 
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A.II.2.4. Conclusion on the analysis by sector 
rding to the product or process nature of 
novation adoption and the level of cooperation.  
abl .II.2.4. Classificatio eir  rison with the 
total 
 
The Table A.II.2.4 gives a sectoral typology acco
in
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NB: Countries have been classified thanks to
 
 a conformity test.  
, Textiles, Mining. Telecommunications is the only service sector in this 
ke/chemicals/plastics and 
Electronics, and one service sector: Finance and insurance. 
e can highlight from the Table A.II.2.4 a strong heterogeneity of profiles for service 
sectors. 
Two main groups of sectors appear: 
-  Process-oriented sectors with a low level of cooperation. This group concerns 
essentially industries: Wood/paper, Computer, Food products, Furniture, Motor 
vehicles
group. 
-  Product-oriented sectors with a high level of cooperation. This group concerns 3 
industries: Other non-metallic mineral products, Co
 
Finally, w
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Appendix II.3. Robustness check of our indicator of Innovation 
Adoption and discussion of alternative indicators 
 
This appendix provides a review of the indicators that could be used to measure innovation 
adoption. They are presented in the first point, with some illustrations of the usefulness of 
these indicators and a discussion of some of their limitations.  
 
Specially due to the impossibility to cross several items on Eurostat website, we choose to 
focus on a single definition of adoption, for which the double counting problem is less 
important. This said, we believe to be interesting to make some comparisons on different 
measures of  innovation adoption that can be derived from alternative definitions of adoption. 
 
Comparing the statistical results obtained by country provides us with some interesting 
information on the extent of adoption. These comparisons are presented in point 2 of this 
appendix. Notice however that these comparisons can be made only on the basis of the micro 
database, for which double counting problem does not occur. The number of countries is thus 
reduced to 14. 
 
A.II.3.1. Alternative definition of adoption and related indicators of 
adoption magnitude 
 
In the CIS, firms have to indicate whether their product innovations are new for the market or 
only new for the firm. Focusing on product that are new to the firm only will be more 
efficient to account for “pure” innovation adoption, since it considers only firms that adopt 
existing technologies, developed outside the firm. In other words, adding the “new for the 
firm only” item would ensure that the innovation already existed. 
 
Although it obliges us to focus on product innovation only, this definition provides us with 
additional information, namely the turnover associated to innovation. Indeed, firms have to 
indicate the distribution of their turnover due to “new to the market” and to “new to the firm” 
innovations. This distribution gives interesting information. It allows us not only to identify 
innovation adoption but also to quantify innovation adoption. This leads to the following 
alternative indicators of the magnitude of adoption.  
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A.II.3.1.1. Share of sales 
Following Mairesse and Mohnen (2002), the extent of innovation adoption can be measured 
by the share of sales due to innovation in adopting firms. 
 
Indicator A.1: Turnover * share of sales due to innovation in adopting firms 
 
This provides us with a measure of the magnitude of innovation adoption that can be observed 
at both firm and sectoral level.  
 
A.II.3.1.2 Share of adoptive firms 
An alternative method can rely on the share of adoptive firms. Two different ratios could be 
considered: 
 
   Indicator A.2a: Adopting enterprises / total number of enterprises 
 
Problems of interpretation will arise with this indicator when comparing countries and 
sectors. Indeed, the differences between countries or NACE sectors could be due to the 
underlying differences in the magnitude of adoption but also from differences in the intensity 
of innovation (activities or countries with higher level of innovation will exhibit higher ratio). 
So, we suggest using a ratio based on innovative enterprises only. 
 
Indicator A.2b: Adopting enterprises / number of innovative enterprises 
 
This will ensure that cross country or cross sector differences in adoption magnitude are not 
due to differences in innovation intensity. It also provides us with more tractable data. Indeed, 
the percentages are higher than with indicator A.2a and its variance is higher as well. 
Therefore, the inference made on this basis will be more efficient. 
 
This latter indicator is similar to the one used in the report which considers as innovative 
firms those engaged in product and/or process innovation activities, but also with “ongoing or 
abandoned innovation activities”). Compared to the share of turnover (Indicator A.1), these 
second kind of indicators are available at sector or country level only. This means that we 
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cannot build an indicator of adoption intensity at the firm level. In this case, measuring 
magnitude of innovation adoption requires aggregated data.  
 
A.II.3.2. Some comparisons of the different adoption indicators 
 
A.II.3.2.1. Overall comparison 
Table A.II.3.1 gives the main statistics obtained with the different indicators of magnitude. 
Sales are expressed as a percentage of turnover (this information being available only for 
firms that introduce product innovation). Compared to the share of sales due to innovative 
activities in the whole sample, the share of sales due to innovation in adopting firms is lower. 
For the whole sample, the average share of turnover due to innovation is 30.5% while it is 
27.1% here. This means that the importance of innovation (in term of sales) is lower for 
adopting firms than for firms that innovate mainly by themselves. 
 
Table A.II.3.1. Magnitude of Innovation Adoption 
 Indicator  A.1:  Share 
of Sales 
Indicator A.2a:          
% of firms 
Indicator A.2b:          
% of innovative firms 














Indicators A.2a and A.2b highlight that the definition based on “ new to the firm” adoption 
only provides us with very low rates of innovation adoption. 4.9% of the firms participate to 
innovation adoption according to this definition, meaning that their product innovations, new 
to the firm only, were developed in cooperation with other enterprises or institutions or 
developed mainly by other enterprises or institutions. This rate is higher considering the broad 
definition of adoption. Indeed, for 16.4% of firms, product or process innovations have been 
developed “in co-operation with other enterprises or institutions” or “mainly by other 
enterprises or institutions”. 
 
These low rates of adoption will be more sensitive at the country level for the less innovative 
countries. This is especially the case of indicator A.2a, computed as the ratio between the 
number of “adopting firms” and the total number of enterprises. Once divided by the number 
of innovative firms only, the rates are higher for both definitions (respectively 11.9% and 
39.9%), suggesting that this third indicator will be more tractable for econometric purpose. 
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These considerations lead us to favour in the report the broad definition of adoption and 
indicator A.2a of magnitude. 
 
A.II.3.2.2. Comparison by country 
Whatever the definition of innovation adoption used, Belgium, Norway and Bulgaria appear 
as highly adopting countries (see Table A.II.3.2). For the other countries their differences of 
ranking according to the definition used is higher. For example, firms from Iceland do not do 
much innovation adoption according to the restrictive definition of adoption (“New to the 
firm” adoption definition) whereas the magnitude of innovation adoption according to the 
broad definition of adoption for this country is among the highest. 
 
Innovation adoption can also be accounted for the share of sales due to innovation adoption 
(see Figure A.II.3.1 below). This gives a very different picture. Except Bulgaria that remains 
among the most adopting countries, the ranking of countries is drastically changed. In 
particular, Belgium, Iceland and Norway experience very low rates of sales due to innovation 
adoption. This means that even if the share of adopting firms is relatively high in these 
countries, the impact of this adoption in terms of sales is rather limited. 
 
Table A.II.3.2. Magnitude of Innovation Adoption by country 
Innovation adoption  “New to the firm” 
adoption definition 
Broad adoption       
definition 
Country Nb  of  obs.  Adoption 
rate 
Nb of obs.  Adoption 
rate 
Belgium (BE)  977  15,4  3170  50,1 
Bulgaria (BG)  151  12,6  535  44,8 
Czech Republic (CZ)  529  9,2  1937  33,8 
Germany (DE)  9901  14,4  27248  39,6 
Estonia (EE)  146  12,4  442  37,7 
Spain (ES)  1897  8,7  9062  41,5 
Greece (GR)  113  10,9  293  28,4 
Hungary (HU)  396  13,2  899  30,1 
Iceland (IS)  21  5,6  164  43,5 
Lithuania (LT)  87  7,6  376  33,0 
Latvia (LV)  38  5,1  271  36,2 
Norway (NO)  429  13,4  1454  45,4 
Portugal (PT)  639  6,1  4291  40,9 
Romania (RO)  82  2,2  1321  34,8 
Slovakia (SK)  113  9,8  398  34,3 
Total 15519  11,9  51862  39,9 
According to this indicator, we can notice the relative weak weight of the most developed 
countries. Belgium, Germany and Norway are representative in this sense with a high 
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percentage of firms practising innovation adoption and a low share of sales due to this activity 
over the total of their turnover (see Figure A.II.3.1). This would reflect the positioning of 
countries on the innovation life cycle. While developed countries would base most of 
their activities on the development of new products, less developed European countries 
would benefit from the adoption of existing technologies. 
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Appendix II.4. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) concerning 




The objectives of this PCA are to analyze correlations between various variables regarding 
the sources of information for innovation, on the one hand, and to describe European 




At the beginning, the database contains the 22 studied countries (see Figure II.11) and 9 
variables:   
-  SENT_HIGH : percentage of innovative firms highly using internal sources within the 
enterprise 
-  SGRP_HIGH : percentage of innovative firms highly using internal sources from other 
enterprises within the enterprise group 
-  SSUP_HIGH : percentage of innovative firms highly using market sources from suppliers 
of equipment, materials, components or software 
-  SCLI_HIGH : percentage of innovative firms highly using market sources from clients or 
customers 
-  SCOM_HIGH : percentage of innovative firms highly using market sources from 
competitors and other enterprises from the same industry 
-  SUNI_HIGH : percentage of innovative firms highly using institutional sources from 
universities or other higher education institutes 
-  SGMT_HIGH :  percentage of innovative firms highly using institutional sources from 
government or private non-profit research institutes 
-  SPRO_HIGH : percentage of innovative firms highly using sources from professional 
conferences, meetings, journals 
-  SEXB_HIGH : percentage of innovative firms highly using sources from fairs and 
exhibitions 
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After a first analysis, we have finally dropped the Iceland and the variable SGRP due to 




We can observe that the two first axes account for 83,88% of the variance, which can be 
considered as a good result for a PCA (see Table A.II.4.1). 
 
The correlation circle (Figure A.II.4.1) and Pearson correlation matrix (Table A.II.4.2) show: 
-  A strong and positive correlation between the two institutional sources on the axis 1 
(SUNI_HIGH and SGMT_HIGH). Countries that are at the left of the graph (see Fig. 
II.11) record a high level of use of these two kind of sources. 
 







1  4,736743 59,21%  59,21% 
2  1,973917 24,67%  83,88% 
3  0,69401 8,68%  92,56% 
4  0,300543 3,76%  96,32% 
5  0,168939 2,11%  98,43% 
6  0,063328 0,79%  99,22% 
7  0,051378 0,64%  99,86% 
8  0,011142 0,14%  100,00% 
Tot.  8 -  - 
 
-  A strong and positive correlation between the other external sources and information 
from competitors. These variables (SPRO_HIGH, SCOM_HIGH and SEXB_HIGH) 
are mainly present on the axis 1 and a somehow less on the axis 2. These 3 variables 
are generally well correlated with the institutional sources. 
-  A strong and positive correlation between internal and clients sources. Countries 
which are on the right of the axis 1 have a high level of internal source. If countries 
are also on the bottom, they record an important use of information from clients.  
-  The use of supplier sources is at the top of the graph. So, countries at the top of the 
graph exhibit a high level of use of this kind of information contrary countries at the 
bottom. This variable is only significantly correlated with client sources.  
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1  0,814**  0,433  -0,539* -0,461*  -0,591** -0,600** -0,655**  SENT_HIGH 
   0,000  0,050  0,012 0,035  0,005  0,004  0,001 
   1  0,561**  -0,415 -0,122  -0,381  -0,511  -0,515*  SCLI_HIGH 
      0,008  0,062 0,599  0,089  0,018  0,017 
      1  0,258  0,311  0,304  -0,045  -0,006  SSUP_HIGH 
         0,258 0,170  0,181  0,845  0,978 
         1  0,777** 0,916**  0,663**  0,733**  SPRO_HIGH 
            0,000 0,000  0,001  0,000 
            1  0,825*  0,405  0,487*  SCOM_HIGH 
               0,000  0,069  0,025 
               1  0,707** 0,769**  SEXB_HIGH 
                  0,000 0,000 
                  1  0,979**  SGMT_HIGH 
                     0,000 
                     1  SUNI_HIGH 
             
** The correlation is significant at 1% level. 




Figure A.II.4.1. Correlation circle 
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Appendix  II.5. Factorial Correspondence Analysis (FCA) and 




The objectives of this FCA are to analyze the correlations between various variables 
regarding the different modalities of R&D expenditures, on the one hand, and to identify 




The database contains the 19 countries (Austria, Luxembourg and Sweden are not included 
because of missing values, see Figure II.14) and 4 variables: 
-  RRDINX : amount of innovative expenditure engaged in intramural R&D 
-  RRDEXX : amount of innovative expenditure engaged in extramural R&D 
-  RMACX : amount of innovative expenditure engaged in the acquisition of machinery 
and equipment 
-  ROEKX : amount of innovative expenditure engaged in the acquisition of other 
external knowledge 
ROTHX (amount of expenditures engaged in training, market introduction of innovations and 
design) is not included in this analysis because this variable contains various types of 
expenditures. 
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A.II.5.3. Results of the FCA 
 
Firstly, we can observe that the two first axes account for 95,86% of the variance, which can 













1  0,1189 72,08%  72,08% 
2  0,0392 23,78%  95,86% 
3  0,0068 4,14%  100% 
 
Khi² test shows that the dependence between rows and columns is very significant (the 
observed value of Khi² is equal to 5,12E+10 and the p-value to 0,00).  
 
                                                 
76 The authors may provide more detailed information on the outputs of the PCA to the interested readers.  
 
Table A.II.5.2. Additional descriptive statistics on innovation expenditure 
 
Country INNOVATION
Intramural research & 
experimental 
development
Acquisition of R&D 
(extramural R&D)
Acquisition of machinery 
& equipment
Acquisition of other 
external knowledge
Training
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Appendix II.6. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) concerning 




The objectives of this PCA are on the one hand, to analyze correlations between various 
variables regarding invention protection methods and, on the one hand, to describe European 
countries according to the importance of these different methods (see section II.4.3.1), on the 




The database contains the 22 studied countries (see Figure II.27) and 8 variables: 
-  PAAP : percentage of innovative firms having apply for at least one patent (between 
1998 and 2000) 
-  IN_PAVAL : percentage of innovative firms being valid patent owner 
-  PROREG : percentage of innovative firms using registration of design patterns 
-  PROTM : percentage of innovative firms using highly trademarks 
-  PROCP : percentage of innovative firms using copyright 
-  PROSEC : percentage of innovative firms using secrecy 
-  PRODES :  percentage of innovative firms using complexity of design 




As a first result, we can observe that the two first axes account for 81,56% of the variance. 
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Table A.II.6.1. Eigen values for each components 
Axis  Eigen value  % explained  % cumulated 
1  5,427731 67,85%  67,85% 
2  1,097113 13,71%  81,56% 
3  0,726168 9,08%  90,64% 
4  0,372155 4,65%  95,29% 
5  0,202075 2,53%  97,82% 
6  0,10377 1,30%  99,11% 
7  0,04535 0,57%  99,68% 
8  0,025638 0,32%  100,00% 
Tot.  8 -  - 
 
The correlation circle (see Figure A.II.6.1) and Pearson correlation matrix (see Table A.II.6.2) 
show that almost all variables are positively and significatively correlated to each other.  
 
The first axis of the factorial map will allow us to identify which are the countries which 
heavily rely on protection (both strategic and formal), as all variables are well represented on 
the right of the axis. 
 
The second axis will allow us to distinguish countries relying mainly on strategic methods 
versus countries relying mainly on formal methods.  
Table A.II.6.2. Pearson correlation matrix and level of significance (in italics) 
 PAAP  IN_PAVAL  PROREG  PROTM  PROCP PROSEC PRODES  PROTIM 
PAAP 1  0,97***  0,89*** 0,71*** 0,55***  0,62*** 0,67***  0,68*** 
      0  0  0,000 0,007  0,002 0,001  0,000 
IN_PAVAL     1  0,89*** 0,63*** 0,53***  0,59*** 0,64***  0,67*** 
         0  0,0013 0,0091  0,0031 0,0009  0,0005 
PROREG        1  0,53*** 0,45*  0,58*** 0,56***  0,55*** 
            0,0097 0,0322  0,0041 0,0058  0,006 
PROTM           1  0,63***  0,40*  0,49* 0,45* 
               0,0012  0,0575  0,0171 0,0297 
PROCP              1  0,39*  0,37*  0,46* 
                  0,0648 0,0868  0,0261 
PROSEC                 1  0,82*** 0,86*** 
                     0 0 
PRODES                    1  0,93*** 
                        0 
PROTIM                       1 
              
*** The correlation is significant at 0.01 level. 
** The correlation is significant at 0.05 level. 
* The correlation is significant at 0.10 level. 
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Appendix II.7. Descriptive statistics by country and sector 
 
The distribution of firms among sectors in each country may, at least partly, explain the 
innovation and adoption performances of countries. In order to explore this issue, the three 
tables below record for each country respectively the distribution of firms among sectors, the 
innovation rates and adoption rates. 
 
On the first table (Table A.II.7.1), numbers are written in bold character when there is a 
specialisation of the country in the sector (compared to the all EU distribution of firms). In 
order to see to what extent these specialisations may impact on the innovation and adoption 
rates, two criteria have been applied: the country/sector percentage must exceed the EU one 
by 20%, and it must also exceed 15% of firms of the country. This second criteria insures that 
the specialisation could impact on the country’s overall innovation or adoption rate. Indeed, 
the strong specialisation of Norway in extractive insdustries cannot impact significantly on 
innovation performances. Even if innovation performances in this sector are low, less than 2% 
of Norvegian firms belong to this sector. This is therefore unlikely to impact on the averall 
Norvegian innovation and adoption rates 
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Table A.II.7.1. Distribution of firms by country and sector 
 
 

















Austria  0,80% 48,96% 1,08%  21,96%  14,25% 5,76%  7,20%  100,00% 
Belgium  0,46%  45,96%  0,15%  27,85%  16,25%  3,07%  6,27%  100,00% 
Bulgaria  1,07% 62,32% 1,18%  22,70%  9,83% 1,43%  1,47%  100,00% 
Czech Republic  0,67%  61,62%  1,51%  17,58%  9,00%  1,35%  8,27%  100,00% 
Germany 0,43%  42,57%  1,41%  18,83%  17,72%  3,10%  15,95%  100,00% 
Estonia  1,14%  53,07%  4,30%  20,09%  15,33%  1,56%  4,52%  100,00% 
Spain  1,09% 60,93% 0,58%  21,69%  10,36% 1,55%  3,79%  100,00% 
Finland  0,46%  53,60%  2,92%  16,86%  15,62%  0,00%  10,53%  100,00% 
France 0,84%  58,27%  0,47%  24,58%  0,48% 3,65%  11,70%  100,00% 
Greece  0,81%  81,63%  0,03%  6,11%  4,16%  4,17%  3,09%  100,00% 
Hungary  0,00% 62,54% 1,26%  19,43%  8,91% 2,07%  5,79%  100,00% 
Iceland  0,82%  45,39%  0,92%  25,52%  10,31%  10,42%  6,62%  100,00% 
Italy 0,75%  73,54%  0,39% 11,17%  8,11%  1,72%  4,33%  100,00% 
Lithuania  0,98%  40,81%  2,78%  25,02%  22,22%  1,54%  6,65%  100,00% 
Luxembourg 0,00%  24,10%  0,94%  19,26%  21,28% 21,79%  12,63% 100,00% 
Latvia  0,85%  48,37%  2,91%  24,42%  15,68%  2,22%  5,55%  100,00% 
Netherlands 0,36%  42,21%  0,33%  27,83% 15,92%  4,39% 8,96%  100,00% 
Norway  1,81%  45,15%  2,73%  23,94%  15,58%  3,76%  7,03%  100,00% 
Portugal  1,40% 68,72% 0,24%  20,25%  5,69% 1,85%  1,84%  100,00% 
Romania  0,75%  62,16%  1,37%  20,97%  8,96%  1,30%  4,48%  100,00% 
Sweden  0,36% 46,65% 1,51%  21,82%  14,19% 2,65%  12,82%  100,00% 
Slovakia  0,87%  54,92%  1,31%  26,59%  6,92%  1,68%  7,71%  100,00% 
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Table A.II.7.2 Innovation rates by country and sector 
 
 
Country Extractives industry Manufacture industry
Electricity, gaz and water 
production and 
distribution
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Table A.II.7.3 Adoption rates by country and sector 
 
 
Country Extractives industry Manufacture industry
Electricity, gaz and water 
production and 
distribution





Computer and other 
business services
Adoption total































































































































































































































Appendix II.8: Typology of EU countries 
 
In order to build a typology of the EU countries, a Principal Component Analysis has been 
made, based on the following variables:  
-  The adoption rate 
-  The innovation rate 
-  The total innovative expenditure (in logs) 
-  Human resources in S&T (in the labour force) 
-  The cooperation rate. 
 
The two first axes account for 72% of the variance, which can be considered as a relative 
good result for a PCA. 
Table A.II.8.1. Eigen values for each components 
Axis  Eigen value  % explained  % cumulated 
1  2,183  43,656 %  43,656 % 
2  1,422  28,441 %  72,097 % 
3  ,764  15,283 %  87,380 % 
4  ,385  7,694 %  95,074 % 
5  ,246 4,926  %  100% 
 
 
From correlation matrix and correlation circle, we can see that: 
 
-  Innovation rate is positively and significant correlated with R&D expenditures and 
human resources in S&T. These variables are well represented on the first axis. The 
adoption rate is also well represented on the first axis. 
-  The cooperation rate is well represented on axis 2. 
-  The human resources in S&T are well represented on the two axes.   
 
Table A.II.8.2. Pearson correlation matrix and level of significance (in italics) 








innovation rate  1  0,277  0,604** 0,484*  -0,185 
   0,212  0,003 0,023 0,409 
adoption rate    1  0,314  0,226  -0,322 
     0,155 0,311 0,144 
R&D expenditures    1  0,294  -0,309 
       0,184 0,161 
human resources in S&T      1  0,379 
         0,082 
cooperation  rate          1 
 
** The correlation is significant at 1% level. 
* The correlation is significant at 5% level.  
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-1 -0,5 0 0,5 1
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Appendix II.9. Summary of the variables used in part II 
 
Table A.II.9.1. Summary of the variables used in part II 
Category Variables  Description  Type  Year  Source 
Innovation 
and adoption  Innovation rate 
Share of innovative firms (in 





Share of adopting firms (in percentage 





Share of innovatives firms which 
mainly cooperate for developing 






Share of innovatives firms which rely 
on innovation developed mainly by 
others  Quantitative 2000  CIS3 
Innovation 
and adoption  No adoption 
Share of innovatives firms which 





Share of product innovative firms (in 
percentage of the total number of firms) Quantitative 2000  CIS3 
Innovation 
and adoption  Product adoption 
Share of product adopting firms (in 





Share of process innovative firms (in 
percentage of the total number of firms) Quantitative  2000  CIS3 
Innovation 
and adoption  Process adoption 
Share of process adopting firms (in 
percentage of process innovative firms)  Quantitative 2000  CIS3 
Sources of 
information Internal  sources 
Share of innovative firms which use 
information from internal sources at 
high level  Quantitative 2000  CIS3 
Sources of 
information Market  sources 
Share of innovative firms which use 
informations from market sources at 





Share of innovative firms which use 
information from institutional sources 
at high/medium/low level or not  Quantitative  2000  CIS3 
Sources of 
information  Others sources 
Share of innovative firms which use 
information from internal sources at 
high level  Quantitative 2000  CIS3 
Innovation 
expenditure Intramural  R&D 
Share of expenditure for intramural 
R&D (in percentage of total innovation 






Share of expenditure for acquisiton of 
machinery and equipment (in 
percentage of total innovation 
expenditure) Quantitative  2000  CIS3 
Innovation 
expenditure Extramural  R&D 
Share of expenditure for extramural 
R&D (in percentage of total innovation 







Share of expenditure for training, 
market introduction of innovations and 
design (in percentage of total 
innovation expenditure)  Quantitative  2000  CIS3 







Share of expenditure for acquisition of 
other external knowledge (in 
percentage of total innovation 





Expenditure for innovation (only for 
innovatives firms and transformed with 
neperian logarithm)  Quantitative 2000  CIS3 
Human 
capital 
ressources  Education level 
Average number of employees with 








Share of labor force in science and 






% of innovative firms having 
implemented new or significantly 
changed organisational structures  Quantitative 2000  CIS3 
Cooperation Cooperation 
Share of innovative firms engaged in 
R&D cooperation  Quantitative  2000  CIS3 
Market 
features Competition 
Value-added as a share of labour and 









Index (from 1 to 10) of the importance 







Share of innovative firms with 
international market as the most 
significant one  Quantitative 2000  CIS3 
Market 
features Exports 
Share of export sales (in percentage of 





Index (from 1 to 10) of the importance 







Barriers to trade 
and investment 
Index containing information about 
ownership barriers, discriminatory 
procedures, regulatory barriers and 








Share of innovative firms which have 
applied for at least on patent to protect 






Share of innovative firms using 
intellectual protection methods (formal 





Index (from 1 to 10) of the importance 










Share of EU directives communicated 






Share of internal market directives 
communicated as having been 





The indicators are constructed from the 
perspective of regulations that have the 
potential to reduce the intensity of 
competition in areas of the product  Qualitative  1998 
OECD PMR 
indicators 
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market where technology and market 
conditions make competition viable. 
They summarize a large set of formal 
rules and regulations 







Increase/decrease of innovation rate 
between CIS3 and CIS4  Quantitative 
2000 / 
2004  CIS3 / CIS4 
Innovation 
and adoption 
growth  Adoption growth 
Increase/decrease of adoption rate 
between CIS3 and CIS4  Quantitative 
2000 / 







Increase/decrease of cooperation-based 
adoption rate between CIS3 and CIS4  Quantitative 
2000 / 








Increase/decrease of other 
organisations-based adoption rate 
between CIS3 and CIS4  Quantitative 
2000 / 
2004  CIS3 / CIS4  
Appendix II.10. Product and Process Innovation Adoption 
correlation matrices 
 




-0,547**  -0,375  -0,523** 
Barrier to trade 










0,015 0,1691  -0,1769 
Barriers to competition 
0,638 0,546  0,528 
-0,13 -0,2584  -0,0835 
Markup 
0,687 0,4173  0,796 
 
Human resources  Adoption  Process 
adoption  Product adoption 
0,226 0,302  0,033  Human resources in 
S&T 
0,3108 0,170  0,881 
0,0493 0,125  0,144 
Average number of 
employees with high 
education in 
innovatives firms  0,827 0,588  0,532 
 
Organisational 
changes  Adoption  Process 
adoption  Product adoption 
0,027 -0,040  -0,078  Firms with new or 
significantly improved 
changed organisation 
structures  0,904 0,861  0,737 
 
PMR  Adoption  Process adoption  Product adoption 
-0,636** -0,615**  -0,570**  Product Market 








expenditure  Adoption  Process adoption  Product adoption 
0,354 0,367  0,037 
Intramural R&D 
0,137 0,123  0,882 
0,112 0,159  -0,085 
Extramural R&D 
0,647 0,517  0,730 
0,015 0,292  0,160  Acquisition of 
machniery and 
equipment  0,951 0,226  0,513 
-0,006 -0,020  -0,111  Acquisition of other 
external knowledge  0,982 0,935  0,652 
-0,175 -0,129  -0,346  Training, market 
introduction of 
innovations and Design  0,473 0,598  0,147 
0,299  0,504**  -0,063  Total innovation 




information  Adoption  Process 
adoption  Product adoption 
-0,218 -0,056  -0,347 
Clients or customers 
0,318 0,801  0,105 
0,072 0,103  0,081 
Competitors 
0,744 0,639  0,712 
-0,095 -0,044  -0,284 
Within the enterprise 
0,666 0,841  0,189 
-0,002 0,161  0,053 
Fairs, exhibitions 
0,992 0,462  0,810 
-0,165 0,009  -0,406*  Government or private 
non-profit research 
institutes  0,452 0,967  0,055 
-0,048 0,054  0,060  Professional 
conferences, meetings  0,829 0,807  0,786 
-0,334 -0,116  -0,407* 
Suppliers 
0,119 0,598  0,054 
0,083 0,199  0,137  Universities or other 
higher education 
institutes  0,707 0,364  0,534 
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Transposition Deficit 
Index  Adoption  Process 
adoption  Product adoption 
-0,236 -0,438  -0,154 
tdi_agr 
0,461 0,154  0,634 
0,228 0,529  -0,134 
tdi_comp 
0,477 0,077  0,679 
0,062 0,116  0,243 
tdi_educ 
0,849 0,720  0,446 
0,455 0,347  0,619** 
tdi_empl 
0,137 0,269  0,032 
0,084 0,355  -0,047 
tdi_ener 
0,795 0,258  0,884 
0,205 0,284  0,114 
tdi_entr 
0,522 0,371  0,724 
0,317 0,327  0,128 
tdi_env 
0,315 0,299  0,693 
0,561* 0,779***  0,261 
tdi_health 
0,058 0,003  0,413 
0,660 0,553  0,526 
tdi_intmk 
0,019** 0,062*  0,079* 
0,223 0,116  0,482 
tdi_rd 
0,486 0,720  0,113 
-0,095 -0,171  -0,282 
tdi_tax 
0,770 0,595  0,375 
0,520* 0,681**  0,309 
tdi_tot  0,083 0,015  0,328 
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0,1937 0,2739  -0,008  Apply to at least one 
patent to protect 
inventions 
0,3878 0,2173  0,9718 
0,1402 0,3093  -0,065  Registration of design 
patterns  0,5338 0,1613  0,7739 
-0,0577 0,0016  -0,0436 
Trademarks  0,7987 0,9945  0,8471 
-0,0673 0,1348  -0,1348 
Copyright  0,7661 0,5499  0,5499 
0,3059 0,2951  0,1664 
Secrecy  0,1662 0,1824  0,4592 
0,363*  0,2825 0,1447 
Complexity of design  0,0969  0,2027 0,5206 
0,3884 0,391  0,1151  Lead-time advantage 
on competitors  0,0741 0,0719  0,6099 
0,0577 0,0869  -0,1779 
Valid patent owner  0,7986 0,7005  0,4284 
0,2271 0,2744  -0,0152  Valid patent owner for 
innovatives firms only  0,3095 0,2165  0,9464 
0,295 0,2457  -0,0711  Security of property 
rights index  0,2504 0,3418  0,7861 
 
Number in italics are p-values. 
* Significant to the level of 10% 
** Significant to the level of 5% 
*** Significant to the level of 1%  
Appendices of Part III 
 
Appendix III.1. Determinants of trade 
 
Table A.III.1. Determinants of trade 
Dependent Variable: ln 
TRADE         
  (i) (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi) 
         
Log Turnover  1.143  0.883 1.078 1.108 1.157 1.404 
  (7.62)***  (9.86)*** (6.62)*** (6.61)*** (7.60)*** (7.39)*** 
Involvement in 
Business Operation  -0.823       -0.828  -0.179 
  (3.34)***       (3.34)***  -0.52 
Freedom to Trade  1.335  1.247 1.732 1.554 1.249 2.624 
  (3.09)***  (5.03)*** (3.63)*** (2.94)*** (2.76)*** (3.94)*** 
Mainly international 
Market (% of innov. firms)    4.224   1.79  1.273  
   (3.15)***    -0.8  -0.65  
Product Market Regulation     -0.35  -0.513     
     (-0.65)  (-0.88)    
TDI Int. Market         -0.068 
         - 0 . 4  
DUMMY  yes  yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant  -14.117  -10.471 -17.427 -16.621 -13.935 -26.133 
  (4.28)**  (4.53)*** (4.63)*** (4.26)*** (4.20)***  (-1.6) 
Observations  80  125  80 80 80 58 
R-squared  0.83 0.76  0.8  0.8  0.83  0.84 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
***, ** and * significant at 1, 5 and 10 % 




Appendix III.2. Determinants of Cooperation 
 
Table A.III.2. Determinants of Cooperation 
Dependent variable: 
Cooperation Across EU firms       
Cooperation within 
firms of 
the same country 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi) 
            
Most People Can 
Be Trusted % 
(TRUST) 
0.276 0.243 0.123 0.281 0.281  0.391 
 (4.22)***  (3.34)***  (1.46)  (3.34)***  (4.22)***  (3.35)*** 
Regulatory and 
Administrative Opacitity  -0.036 -0.011 0.005 -0.023 -0.039  -0.051 
 (-2.86)***  (-0.458)  (0.42)  (-1.63)  (-2.96)**  (-2.26)** 
Science and technology 
graduates  0.008 0.006    0.005 0.008  0.016 
 (3.31)***  (2.50)**    (1.86)*  (3.19)***  (3.64*** 
Log GVA sector  -0.044  -0.007  -0.038    -0.048  -0.064 
 (-5.30)***  (-3.20)***  (-3.67)***    (-4.66)***  (-4.33)*** 
TDI Education    -0.001         
   (-1.14)         
EMPHI share             
            
Youth Education Attainment 
Level Total     0.001      
     (1.41)       
Log Turnover        -0.023     
       (-2.83)**     
Organizational Changes          -0.000   
         (-0.57)   
Group         0.000   
         (1.00)   
            
DUMMY yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Constant 0.50  0.071  0.058  0.085  0.550  -0.81 
 (5.50)***  (-0.9)  (-1.1)  (-1.13)  (5.10)***  (5.01)*** 
            
Observations 69  56  76  73  69 69 
R-squared 0.51  0.58  0.38  0.34  0.52  0.43 
t statistics in parentheses 
***, ** and * significant at 1, 5 and 10 % 
Sectoral Dummies are inserted in all regressions 
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Appendix III.3. Determinants of Competition 
 
Table A.III.3. Determinants of Competition 
Dependent variable: Mark up       
  (i)  (ii) (iii) (iv)  (v) 
       
TDI Competition  -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 
  (-6.32)*** (-3.12)*** (-3.15)*** (-6.06)*** (-3.68)*** 
State Control  0.016 0.031 0.022 0.028 0.043 
  (1.52) (2.40)** -1.54 (2.67)***  (4.46)*** 
Sectoral and ad hoc State Aid  
as a % of GDP  0.077      0.023 
  (3.29)***       -1.09 
Transfers and Subsidies from 
National govts. as % of GDP  -0.039    -0.022  -0.035 
  (7.46)***    (-6.09)***  (-6.96)*** 
Log of number of  
firms in each sector  -0.007        
  (-1.23)        
Working days spent to  
deal with Bureaucracy  0.000      0.000 
  (1.89)*      (-0.03) 
Number of bodies to  
be contacted in order to  
open a Business 
0.005        
  (2.85)***        
Regulatory And Administrative 
Opacity   0.011  0.013  0.009  
   (-1.66)  (1.94)*  (-1.57)  
Barriers To Competition 
   0.026  0.022    
   (1.43)  (1.23)    
Outward Oriented Policies 
     0.037    
     (-1.5)    
Govt. enterprises and investment 
as a %of total investment       0.003 
       (-1.12) 
Log Firm Size       -0.007 
       (-0.85) 
Log GVA sector       -0.015 
       (-1.4) 
DUMMY  yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant  0.855 0.338 0.313 0.692 0.973 
  (6.94)*** (2.37)** (2.21)** (5.64)*** (7.60)*** 
Observations  76 77 77 77 61 
R-squared  0.7 0.44  0.46  0.63 0.82 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
***, ** and * significant at 1, 5 and 10 % 




Appendix III.4. Some explanations about variables used in Part 
III and their definitions 
 
A. Involvement in business operation 
 
“Involvement in business operation” is the weighted average of two regulation indicators 
coming from the OECD Product Market Regulation database (see Conway, Janod and 
Nicoletti, 2005). In particular (and as detailed in Conway, Janod and Nicoletti, 2005) the 
proxy for the Involvement of government in business operation is the weighted average of 
respectively Price Controls (with a weight of 0.45) and Use of command and Control 
regulation (with a weight of 0.55). To be more specific on these issues, as pointed out by 
Conway, Janod and Nicoletti (2005), the low level indicator for “price controls” can be 
disaggregated into 4 sub-indices: air travel, road freight, retail distribution and 
telecommunication. All of these sub-indices get a higher value as the perceived regulation is 
strengthened. Here below we give the detail description of how the indicator for price controls 
is computed by the OECD: 
 
Price Controls Indicator 
1. Air travel 
1.1 Prices of domestic air fares are regulated 
1.2 Number of 5 or 4 busiest international routes subject to price regulation (n) 
2. Road freight 
2.1 Retail prices of road freight services are regulated in any way by the government  
2.2 Government provides pricing guidelines to road freight companies 
2.3 Professional bodies or representatives of trade and commercial interests are involved in specifying or 
enforcing pricing guidelines or regulations 
3. Retail distribution 
3.1 Retail prices of the following products are subject to prices controls: 
¾  Retail prices of certain staples (e.g. milk and bread) 
¾  Retail prices of gasoline 
¾  Retail prices of tobacco 
¾  Retail prices of alcohol 
¾  Retail prices of pharmaceuticals 
¾  Retail prices of the other product 
4. Telecommunication 
4.1 Retail prices of digital mobile service in telecommunications are regulated 
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Along with price controls sub-index, also the specific regulations attaining the “use of 
command and control regulation” seem to negatively affect the turnover exported. Here below 
we give a brief description of the specific feature composing the use of command and control 
regulation sub-index: 
 
Use of command and Regulation 
1. General information 
1.1 Regulators are required to assess alternative policy instruments (regulatory and non-regulatory) 
before adopting new regulation 
1.2 Guidance has been issued on using alternatives to traditional regulation 
2. Sector-specific information 
2.1 Road freight 
2.1.1 Regulations prevent or constrain backhauling (picking up freight on the return leg) 
2.1.2 Regulations prevent or constrain private carriage (transport only for own account) 
2.1.3 Regulations prevent or constrain contract carriage (contractual relation between an otherwise 
independent hauler and one shipper) 
2.1.4 Regulations prevent or constrain intermodal operations (operating or ownership links between 
firms in different transportation sectors) 
2.2 Retail distribution 
2.2.1 Shop opening hours are regulated 
2.2.2 Government regulations on shop opening hours apply at national level 
2.2.3 The regulation of opening hours became more flexible in the last 5 years  
2.3 Air travel 
2.3.1 Carriers operating on domestic routes are subject to universal service requirements (e.g. obligation 
to serve specified customers or areas) 
2.4 Railways 
2.4.1 Companies operating the infrastructure or providing railway services are subject to universal 
service requirements (e.g. obligation to serve specified customers or areas) 
 
 
Again the sub-index of use of command and control regulation can be decomposed into 2 








B. Regulatory and administrative opacity. 
 
The two sub-indexes that are considered in the construction of this OECD proxy are:  
 
Communication and Simplification 
1. Communication
 
1.1 There are systematic procedures for making regulations known and accessible to affected parties 
1.2 There is a general policy requiring “plain language” drafting of regulation 
1.3 There are inquiry points where affected or interested foreign parties can get information on the 
operation and enforcement of regulations 
1.4 Affected parties have the right to appeal against adverse enforcement decisions in individual cases 




2.1 National government (all ministries and agencies) keeps a complete count of the number of permits 
and licenses required 
2.2 There is an explicit program to reduce the administrative burdens imposed by government on 
enterprises and/or citizens 
2.3 There is a program underway to review and reduce the number of licenses and permits required by 




Licenses and permits system 




(ck)  Yes No 
The ’silence is consent’ rule (i.e. that licenses are issued 
automatically if the competent licensing office has not acted by 
the end of the statutory response period) is used at all. 
1/3 0  6 
There are single contact points (“one-stop shops”) for getting 
information on notifications and licenses. 
1/3 0  6 
There are single contact points (“one-stop shops”) for issuing or 
accepting on notifications and licenses. 
1/3 0  6 
Country scores (0-6)  ∑kck answerjk 
Note: Missing data points: if at least two of the three data points are available, the indicator is calculated as a 
simple average of the available data points. 
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C. The public ownership proxy 
 
The The public ownership proxy can be approximated by the followings sub-indexes: 
 
The “scope of public sector” low-level indicator refers to the control exerted by the state on 
an array of industries. The more the industries directly controlled by the national government, 
the less the competition level (conversely the higher the estimated markup index). 
 
Scope of Public Sector 








16  Manufacture of tobacco products  1 
232  Manufacture of refined petroleum products   1 
27  Manufacture of basic metals  1 
28, 29  Manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment  1 
4010  Electricity: electricity generation/import or electricity transmission or 
electricity distribution or electricity supply 
1 
4020  Gas: gas production/import or gas transmission or gas distribution or gas 
supply 
1 
4100  Collection, purification and distribution of water  1 
50, 51  Wholesale trade, incl. motor vehicles  1 
55  Restaurant and hotels  1 
601, 6303  Railways: Passenger transport via railways, Freight transport via railways, 
Operation of railroad infrastructure 
1 
6021  Other urban, suburban and interurban passenger transport  1 
6021  Other scheduled passenger land transport  1 
6023  Freight transport by road  1 
6303  Operation of road infrastructure  1 
61 Water  transport  1 
6303  Operation of water transport infrastructure  1 
62 Air  transport  1 
6303  Operation of air transport infrastructure  1 
642  Telecommunication: fixed line services, mobile services, internet services  1 
6519, 659, 671  Financial institutions  1 
66, 672  Insurance  1 
74 Other  business  activity  1 
851 Human  health  activities  1 
9211, 9212  Motion picture distribution and projection  1 
 
 
The item referring to the “size of public enterprise sector” is instead given by the following 






Size of public enterprise sector 








Source  CEEP (1997)  Gwartney and Lawson 
(1997) 
 
OECD estimate based on 
A and B 
Definition of 
indicator 
State ownership in the 
non-agricultural 
business sector (overall 
and by sector) 
 
Size of government 
enterprises as a share of 
economy 
Size of public enterprises 
sector 




Index: scale 0-10 from 
largest to smallest size 
Index: scale 0-10 from 
largest to smallest size 
Coverage  15 European countries  115 OECD and non-
OECD countries 
 
29 OECD countries 
Criterion for 
scale 
  10 = less than 1% 
8 = only natural 
monopolies 
6 = less than 10% 
4 = more than 10% less 
than 20% 
2 = more than 20% less 
than 30% 




Gwartney and Lawson 
index revised and 
updated with CEEP data 
 
Finally, the item referring to the “direct control over business enterprises” can be 
summarized by the following: 
 
Direct control over business enterprises 
1. General constraints 
There are any legal constitutional constraints to the sale of the stakes held by government in these 
firms 
Strategic choices of any publicity-controlled firms have to be reviewed and/or cleared in advance by 
national, state, or provincial legislatures 
2. Golden shares 
National, state or provincial governments have special voting rights (e.g. golden shares) in any firms 
within the business sector 
3. Extent of the special voting rights 
These special rights can be exercised in: 
¾  merger with or acquisition by another company 
¾  change in controlling coalition 
¾  choice of management 
¾  strategic management decisions 
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  Appendix III.5. Determinants of Innovation and Innovation 
Adoption at micro level 
 
As we have explained in section III.5, we present here the detailed results related with the 
determinants of innovation adoption at micro level. The dependent variable measures the fact 
that the firm has adopted an innovation (product or process) or not. More precisely, the 
decision to adopt an innovation is estimated by means of a binary choice model. The profit 
associated with adoption is considered to be the latent variable. Since a measure of this profit 
is not available, we use a probit model where the dependent variable takes value 1 if firm i 
adopted a product or a process innovation (developed by others or in collaboration with 
others) and 0 otherwise. Adoption is assumed to occur if the associated payoffs are positive.  
 
For each firms, adoption is assumed to occur if and only if the expected profit, noted   is 
positive. So, the probability that adoption occur in firm i is . For each firm, 
the profit associated with adoption is given by: 
i Π
) 0 ( > Π = i i P P
 
(A.1)                i i i V ξ + = Π
where   is a function of all the characteristics of firm i likely to impact on the decision to 
diffuse.   is a random perturbation. We choose a linear expression for  : 
i V
i ξ i V
 
(A.2)               i i X V β =
where   is the vector of the observable characteristics of firm i  and  i X β  is the vector of the 
parameters to be estimated. These characteristics may be associated with the firms themselves 
( ) but also with their position in the market (Trade) and their propensity to collaborate 
(Coop), as well as with their country and sector specific features, hence leading to the 
following latent model: 
i ZID
 
(A.3)    i C i i i i i DUM DUM ZID Trade Coop ξ λ λ λ λ λ λ + + + + + + = Π 5 4 3 2 1 0
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The hypothesis of an impact of IM will be tested indirectly by looking at the sign and 
significance of the coefficients associated respectively with TRADE (Trade) and 
COOPERATION (Coop).  
 
Only innovative firms (in terms of product or process) are included in the sample, so that the 
absence of adoption cannot be explained by the absence of innovation. Therefore, the analysis 
focuses on the reasons that lead to adopt an existing technology or a process, instead of 
developing it within the firm.  
 
As for the explanatory variables, two sets of variables are considered. On the one hand, the 
channels (Trade and Cooperation) through which IM is likely to impact innovation adoption. 
Trade is measured by the level of exports of the firm (LNEXP), while cooperation is 
accounted for by a dummy variable (COOP) that takes value 1 if the firm has been involved 
in cooperation activities for its innovation. On the other hand, a set of control variables (ZID) 
is used. These latter are drawn from the theoretical studies detailed in Part I of this report. Six 
variables are introduced: 
 
•  First of all, the equation of innovation adoption includes the turnover of the firms, 
(LNTURN) in order to measure the firm size effect. As mentioned in Part I, we can 
expect a positive effect of this variable on the propensity to adopt a technology, via the 
absorptive capacity of the firms. However, a large size may also reduce this propensity 
due to a lack of flexibility.  
•  The absorptive capacity of firms does not only rely on a size effect. It is usually 
associated with the level of skill within the firm or with the Research and Development 
investment made by the firm. For this reason, we include in the equation the number of 
workers with higher education (LNEMPHI). We include the total innovative expenditure 
as well (LNRTOT). A positive sign is expected for these two variables. 
•  As detailed in Part I of this report, IPR may also play a crucial part in the way 
innovation is likely to diffuse across firms. The variable PATENT takes the value 1 if the 
firm uses patent protection and 0 otherwise. Note however that this variable is observed at 
the firm level. Therefore it cannot account for the impact of the IPR intensity that prevails 
in the sector. This variable measure to what extent firms with patenting policies are more 
likely to adopt innovation than firms with no patent policy. We can expect a positive sign 
of the associated parameter. Since adoption may lead to new innovation, patenting firms 
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may have more incentives to adopt. On the opposite, a negative sign may occur if there 
exists a trade off between own firm innovations and adoption. In this case, patenting 
activities may characterize firms that mainly innovate by themselves, whereas mainly 
adoptive firms would have a low propensity to patent. 
•  Adoption of innovation is also closely linked in the literature to the ability of firms 
to adapt their organizational structures. The dummy variable ORGA is introduced to 
account for this potential effect. A positive sign of the associate coefficient is expected. 
Firms that introduce organizational innovation would be more likely to adopt new 
technologies. 
•  The public financial supports have also been highlighted as a positive factor for 
innovation adoption. A dummy variable, labelled PUBLIC, accounts for this potential 
effect. A positive coefficient is expected. 
•  In addition to these variables, we also include in the estimation a dummy variable 
indicating whether the firm belongs to a group or not (GP)
77. Although the literature does 
not stress this point, it appears that this can affect the ability to adopt an innovation. On 
the one hand, one can consider that belonging to a group increases the opportunities to 
adopt technologies. On the other hand, due to the way our dependent variable is built, a 
negative sign may be expected. Indeed, innovations adopted from the remainder of the 
group are excluded of our definition of adoption. Therefore, if firms that belong to a group 
rely on innovation developed by the remainder of the group, this will reduce their share of 
adoption based on external innovation only (which is our definition of adoption). More 
practically, it is also important to control for this characteristic because some firm may 
have answered certain items refering to the whole group instead of the firm only.  
•  Finally, the set of control variables includes both industry and country dummies. 
These variables measure the net effect of all the industry and country specific features 
(Competition, IPR, geographical distribution, etc) that impact on the innovation process. 
 
From a methodological point of view, adoption choice is only observed by the enterprises 
which have decided to innovate. Therefore, our estimation is exposed to the well-know 
“selection bias” (Heckman, 1979). Consequently, we choose to estimate the probabilities to 
                                                 
77 This is an item from CIS. A firm belongs to a group when more than 10% of its capital is owned by another 
firm.  
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adopt new technologies following the method of Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981). This 
approach
78 applies the Heckman’s method in a context of binary endogenous variable. 
 
For this reason, we estimate three main equations. Equations (i) explains the innovation 
decision meanwhile Equations (iii) and (iv) explain the innovation adoption decision. 
Equation (i) can be referred as the selection equation. This model (i) allows for the calculation 
of the Inverse Ratio of Mills (IRM) for the computation of the model (iv). Equation (iv)  in 
Table A.III.4 is our main equation of interest. Equation (iii) is the model of adoption 
estimated by a standard probit method, without selection bias correction, in order to allow the 
comparison with equation (iv) including IRM. Equation (ii) is an alternative selection 
equation that was estimated to check the robustness of  equation (i). It is estimated to 
distinguish the effects of exports (LNEXP) from the crossing variables of the model (i).  
 
In order to respect identification condition, equations (i) and (ii) (related to innovation) 
include variables that are different from the one included in the adoption equations (iii and 
iv). Concerning identification condition, at least one variable of the model (i-ii) must be 
excluded from model (iii-iv). The variable EST is considered sufficiently correlated with the 
innovation decision but not correlated with the adoption decision. EST is a dummy variable 
indicating that the firm was newly established during the period 1998-2000. This variable is 
likely to impact negatively the decision to innovate. This is due to the definition of innovation 
retained in the CIS. It is clearly mentioned in the CIS user guide for the respondent that, in all 
cases, the innovation or improvement must be considered in reference to the enterprise. They 
may not necessarily be innovations or improvements for the market or relatively to the 
enterprises of your sector (or of any other firm). An additional item is devoted to product 
innovations that are new to the market as well. Therefore, even if some new firms are set up 
because they provide new product or process compare to other firms, these innovations are 
not new in reference to the firm previous activity. As a consequence, new established firms 
are unlikely to be registered as innovating in the CIS. A firm with only one or two years of 
life is indeed less likely to change its product or process than older firms.    
 
Other structural changes faced by the firm during the period 1998-2000 are also included. The 
variable TURNINC is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm increased its turnover 
                                                 
78 This method (also used by Sollogoub and Ulrich, 1999) include a heteroscedastic correction for robust 
standard error.  
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by 10% or more, due to merger with another enterprise or part of it. Similarly, the variable 
TURNDEC takes value 1 for firms that experienced a decrease in their turnover of 10% or 
more due to sale or closure of part of the enterprise. A positive impact of TURNINC is 
expected. The merger with another enterprise often goes together with a reorganization of the 
production process and/or with a redefinition of the firm product range. Conversely, the sale 
or closure of part of the firm is usually associated with a reduction phase of the firm activity, 
rarely associated with a dynamism in terms of innovation. 
 
Following Mairesse and Mohnen (2002), a size variable (LNWTURN) is also added in the 
model (i-ii). This variable captures the firm turnover. In order to make the specification of our 
innovation equation different from our adoption equation however, this variable is crossed 
with the industry specific effects. LNWTURN is thus the enterprise sales weighted by the 
share of sales generated by the industry to which the enterprise belongs. This measure of size 
reflects access to finance, scale economies, and differences in the organization of work. 
Therefore, a positive sign of the coefficient associated with this variable is expected. The 
group membership variable (GP) is included as well. Firms that are members of a group are 
expected to benefit, for instance, from intra-group knowledge spillovers and internal access to 
finance. 
 
This first stage includes also the variable LNEXP. The rate of export is known as a factor that 
stimulates competition pressure. Therefore a positive impact on innovation is expected. The 
other explanatory variables that are included in our adoption equation (COOP, PUBLIC, 
ORGA) cannot appear into this first stage. These variables are observed for innovative firms 
only. Similarly, the industry dummies are not introduced in these first stage equations. The 
correlation with LNWTURN is such that multicolinearity would arise in a specification 
including industry dummies. 
 
Estimations are first run on the whole sample. The aim is to study the determinants of the 
adoption of an innovation, this latter being product or process innovation. One can think 
however that the underlying mechanisms are different according to the nature of innovation. 
The IM may impact differently on product innovation adoption and process innovation 
adoption. In order to assess the very existence of such differences, estimations are then run 
separately for product innovation and process innovation. 
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A.III.5.1.  Innovation Adoption in both product and process 
 
The preliminary results are reported in table A.III.4 Innovation equation results are reported 
in columns (i) and (ii), while columns (iii) and (iv) report the adoption equation results, 
respectively without and with the selection bias correction. We firstly briefly comment on the 
innovation equation results. After that we focus on adoption equations, our main equations of 
interest. 
 
Model (i) and (ii) reveal that the firm size, measured by the firm turnover, weighted by the 
industry turnover (LNWTURN) as well as GP (i.e. membership of a group) exert a positive 
impact on the firm propensity to innovate. These results are consistent with those obtained 
in previous studies (Mairesse and Mohnen, 2002). In the same way, the number of workers 
of higher education level (i.e. LNEMPHI) influences positively and significantly the 
probability to innovate. A positive effect is found for the firm exportations (LNEXP). The 
crossing variables of LNEXP with the type of market – local (i.e. LOCMAR), national (i.e. 
NATMAR) and international (i.e. INTMAR) – suggest a greater benefice of exportation 
with a higher competition (i.e. NATMAR and INTMAR). This positive role of foreign 
exposure is consistent with the results obtained by Mairesse and Mohnen (2005). Using a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not the international market is the main market or not, 
they observe a positive and significant impact on innovation. Lastly, new established 
enterprises (EST) have smaller probabilities to innovate. The variables TURNINC
79 (i.e. 
an increase of turnover of 10% due to merger with other enterprise) and TURNEC (i.e. a 
decrease of 10% of turnover due to closure of a enterprise part) have remarkable symmetric 
effect, respectively positive and negative.  
 
From the model (iv), IRM is not significant. This correction captures some negative trends of 
intercept and the correction on the other variables is weak. Despite these results, we choose to 







                                                 
79 This variable also reflects a structure change and probably a need of new technology. 
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Table A.III.4. Total Innovation Adoption 
Variables Innovation 









with correction  
(iv) 
Intercept  -1.535*** 
(0.063) 














LNEMPHI  0.200*** 
(0.006) 










GP  0.190*** 
(0.019) 
























TURNINC  0.109*** 
(0.028) 
0.105***     
(0.027) 
nc nc 
TURNDEC  -0.105** 
(0.034) 
-0.105**      
(0.033) 
nc nc 
LNWTURN  0.057*** 
(0.005) 
0.023***     
(0.003) 
nc nc 
LNEXP*INTMAR  0.021*** 
(0.001) 
nc nc  nc 
LNEXP*NATMAR  0.029*** 
(0.002) 
nc nc  nc 
LNEXP*LOCMAR  0.014*** 
(0.002) 
nc nc  nc 
EST  -0.232*** 
(0.036) 
-0.361***     
(0.033) 
nc nc 
Sectoral Dummies (7)  no no  yes  yes 
Country Dummies (14)  yes yes  yes  yes 
Lambda  nc nc  nc  -0.210 
(0.148) 
Percent concordant  77.5 76.9  63.8  63.4 
Likelihood  -23996.31 -24027.49  -9223.66  -9222.63 
LR test (Beta=0)
80  9848.80*** 9786.45***  841.55***  843.62*** 
LR test (dummies=0)  2287.84*** 2323.87***  150.26***  152*** 
Observations  46010 46010  14445  14445 
Note : LNRTOT: Total innovation expenditure of the firm, LNTURN : turnover of the firms, LNEMPHI: higher 
education-skilled workforce, PATENT: takes the value 1 if the firm uses patent protection and 0 otherwise, GP: 
dummy variable indicating whether the firm belongs to a group or not, ORGA: dummy variable for organizational 
structure PUBLIC: public financial supports, LNEXP: exports as in CIS, COOP: firms cooperate in innovation, 
LNWTURN: Firm turnover weighted by industry turnover, INTMAR: mainly international market, NATMAR: 
mainly national market, LOCMAR: mainly local market, EST: dummy for new established firm. 
t-ratio are given in parenthesis level of significance: * 10%, **5%,***1% 
(Columns i and iii: without correction of selection bias. Columns ii and iv: with correction of selection bias)   
                                                 
80 The LR statistics is compared to a Chi2 with the number of constraints as degree of freedom.  
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Our results suggest that the variables influencing positively the probability to innovate 
influence negatively the probability to adopt a new technology.
81 
 
The global quality of the model is not very high. We succeed in predicting innovation 
adoption behaviour for 63% of the sample only. This statistic refers to traditional indicators 
based on Probit estimation. We consider the predicted value of the latent variable. If it 
exceeds 0.5, we consider that the predicted dichotomous variable is 1, and conversely, if the 
propensity remains below 0.5, we consider that the predicted dichotomous variable equal 0. 
We then compare it with the observed sample and compute the proportion of correct 
predictions.  The introduction of the channels (Trade and Cooperation) improves 
substantially the model. Several other specifications have been tested but none of them 
increases the explanatory power.  
 
The firm turnover (expressed in logarithm, LNTURN) exerts a positive and significant 
impact, supporting the idea of a positive size effect on innovation adoption. The coefficient 
associated with research expenditure (LNRTOT) has the expected sign. Hovewer, the 
significance disappears once the selection bias is accounted for. The amount of R&D does 
not appear as a specific feature of adopting firms, compare to firms that generate 
innovation. 
 
On the opposite, the number of workers with a higher education (LNEMPHI) has a 
significant and negative coefficient. This is consistent with the fact that only innovative 
firms are considered in our sample. Firms that do not adopt innovation are firms that innovate 
by themselves. Therefore, they hire a larger number of high skilled workers. Among 
innovative firms, those with the lowest number of high skilled workers are more likely to 
build their innovative strategies on external knowledge, and thus to adopt innovation 
developed by other firms. 
 
The variable PATENT exerts a negative impact as well. Firms that base their innovation 
strategy on legal protection are primarily those who generate internal innovation. 
 
The coefficient associated with the dummy variable GP has a negative sign, which was the 
expected sign. Firms that belong to a group have lower rates of adoption. This is due to 
                                                 
81 This result is also confirmed by the sign of estimated coefficient of IRM. 
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our definition of adoption. Within group adoption is recorded as generation of innovation, and 
not as adoption. 
 
The idea of organizational innovation as a pre-requisite to adopt technology developed 
outside is only partly confirmed. The coefficient of the corresponding variable (ORGA) is 
significant at a 10% threshold only. This does not mean organizational innovations are not 
necessary, but they do not play a very specific role on adoption compared to “internal” 
innovation.  
 
According to the positive coefficient associated with the variable PUBLIC, public financial 
support would provide incentives to adopt. Public funding of innovation would be efficient 
to foster adoption of innovation, more than generation of innovation. This could result 
from the type of instruments used by policy makers, but it can also result from a different 
level of incentives associate to generation and adoption of innovation. One may hypotheses 
that incentives to generate innovation (due to temporal monopoly power) are high enough to 
lead firms to produce innovation. Incentives associated with innovation adoption would 
conversely be more reduced, and public policies would have a more critical impact on firm 
choices. 
 
Regarding the channels through which IM may impact on innovation adoption, two sources 
are studied. The first one, LNEXP gives the amount of exported sales (expressed in 
logarithm). The negative effect of LNEXP is unexpected. Theoretical model as well as 
empirical studies have shown the positive impact of trade on innovation adoption. However, 
once again, we must be careful in interpreting this coefficient. Compared to innovations 
developed within firms, exports exert a negative effect on innovation adoption
82. 
However, the global impact on innovation remains positive. This interpretation is clearly 
confirmed by our first stage estimation. In the innovation equation, LNEXP has a positive and 
significant coefficient. Therefore, it appears that exports impact positively on both 
generation and adoption of innovation, compared to the non innovative choice. 
However, in the choice between adoption and generation of innovation, the level of 
export favours generation. 
 
                                                 
82 However, one should take this result with caution. The use of the micro database restricts the analysis to a 
subset of countries which, as we pointed out in part II, are not the EU-core countries. 
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The effect of cooperation on adoption is conversely positive. Among innovative firms with 
cooperation activities are more likely to adopt innovation, while non cooperative firms are 
more likely to generate innovation. This result corroborates the theoretical hypothesis. 
Cooperation is a powerful driver of innovation adoption. Note however that the potential 
impact of cooperation on the propensity to innovate cannot be addressed here, since the 
cooperation variable is observed for innovative firms only. 
 
A.III.5.2.  Innovation Adoption according to the nature of innovation 
 
Innovation adoption may be driven by different factors according to the nature of innovation. 
In order to evaluate these potential differentiated effects, this second part explores separately 
firms that introduce product innovations and those that introduce process innovations. 
 
A.III.5.2.1.  Product Innovation Adoption 
We consider here a sub-sample of firms, those that innovate in product (and possibly in 
process as well). This way, we are going to analyse the impact of our explanatory variables on 
the decision to adopt a product innovation or to develop it within the firm. Table A.III.5 gives 
the results obtained for the same specifications as in Table A.III.4. A selection bias arises 
once again in this estimation. Information regarding product adoption is available for product 
innovative firms only. Therefore, in a first stage, we should estimate the propensity to 
innovate in product. 
 
The equation selection (v) is estimated using all the observations in the sample. It differs from 
selection (i) since the dependent variable takes value 1 if the firm has introduced product 
innovation during the period 1998-2000 and 0 otherwise (e.g. if firm has not introduced 
innovation at all, or if it has introduced process innovation only). The lambda parameter 
accounting for the selection bias is not significant and the results obtained for equation (vi) 
and (vii) are very similar. 
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Table A.III.5. Product Innovation Adoption 
Variables Product  Innovation 
Selection eq.  
(v) 
Product adoption eq.  
without correction 
(vi) 
Product adoption eq.  
with correction 
(vii) 
Intercept  -0.977*** 
(0.048) 
-0.961***       
(0.166) 
-0.884***      
(0.119) 
LNRTOT   
Nc 
-0.024***      
(0.004) 
-0.020***      
(0.003) 




LNEMPHI  0.188*** 
(0.006) 
-0.043**      
(0.015) 
-0.040**     
(0.014) 
PATENT  Nc  -0.137***      
(0.034) 
-0.124***       
(0.032) 
GP  0.185*** 
(0.018) 
-0.147***       
(0.038) 
-0.139***       
(0.036) 
ORGA  Nc  0.060       
(0.040) 
0.053       
(0.038) 
PUBLIC  Nc  0.028       
(0.040) 
0.011       
(0.038) 
LNEXP  Nc  -0.004      
(0.003) 
-0.004      
(0.003) 
COOP  Nc  0.504***       
(0.036) 
0.504***       
(0.034) 
TURNINC  0.089*** 
(0.028)  Nc Nc 
TUNRDEC  -0.086** 
(0.034)  Nc Nc 
LNWTURN  0.004 
(0.004)  Nc Nc 
LNEXP*INTMAR  0.021*** 
(0.001)  Nc Nc 
LNEXP*NATMAR  0.029*** 
(0.001)  Nc Nc 
LNEXP*LOCMAR  0.016*** 
(0.002)  Nc Nc 
EST  -0.248*** 
(0.034)  Nc Nc 
Sectoral Dummies  No Yes Yes 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Lambda  Nc Nc  -0.001 
(0.022) 
Percent concordant  73.9 68.1 62.8 
Likelihood  -22495.67 -4476.78  -4933.63 
LR test (Beta=0)  6141.91*** 695.72***  721.30*** 
LR test (dummies=0)  1402.67*** 323.52***  359.04*** 
Observations  46010 11658 11658 
Note: LNRTOT: Total innovation expenditure of the firm, LNTURN : turnover of the firms, LNEMPHI: 
higher education-skilled workforce, PATENT: takes the value 1 if the firm uses patent protection and 0 
otherwise, GP: dummy variable indicating whether the firm belongs to a group or not, ORGA: dummy variable 
for organizational structure PUBLIC: public financial supports, LNEXP: exports as in CIS, COOP: firms 
cooperate in innovation, LNWTURN: Firm turnover weighted by industry turnover, INTMAR: mainly 
international market, NATMAR: mainly national market, LOCMAR: mainly local market, EST: dummy for 
new established firm. t-ratio are given in parenthesis level of significance: * 10%, **5%,***1% 
(Columns v and vii: without correction of selection bias. Column vi: with correction of selection bias)   
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They show that the prediction power of the model is higher than on the whole sample. 
Regarding the control variable, the effect of LNEMPHI, PATENT and GP are unchanged 
with a negative sign. LNRTOT becomes significant and negative whereas LNTURN, 
PUBLIC and ORGA becomes non significant. As for the channels of IM impact, the results 
are partly different to those obtained on the whole sample. The influence of export becomes 




A.III.5.2.2. Process Innovation Adoption 
This subsection assesses the impact of our explanatory variables on the decision to adopt a 
process innovation (see Table A.III.6). We consider here a sub-sample of firms that innovate 
in process. The selection bias we have to deal with here is due to the propensity to innovate in 
process. 
 
The selection equation (viii) does not differ from the one of product innovation. The 
determinants of product innovation are almost similar to those of process innovation, 
except LNWTURN that exerts a positive impact on process innovation, as it was already 
observed for total innovation.  
 
As already observed for the product innovation sub-sample, the explanatory power is slightly 
higher than with the whole sample. This improvement is however lower here than for product 
innovation if we consider the equation corrected for the selection bias (x). 
 
Several differences appear compared to product innovation. First of all, the size effect 
captured by the variable LNTURN is significant. Larger firms are more likely to adopt 
process innovation than developing them by themselves. 
 
Public funding is also significant. Public financial support would foster process adoption 
more than product adoption. 
 
Similarly to product adoption, the coefficient associated with the introduction of 
organizational innovation is again non significant.  
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Table A.III.6. Process Innovation Adoption 
Variables Process  Innovation 
Selection eq. (viii) 
Process Adoption eq. 
 without correction (ix) 
Process Adoption eq. 
with correction (x) 














































TURNINC  0.117*** 
(0.028) 
Nc Nc 
TUNRDEC  -0.060 
(0.034) 
Nc Nc 
LNWTURN  0.023*** 
(0.004) 
Nc Nc 
LNEXP*INTMAR  0.022*** 
(0.001) 
Nc Nc 
LNEXP*NATMAR  0.031*** 
(0.002) 
Nc Nc 
LNEXP*LOCMAR  0.017*** 
(0.002) 
Nc Nc 
EST  -0.378*** 
(0.034) 
Nc Nc 
Sectoral Dummies  No Yes Yes 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Lambda  Nc  Nc 0.001 
(0.019) 
Percent concordant  76.8 65.1 64.8 
Likelihood  -22556.51 -5734.57  -6340.55 
LR test (Beta=0)  8342.67*** 614.80***  653.24*** 
LR test (dummies=0)  2104.58*** 246.98***  257.7*** 
Observations  46010 12530 12530 
Note : LNRTOT: Total innovation expenditure of the firm, LNTURN : turnover of the firms, LNEMPHI: 
higher education-skilled workforce, PATENT: takes the value 1 if the firm uses patent protection and 0 
otherwise, GP: dummy variable indicating whether the firm belongs to a group or not, ORGA: dummy variable 
for organizational structure PUBLIC: public financial supports, LNEXP: exports as in CIS, COOP: firms 
cooperate in innovation, LNWTURN: Firm turnover weighted by industry turnover, INTMAR: mainly 
international market, NATMAR: mainly national market, LOCMAR: mainly local market, EST: dummy for 
new established firm. 
t-ratio are given in parenthesis level of significance: * 10%, **5%,***1% 
(Columns viii and ix: without correction of selection bias. Column x: with correction of selection bias)   
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Regarding the channel of IM, export is non significant whereas cooperation remains 
positive and significant. However the coefficient is slightly smaller than the one observed on 
product adoption (the marginal effects that allow to compare the value of the coefficients are 
respectively 0.119 for product and 0.097 for process, and the difference is statistically 
significant).  Cooperation would favour product innovation more than process 
innovation. 
 
A.III.5.2.3.  Cooperation-based adoption vs other organization-based adoption  
Our definition of innovation adoption relies on two different items regarding the way product 
and process innovations occurred. The first one refers to “innovation developed mainly in 
collaboration with other firms or institutions”, while the second one deals with “innovation 
developed mainly by other firms or institutions”.  These two items pointed two different ways 
of adopting innovation. Their determinants, including IM channels, may differ.  
 
In order to examine this issue, estimations are made considering as dependent variable the 
choice made by firms between the adoption developed mainly in collaboration and the 
adoption developed mainly by other firms or institutions. 
 
Therefore, two selection biases are faced. The first one, as in previous estimations is due to 
the rejection of non innovative firms. The selection equation is the same as the equation (i) 
reported in Table A.III.4. In addition to that, a second selection bias can appear as our 
estimation is conditional to the adoption of a new technology. Indeed, in order to analyse the 
way adoption occurs, we reject from the sample of innovative firms, those firms that mainly 
develop their innovations by themselves. To say it differently, only adoptive firms are 
observed in our final equation. Therefore, two selection equations are needed to account for 
the two restrictions imposed: only innovative firms, and among them, only adoptive ones. The 











YES Selection Bias 
 
 





Cooperation – Based Adoption  Other Organization - Based 
Adoption  
 
The second selection bias is corrected using estimation (iv). Consequently, model (xii) 
estimates the probabilities to adopt a technology developed by other organizations or 
institutions (model xi is estimated without bias selection to allow comparison).
83 In order to 
respect the identification condition, LNTURN is assumed to influence the choice to adopt or 
not only, and not the choice between made in cooperation and in isolation.  
 
The estimations are reported in Table A.III.7 below. Concerning the selection equations, 
LAMBDA is significant. The IRM captures unobservable effects included in the intercept 
suggesting that correction is needed.  The selection bias is positive, which means that the 
unobserved characteristics affecting positively the probability to adopt influence positively 
the probability to adopt product or process developed by others. Conversely, they affect 
negatively the probability to adopt by cooperation.  
 
Equation (xii) shows that several significant differences appear between adoption made in 
cooperation and in isolation. Four explanatory variables influence significantly the way 
adoption is made. The higher the level of highly educated workers and export, the lower 
the propensity to adopt innovations developed by others (and hence, the higher the 
propensity to adopt innovations by cooperation). Similarly, belonging to a group and using 
                                                 





patent protection reduce the probability of adoption  made in isolation (and hence, 
increase the probability of adoption made by cooperation).  
 
Table A.III.7. Cooperation-based adoption vs other organization-based adoption
84 
Variables  Total Adoption made in isolation 
without correction (xi) 
Total Adoption made in isolation 
with correction (xii) 




































Sectoral Dummies  Yes Yes 
Country Dummies  Yes Yes 
Lambda  Nc 0.817* 
(0.384) 
Percent concordant  67.8 67.9 
Likelihood  -3275.12 -3273.40 
LR test (Beta=0)  7062.26*** 513.47*** 
LR test (dummies=0)  182.56*** 187*** 
Observations  5599 5599 
Note: LNRTOT: Total innovation expenditure of the firm, LNTURN : turnover of the firms, LNEMPHI: 
higher education-skilled workforce, PATENT: takes the value 1 if the firm uses patent protection and 0 
otherwise, GP: dummy variable indicating whether the firm belongs to a group or not, ORGA: dummy variable 
for organizational structure PUBLIC: public financial supports, LNEXP: exports as in CIS, COOP: firms 
cooperate in innovation 
t-ratio are given in parenthesis level of significance: * 10%, **5%,***1% 
 
 
The correction of the second selection bias modifies substantially the level of significance of 
the variables that account for organizational innovation (ORGA) and cooperation activities 
(COOP). This means that, once the selection bias is accounted for there is no significant 
impact of these two variables on the choice between adopting innovation in collaboration 
or adopting innovation developed by others.  
                                                 
84 The selection  equation is not reported here because it it the same as equation as the equation (i) reported in 
Table A.III.4. Moreover, results for total adoption made in cooperation are not reported since they are exactly 




                                                
On the whole, concerning the estimated impact of the different determinants over the adoption 
of innovation, different conclusions arise
85: 
  
•  The size of the firm positively impacts on innovation adoption. But its effect is due to 
process innovation and does not occur for product innovation adoption.  
•  Firms benefiting from public funding have a higher propensity to adopt innovation, 
and more specifically process innovation. 
•  Organizational innovations are also positively associated to adoption, but weakly 
significant. 
•  Then several variables produce a negative impact on adoption. This is the case for 
membership of a group, absorptive capabilities (measured by innovation expenditure 
and highly educated workers) and exports. This runs counter traditional theoretical 
model as well as empirical studies. This is due to our specific sample that covers only 
innovative firms. The selection equation highlights that a positive impact occurs on 
innovation. Then, compared to innovations developed within firms, these variables 
exert a negative effect on innovation acquired externally. Therefore, these variables 
increase the global propensity to innovate. Among the different ways of innovation 
however they foster generation of innovation instead of adoption.  
•  Cooperation increases the ability to adopt both product and process innovation. The 
impact is however higher on product adoption than on process adoption. However, this 
variable does not impact differently the choice between other adoption made in 
cooperation and adoption made in isolation. Cooperation would thus be an important 
characteristic of adoption, whatever the way this adoption is made. 
•  Several factors impact on the way adoption is made. Higher education, legal 
protection (patents), ownership by a group, organizational changes, public funding of 
innovation and exports are the main drivers of cooperation-based adoption. They 
conversely influence negatively adoption made in isolation. 
 
 
A.III.5.2.4. Some ancillary statistics 
Here below we provide some additional statistics on the main variables that have been used in 
the second stage regression at a micro level. 
 

















Table A.III.8. Descriptive statistics 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Num. Obs. 
LNRTOT  4.970 5.93  0  22.179  29010 
LNTURN  14.275 2.213  0  24.532 47759 
LNEMPHI  1.747 1.473  0  10.073  47045 
PATENT  0.213 0.409  0  1  47759 
GP  0.215 0.411  0  1  48790 
ORGA  0.509 0.500  0  1  47759 
PUBLIC  0.070 0.255  0  1  47759 
LNEXP  6.500 6.723  0  23.981  45324 
COOP  0.293 0.455  0  1  14217 
TURNINC  0.110 0.313 
 
0 1  49064 
TUNRDEC  0.067 0.251  0  1  49061 
LNWTURN  12.805 2.463  0  23.869 47712 
LNEXP*INTMAR  3.206 6.005  0  23.981  45324 
LNEXP*NATMAR  2.239 4.855  0  21.184  45324 
LNEXP*LOCMAR  1.036 3.348  0  20.978  45324 
EST  0.048 0.215  0  1  49139 
Adoption  0.125 0.331  0  1  49139 
Product adoption  0.041 0.199  0  1  47759 
Process adoption  0.059 0.235  0  1  47759 
Cooperation-based 
adoption 








Table A.III.9. Correlation matrix 
  PDT  PROC  LNRTOT  lnturn lnemphi patent 
PDT    1.00000  -0.05189 0.19041 0.07171 0.06929 0.11667 
PROC  -0.05189  1.00000 0.33004 0.17034 0.12323 0.15420 
LNRTOT   0.19041 0.33004 1.00000 0.37525 0.34184 0.48220 
lnturn   0.07171 0.17034 0.37525 1.00000 0.53623 0.28196 
lnemphi    0.06929 0.12323 0.34184 0.53623 1.00000 0,26935 
patent  0.11667 0.15420 0.48220 0.28196 0.26935 1.00000 
GP                0.06511  0.09907  0.26198  0.43628  0.34948  0.24335 
orgalarg        0.09197  0.13301  0.20131  0.24156  0.26982  0.32270 
public            0.11644  0.21220  0.43136  0.19365  0.18986  0.27651 
lnexp             0.04567  0.10542  0.30857  0.38680  0.27701  0.26989 
CO              0.07918  0.06568  0.20683  0.15857  0.24090  0.18471 
 GP  orgalarg  public  lnexp  CO   
PDT    0.06511 0.09197 0.11644 0.04567 0.07918 
PROC  0.09907 0.13301 0.21220 0.10542 0.06568 
LNRTOT   0.26198 0.20131 0.43136 0.30857 0.20683 
lnturn   0.43628 0.24156 0.19365 0.38680 0.15857 
lnemphi    0.34948 0.26982 0.18986 0.27701 0.24090 
patent  0.24335 0.32270 0.27651 0.26989 0.18471 
GP                1.00000  0.16033  0.12970  0.23587  0.21217   
orgalarg        0.16033  1.00000  0.17534  0.10926  0.08850   
public            0.12970  0.17534  1.00000  0.16930  0.20948   
lnexp             0.23587  0.10926  0.16930  1.00000  0.16061   












Appendix III.6. Summary of the variables used in part III 
 
 
Table A.III.10: Summary of the variables used in part III 
Category Variables  Description  Type  Year Source 
Innovation 
and adoption  Innovation rate 
Share of innovative firms 
(in percentage of the total 





Share of adopting firms 
(in percentage of total 
number of innovatives 





Share of innovatives firms 
which mainly cooperate 






Share of innovatives firms 
which rely on innovation 
developed mainly by 
others Quantitative 2000  CIS3 
Innovation 
and adoption  No adoption 
Share of innovatives firms 
which develop innovation 





Share of product 
innovative firms (in 
percentage of the total 
number of firms)  Quantitative 2000  CIS3 
Innovation 
and adoption  Product adoption 
Share of product adopting 
firms (in percentage of 





Share of process 
innovative firms (in 
percentage of the total 
number of firms)  Quantitative 2000 CIS3 
Innovation 
and adoption  Process adoption 
Share of process adopting 
firms (in percentage of 







Weighted average of two 
regulation indicators: 
Price Controls (with a 
weight of 0.45) and Use 
of command and Control 
regulation (with a weight 
of 0.55)  Quantitative 1998  PMR OECD 
Internal 
Market 
Proxy Price  controls 
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